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Abstract
There are two central arguments in this project. The first is a kind of 
‘second-order’  argument,  that is,  an argument about  the dialectical 
situation  of  an  existing  argument  (namely,  about  the  ‘free  will 
problem’). The second is a straightforward argument about agency, 
but one which can be better addressed—I claim—once the second-
order argument has been made.
The  ‘free  will  problem’  is  widely  claimed to  be  one  of  the 
perennial  philosophical  problems.  But  it  is  not  one  that  has  any 
widely  accepted  solution.  The  reason  for  this,  as  others  have 
acknowledged, is due in large part to the wide range of problems 
that have historically been considered under the rubric of ‘the free 
will problem’.
My proposal is straightforward: stop talking about ‘free will’ 
altogether! More precisely, my claim is that we could—in principle—
eliminate the term. However, it may be more difficult in practise to 
actually cease using the term, and so my prescription is to define the 
term operationally, as a philosophers’ technical term. As I will go on 
to  explain,  ‘free  will’  means  something  like:  ‘whatever  it  is,  if 
anything, in virtue of which people are appropriate subjects of moral 
responsibility’.
The second argument then becomes apparent: setting aside the 
question of moral responsibility, we can see that there are a number 
of putative ‘free will’ issues that don’t go away. While most things 
can be sectioned off into the moral responsibility debate, as explained 
above,  several  of  these  issues  actually  turn out  to  depend on the 
concept of agency. This has not previously been recognised because of 
the structure of the ‘free will debate’, and especially because of its 
fixation on the notions of determinism and indeterminism. I then go 
on to sketch the outlines of  a positive account of  agency that  can 
independently  address  those  concerns  which  were  previously 
thought to be about ‘free will’.  
1Introduction
1.1 The Problem
There are two central arguments in this project. The first of these 
can  best  be  thought  of  as  a  ‘second-order’  argument:  it  is  an 
argument  about  the  dialectical  state  of  an  existing  philosophical 
argument, or group of arguments — namely, the ‘free will problem’. 
The second is a straightforward argument about agency. However, 
part of my claim is that the theory of agency that I am proposing is 
best addressed once the second-order argument has been made. I 
will address these in turn.
The ‘free will  problem’ is  widely claimed to be one of  the 
perennial  philosophical  problems.  But  it  is  not  one  that  has  any 
widely  accepted  solution.  The  reason  for  this,  as  others  have 
acknowledged,  is  due  in  large  part  to  the  wide  range  of 
philosophical  issues  that  have  historically  been  addressed  under 
the  rubric  of  ‘the  free  will  problem’.  These  issues  could  involve 
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anything  from  worries  about  divine  foreknowledge  to  the 
philosophical  implications of the latest  work in neuroscience and 
neurobiology on ‘free will’.1
In the following chapters, I begin by addressing the current 
state  of  the  ‘free  will  debate’.  One  of  the  principal  arguments  I 
make is that, strictly speaking, it would be possible to eliminate the 
term  ‘free  will’  from  the  philosophical  vocabulary,  without 
significant  loss  of  substance.  Nearly  all  of  the  important, 
philosophically substantial discussions could carry on without the 
term:  anything  that  could  not  be  thus  continued  is  likely  to  be 
confused, perhaps only a ‘verbal dispute’.2
With that said, I will not make much of the ‘verbal dispute’ 
claim. It is in any case probable that wholesale elimination of the 
term ‘free will’ is more trouble than it is worth, for reasons of clarity 
and  convenience.  The  point  of  emphasising  the  theoretical 
possibility of  its  elimination is  to  support  my claims about what 
‘the free will problem’ is really about. I suggest that, in most cases, 
 See John Fischer’s (1989) edited volume as an example of the former. As for the 1
latter, there has been philosophical interest—one way or the other—in what brain 
science means for ‘human freedom’ almost as long as there has been a science of 
the brain. For a recent example, see Tse (2013).
 For some discussion of the notion of a ‘verbal dispute’ see Chalmers (2011).2
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what is really at issue is the nature of moral responsibility — and it 
is  quite  possible  to  recognise  this  and  formulate  all  of  the 
philosophically  important  research  questions  in  such  terms  (i.e. 
questions about the various conditions or properties that one might 
think are required for this or that theory of responsibility).
Now, there are two points to clarify here.  First,  I  said it  is 
mostly  the  case  that  moral  responsibility  is  at  issue.  There  are 
certain areas where this is not true, and these cases are in fact more 
interesting to me than most of the cases in which it is true. In fact, 
the main point of this work is to draw attention to precisely those 
cases. More on this below. 
The second point to clarify is that I  do not mean that ‘free 
will’  discussions  are  really  about  this  or  that  theory  of  moral 
responsibility.  The proposal  I  make with regard to the dialectical 
situation of the ‘free will debate’—eliminativism notwithstanding—
is to define the term ‘free will’  operationally, as though it were a 
philosophers’ technical term from the beginning. As I will go on to 
explain in  more detail,  ‘free  will’  should be understood to  mean 
something  like  ‘whatever  it  is,  if  anything,  in  virtue  of  which 
people are appropriate subjects of moral responsibility’. To put it a 
little simplistically, the claim is that talking about whether people 
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have  free  will  just  is  talking  about  whether  they  are  morally 
responsible agents.
Note that ‘being morally responsible’, in the sense of ‘being 
an  appropriate  subject  of  moral  responsibility’,  does  not 
automatically  mean that  such  a  person  is  deserving  of  praise  or 
blame, or anything else. This will depend on whatever specific view 
of  moral  responsibility  that  you  hold  —  something  that  my 
argument here is silent on. It simply means that the person has met 
whatever  conditions  or  requirements  that  there  are  on  being  the 
kind  of  subject  that  is  a  possible  bearer  of  these  ‘responsibility 
predicates’ (if anything is). 
Note further that, even if one thinks that there is no possible 
theory  of  responsibility  that  is  adequate—i.e.  one  is  a  ‘moral 
responsibility skeptic’—then my theory accommodates this. In such 
a case, one is simply a ‘free will skeptic’. On that point, it is worth 
observing  that  many  of  the  recent  popular-audience  books  and 
articles concerned with the ‘science has shown free will to be . . . ‘ 
theme are actually concerned with the notion of moral responsibility, 
and the implications for our notions of responsibility that might be 
drawn from the emerging science of human behaviour.3
 See, for example, the neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga’s (2011) book.3
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After making the argument above, I do not in fact go on to 
build a  theory of  moral  responsibility.  Far  too much has  already 
been  written  about  that  topic.  What  I  do  instead  is  take  up  the 
question of what does not fit into the characterisation of ‘free will’ 
just  outlined.  I  suggested that  there  are  some cases  where moral 
responsibility is not the issue, and these are more interesting for me 
in what follows, partly because they have received comparatively 
less attention. In such cases, it turns out that agency  is the salient 
issue. This has not previously been recognised, for the most part, 
because  of  the  structure  of  the  ‘free  will  debate’,  and  especially 
because  of  its  fixation  on  the  notions  of  determinism  and 
indeterminism.
By making  explicit  which  parts  of  the  ‘free  will’  issue  are 
strictly about moral responsibility, we can group them together and 
address them in the appropriate theoretical  context.  By doing so, 
we  also  see  that  some  of  the  ‘problems  for  our  free  will’  have 
nothing to do with moral responsibility — but they do directly bear 
on  certain  questions  about  the  structure  of  agency.  Apart  from 
clarity and consistency, one of the advantages of this approach is 
that we can address those issues (i.e. those which are about agency) 
in  their  proper  context:  namely,  in  the  light  of  work  in  the 
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philosophy  of  mind  and  action,  and  also  recognise  that  issues 
pertaining  to  metaphysical  determinism  are  not  so  relevant, 
something  which  goes  against  the  prevailing  view  of  what  is 
important in the free will problem.
1.2 Overview of the Argument
In Chapter 2, I make the ‘second order’ argument in more detail, 
and claim that we could in principle do without the term ‘free will’ 
altogether. However, for practical purposes, I suggest we retain the 
term,  but  stipulate  its  meaning in  the  way already indicated.  As 
well as the practical benefits just mentioned, in this chapter I make 
the claim that much of the existing literature on ‘free will’ already 
uses the term in this way, albeit implicitly. 
I canvass a range of the most popular positions on the ‘free 
will’ issue, and show how they are ultimately concerned with the 
possibility of moral responsibility when they are writing about ‘free 
will’. I then turn to consider a possible counterexample to my view: 
namely  the  ‘semicompatibilism’  of  John  Fischer.  The  putative 
objection  is  that  Fischer’s  view  doesn’t  conform  to  the  way  of 
characterising the ‘free will problem’ that I suggest in this chapter, 
because he appears to be saying that ‘free will is not required for 
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moral responsibility’.  However,  my response to this is  to suggest 
that,  by  contrast,  we  can  see  Fischer’s  view  as  a  positive 
demonstration  of  the  utility  of  my view,  by slightly  reframing his 
discussion  of  ‘guidance  control’  and  ‘regulative  control’.  The 
putative  objection  thus  turns  out  to  serve  as  a  case  study  that 
supports my argument.
In  Chapter  3,  I  move  away  from  the  issue  of  moral 
responsibility, and pick up on the remaining cases in which moral 
responsibility is not the salient issue. In these case, as I have already 
suggested, we find issues that directly concern agency. In particular, 
a  central  feature  of  agency  that  I  call  ‘agential  control’,  or  just 
‘control’  for  short.  On  my  view,  agents  necessarily  control  their 
actions in this way, and thus agential control is a constitutive feature 
of  agency.  In  some ways,  it  might  be  better  to  think of  ‘agential 
control’  as  simply  being  my theory  of  agency,  although I  do  not 
make an argument for that identification here. It is enough to accept 
that agential control is an essential feature of agency. In particular, I 
consider two examples from the ‘free will’ literature in which the 
notion of agential  control is at issue. Traditionally,  of course,  this 
has  not  been recognised,  since the discussions have been carried 
out as though they were about ‘free will’ and not agency.
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The  first  case  concerns  the  notion  of  ‘sourcehood’  or 
‘authorship’.  It  is  sometimes  claimed  that  we  could  not  be  the 
‘ultimate  source’  of  our  actions  unless  we  have  ‘free  will’  of 
whatever  kind is  being promoted by that  philosopher:  Randolph 
Clarke,  for  example,  notes  that  by  ‘acting  freely’  we  are  ‘the 
ultimate  source  of  [our]  behaviour’  and  that  the  action  may  be 
attributable to us as its ‘author’. Traditionally, it has been thought 
that it is because of ‘free will’ that we are the source or author in 
this way, and that threats to such sourcehood are threats to free will 
(and vice versa). Instead, I argue that the best sense we can make of 
these notions is  as  central  features  of  agency — albeit  with some 
important revisions.  I  make this argument in the context of Derk 
Pereboom’s ‘Four-Case Argument’ against ‘compatibilist free will’.
The second case concerns the notion of ‘agent causation’. In 
the literature on ‘free will’ there is a type of argument that turns up 
in the debate between those who think ‘free will’ is compatible with 
determinism, and those who do not. My argument here is that an 
important  step in  that  argument  depends on an assumption that 
cannot be sustained when it is recognised that agency is the salient 
notion at work. Hence, making the distinction outlined in Chapter 2 
actually  has  implications  for  an  important  argument  in  the  ‘free 
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will’  literature.  I  conclude  with  some general  remarks  about  the 
structure of agency.
In Chapter 4, I turn to consider the notion of ‘agency’ in more 
detail. Whereas in Chapter 3 I suggest that agency has something to 
do with ‘causal integration’, here I go on to make that idea more 
explicit. To begin with, I survey some existing literature to try and 
get a handle on what the concept of agency, as it stands, actually 
looks like. I suggest that the concept has been put to a wide range 
of  uses,  and thus  we need some general  constraints  on  what  an 
acceptable notion of agency (for present purposes) is going to look 
like, that will  enable us to narrow down the possibilities.  To that 
end, I consider Helen Steward’s view of agency as a useful starting 
point for inquiry.
I take two important points from Steward’s work. First, I use 
her  discussion  as  a  springboard  for  considering  the  relation 
between folk psychology and agency, and more generally between 
cognitive science and metaphysics. Secondly, I  pick up on certain 
features  of  her  concept  of  agency,  although I  set  aside others:  in 
particular, the intriguing notion of ‘being a centre of subjectivity’, is 
a feature of Steward’s concept of agency that she names but does 
not go on to explore in detail (due to the fact that her main focus is 
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elsewhere). Thus, making no claims about what Steward would say 
about  my account  of  this  notion,  I  go  on to  develop the  idea  of 
‘being a  centre  of  subjectivity’  in  my own theory of  agency.  The 
upshot  of  Chapter  4  is  that  agency  involves  two  central,  and 
interconnected, notions that require further elaboration. These are 
intentional realism and phenomenal consciousness. I consider these in 
the following two chapters.
In Chapter 5, I consider the first of these notions, and unpack 
the  connections  between  the  concept  of  agency  and  that  of 
intentional realism. I take the notion of ‘intentional realism’ to be 
fundamentally  a  claim about  how we should understand human 
behaviour. It is associated with the ideas of ‘folk psychology’ and 
the so-called ‘belief-desire psychology’, because of its emphasis on 
the  common  sense  notions  of  ‘belief’  and  ‘desire’.  Jerry  Fodor, 
whose  work  I  will  briefly  touch  on  below,  has  been  a  vocal 
supporter of some form of intentional realism. 
For all the emphasis on the locutions of ‘belief’ and ‘desire’, 
however, the thesis of intentional realism is not strictly committed to 
those terms. Indeed, as Fodor emphasises, “the identity conditions 
for  belief-states  are  vague  and  pragmatic  in  practise;  perhaps 
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ineliminably so.”  What is  important,  in this  project  especially,  is 4
that intentional realism is committed to the view that a true account 
of human behaviour cannot do without intentionality (i.e. the terms 
of  a  ‘mature scientific  psychology’  must  be intentional),  and that 
such intentional states are causally efficacious  — i.e.  they figure in 
true causal explanations of human behaviour. Whether or not the 
specific  concepts  of  ‘belief’  and  ‘desire’  themselves  figure  in  the 
final analysis is of less importance.
I consider two primary challenges to the notion of intentional 
realism,  those  of  eliminativism  and  instrumentalism.  Although  the 
problem of eliminativism is fairly quickly dispatched, the challenge 
presented  by  instrumentalism  leads  into  a  deeper  discussion  of 
causation and its role in our concept of agency. Thus the discussion 
of  this  chapter  ends  up  turning  to  the  interventionist  view  of 
causation as offering a way of responding to the instrumentalist — 
but in a way that centrally involves the contribution of phenomenal 
consciousness.
In  Chapter  6,  then,  I  turn  to  the  notion  of  phenomenal 
consciousness and its role in agency. It was suggested in Chapter 5 
that it is a condition of intentional realism that there actually are the 
 Fodor (1992: 175).4
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right kind of interventions on our mental states, and not simply the 
theoretical  possibility  of  such  interventions.  In  this  chapter  I 
suggest  that  consciousness  actually  does  function  as  an 
intervention  in  this  way,  and  therefore  that  phenomenal 
consciousness becomes an integral part of the notion of agency. 
But showing merely that an agent’s intentional states can be 
affected  by  consciousness  (via  conscious  perception)  is  by  itself 
insufficient — it needs to be shown that such states make a difference 
to behaviour,  since otherwise there is an important sense in which 
such  states  are  epiphenomenal.  It  is  a  central  requirement  of 
Chapter  6  to  defend  my  view  against  the  challenge  of 
epiphenomenalism.
To that end, I consider a recent challenge of this kind that has 
been  called  the  problem  of  ‘Zombie  Action’.  According  to  this 
problem, consciousness is not, in fact, constitutively involved in the 
production of action. And this is precisely what my view of agency 
requires:  the purpose of Chapter 6 therefore is to defend a thesis 
that has been called ‘Experience-Based Control’. That is, the thesis 
that phenomenal consciousness is involved in the production and 
control of action.
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Finally,  Chapter  7  wraps  things  up  with  some  concluding 
remarks, and brings together the various strands of argumentation 
that have been considered thus far. I consider the claims that I have 
made about agency in the light of the original dialectical situation 
of the ‘free will problem’, and also note that the theory of agency 
provided is only a sketch  of a theory, and that much work would 
need to be done to make the theory convincing as an account of 
agency in its own right. However, what it does show is the potential 
avenues that are opened up by recognising the role that the notion 
of agential control plays in the existing ‘free will’  debate, and by 
considering it in its proper context, divorced from the constraints of 
the determinism-indeterminism-compatibilism backdrop. 
2The Problem of ‘Free Will’
2.1 Introduction
It has been observed that ‘the free will problem’ is really a name for 
a  cluster  of  related problems or  worries.  Such problems include 1
certain issues in the philosophy of mind;  concerns about physical 2
determinism,  reductionism,  and  mechanism;  inquiry  about  the 3
various  ‘reactive  attitudes’  that  belong  to  our  involvement  and 
participation  with others in human relationships;  whether agents 4
are ‘truly’ deserving of blame (and praise); and the justification of 
 As Dennett  puts it,  ‘the free will  problem’ is  really a name for several  related 1
problems that are “tied together by a name and lots of attendant anxiety” (1981: 
286).
 In particular, the work that begins with Libet’s work on conscious willing (1985); 2
see also Wegner (2002).
 See for example, van Inwagen (1983) or Honderich (1988) for classic statements of 3
the  concern  with  determinism;  see  Dennett  (1973:  157-84)  for  a  discussion  of 
mechanism — but of course, also see La Mettrie (1996 [1747]).
 Strawson (1962).4
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specifically  retributivist  punishment  (i.e.  over  and  above  that 
needed for rehabilitation).5
In this chapter, I suggest that we need to rethink our use of 
terms like ‘free will’  and ‘the problem of free will’.  As things are 
now, there is more heat than light in the literature on free will and 
moral responsibility. I am going to argue that we could eliminate 
the term ‘free will’  (and its various cognates ) from the literature 6
altogether without significant loss to the substantive philosophical 
issues.  While  theoretically  possible,  however,  it  may  be  that 
wholesale  elimination  of  the  term  proves  impractical  or 
undesirable,  for  whatever  reason:  in  that  case,  I  suggest  that  we 
move forward by stipulating the meaning of the term ‘free will’.
In fact, it is surprising that anyone believes that ‘free will’ is 
anything other than a philosopher’s term of art at this point: but the 
 See for example the debate between consequentialist views of justice and desert 5
based views. See (Feldman and Skow 2015) for an overview. Often, the discussion 
over  whether  desert-based  views  of  justice  (esp.  punishment)  are  appropriate 
depends on one’s view of ‘free will’. Libertarians tend to favour it, compatibilists 
don’t. In my view, this difference really turns on one’s theory of MR.
 Here and in the remainder of the text, when I write ‘free will’, meaning to refer to 6
the term itself, I mean to include all of the variations such as ‘free action’, ‘free 
agent’, ‘free’ and any other ways that the relevant sense of ‘freedom’ is supposed to 
modify other terms. It is this notion of ‘free’ that is important.
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proliferation of work concerned with what the ‘folk’ think about the 
term suggests otherwise.  It is supposed that we are constrained by 7
the ‘folk concept’  of  free will  when working with the term, such 
that we are in danger of failing to talk about free will at all if we 
stray too far from that folk conception.  Now, there may be some 
relatively  common  understanding  of  the  term  ‘free  will’  among 
people  without  higher  degrees  in  philosophy  (the  ‘folk’?)  — 
although I  doubt  it.  It  doesn’t  matter,  because the terminological 
prescription I am making here explicitly requires that we use ‘free 
will’ as a technical term, with the meaning of that term stipulated in 
the way that I will now go on to explain.
I propose that ‘free will’ be understood along the lines of ‘the 
conditions necessary for moral responsibility (whatever they are)’. 
So, for example, when we say that an agent ‘has free will’, what this 
means  (according  to  my  view)  is  that  she  has  met  whatever 
conditions are necessary for her to be morally responsible for her 
actions.  Acting  ‘with  free  will’  means  acting  in  such  a  way  that 
those conditions are satisfied, and a ‘free action’ is one that can be 
appraised morally — i.e. it is an action performed by an agent who, 
at  the  time  of  acting,  satisfied  the  various  conditions  for  moral 
 For example, (Nahmias et al. 2005); Nichols (2004).7
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responsibility  (whatever  they are).  I  do not  take a  stand here on 
what those particular conditions might be, although examples from 
the literature include: having a ‘reasons-responsive mechanism’, the 
ability  to  respond  to  specifically  moral  reasons,  or  having  an 
appropriate set of second-order desires.
The  utility  of  defining  ‘free  will’  in  this  way  will  be 
demonstrated  by  the  clarity  that  can  be  brought  to  various 
philosophical issues: indeed, as I will argue, most of the important 
work on free will is already concerned with moral responsibility, in 
more  or  less  direct  ways.  Hence,  there  would  be  no  loss  of  any 
substantial  issues  by  simply  defining ‘free  will’  in  this  way.  The 
obvious advantage is freedom from the task of staying faithful to a 
supposed  folk  usage  of  the  term  (what  it  ‘really  means’),  and 
uniformity across the philosophical landscape (i.e. no talking past 
one  another  because  of  a  slightly  different  understanding  of  the 
term ‘free will’). 
Finally, and most importantly for my purposes here, doing so 
will reveal a set of issues that are really distinct from the question of 
moral  responsibility,  but  which  have  been  run together  with  the 
above  concerns,  all  coming  under  the  heading  of  ‘the  free  will 
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problem’.  Hence, the lack of consistency with the term ‘free will’ 
obscures a distinction that needs to be recognised.
Below, I will survey a range of examples from the literature 
to support the claim that moral responsibility is already the main 
driving force in many of the worries about free will. Simply put, if 
you think  that  free  will  matters  because  the  possibility  of  moral 
responsibility somehow hangs on the question ‘whether we have 
free  will’,  then  you’re  interested  in  the  conditions  necessary  for 
moral responsibility — so it would be preferable to go on with the 
clear  and  unambiguous  project  of  determining  what  those 
conditions  might  be,  without  worrying  about  whether  those 
conditions are really ‘free will’.
Objection: You’ve got it the wrong way around. Yes, we are 
interested in  the  conditions  necessary for  moral  responsibility  — 
but one of those conditions, perhaps the most important one, is that 
we have free will.
Reply: I would simply point out that ‘having free will’ must 
amount to something that is describable using terms other than ‘free 
will’  (or  else  it’s  circular).  We  must  have  free  will  in  virtue  of 
something  about  the  way  we  are,  or  about  the  world  (or  both). 
Hence, we could even drop the term ‘free will’ altogether and have 
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a discussion about whether we in fact have this thing (X) — and, 
perhaps more importantly, about whether it really is X that grounds 
moral responsibility, and not Y or Z — without any significant loss 
of substance. For the sake of retaining the term, however, we can 
simply  stipulate  that  ‘free  will’  is  a  way  of  referring  to  those 
properties  or  conditions (X,  Y,  Z,  .  .  .  ),  whatever they might be. 
When we ask, ‘What is free will?’, we are thus asking, ‘What are the 
conditions necessary for an agent to be morally responsible for her 
actions?’
The only further objection that could be introduced against 
my claim here, which I mentioned above, is that I have neglected 
the question whether X (or Y or Z) is really what ‘free will’ means: 
whether, for example, ‘X’ is what the folk have in mind when they 
talk  about  ‘free  will’  or  ‘freedom’.  But  the  pressure  to  remain 
faithful to the folk usage of the term ‘free will’ is not a substantive 
metaphysical issue — it is not an issue that has anything to do with 
moral responsibility itself. It is a basically semantic question.
I do in fact think that such conceptual issues are important 
and interesting: in Chapter 4, I address the folk psychology of our 
concept of agency, for example. However, this is not what matters 
when one is engaged in the substantive project of articulating the 
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conditions necessary for agents to be actually morally responsible 
for  their  actions  (or  whether  it  is  even  possible  to  meet  such 
conditions,  or  whether  there  even  is  a  consistent  set  of  such 
conditions  to  be  articulated,  etc.).  These  are  substantive 
metaphysical,  and empirical,  issues.  These are the issues that can 
continue to be addressed whether we retain the term ‘free will’ to 
describe them or not. 
If the ever growing body of work in experimental philosophy 
did happen to turn out definitive evidence that there is a clear and 
precise sense of the term ‘free will’ that is ‘the’ folk meaning of the 
term, and hence is what the term ‘really means’, even this would 
not be a significant problem for my project here:  I  would simply 
give up the term ‘free will’, and continue with the two substantial 
metaphysical  and empirical  projects  already discussed — that  of 
articulating the conditions necessary for moral responsibility,  and 
the other, distinct issue that I will shortly discuss.
2.2 Free Will as a Condition of Moral Responsibility
The first task, in this section, is to back up the claim that most of the 
discussion  of  ‘free  will’  is  already  concerned  with  moral 
responsibility.  I  will  do  this  by  briefly  surveying  some 
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representative examples from the most popular positions that have 
been  taken  on  ‘the  free  will  problem’,  and  show  how  they  are 
concerned with moral responsibility. 
Indeed, it  is  even worth noting that the so-called ‘free will 
skeptics’  that  are popular in the contemporary philosophical  and 
mainstream  literature  generally  turn  out  to  be  concerned  with 
skepticism  about  moral  responsibility.  The  three  types  of  view  I 
consider below cut across the main positions that have been taken 
on  the  problem,  skepticism  notwithstanding.  These  are 
incompatibilism, compatibilism, and revisionism.
2.2.1 Incompatibilism
Pereboom, for  example,  is  a  leading proponent of  the suggestion 
that we do not have the free will required for moral responsibility: 
his  ‘hard  incompatibilist’  view  is  that  while  there  is  in  fact  a 
consistent  description  of  the  conditions  under  which  we  would 
have  free  will  (conditions  that  he  takes  to  be  incompatible  with 
determinism),  these  conditions  are  not  instantiated  in  our  world 
whether  it  turns  out  to  be  deterministic  or  not  (because  they 
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involve  certain  ‘agent  causal’  metaphysical  requirements  that  he 
believes we have good evidence against).  8
The connection here between ‘free will’  and the conditions 
for being a morally responsible agent is explicit.  For example, he 
writes that “the hard incompatibilist disavows freedom of the sort 
required for moral responsibility”,  and that hard incompatibilism 
“is the view that there is no freedom of the sort required for moral 
responsibility.”  The  first  paragraph  of  the  book  introduces  the 9
topic  with  a  discussion  of  criminal  behaviour  and  raises  “the 
possibility  that  [such behaviour]  may be caused by influences  in 
upbringing or by abnormal features of the brain”, suggesting that 
this should make us doubt that such agents are morally responsible, 
before going on to claim that the main hard incompatibilist thesis is 
that,  in some important sense,  all  our actions are like this.  Free 10
will is important, even for those who deny that we have it, because 
it is required for moral responsibility.
On the ‘optimistic’  side of  incompatibilism—the libertarian 
view, according to which we have free will, and it is incompatible 
with  determinism—Kane  points  out  that  it  is  possible  to 
 Pereboom (2001) is the classic discussion. Also see more recently (2014).8
 Pereboom (2001: xxii, xxiii).9
 Ibid. (xiii).10
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understand  what  the  free  will  problem  is  by  considering  moral 
responsibility: he notes that “Free will in the sense just described is 
also  intimately  related  to  notions  of  accountability, 
blameworthiness, and praiseworthiness for actions.”11
Similarly, both van Inwagen and O’Connor apparently define 
‘free will’ in terms of a specific ability thesis, namely, the ability to 
do otherwise than one actually does, for some particular choice or 
action. (And both philosophers give incompatibilist analyses of this 
ability).  Both  philosophers  take  this  ability  to  be  necessary  for 12
moral responsibility — a common view among those who believe 
moral responsibility is not compatible with determinism, as well as 
some  compatibilists  who  interpret  the  ability  such  that  it  is 
compatible  with  determinism.  The  ability  to  do  otherwise—
sometimes  referred  to  as  ‘the  freedom  to  do  otherwise’—is 
sometimes  taken  to  simply  be  free  will.  When  the  ability  to  do 
otherwise is  said to be required for genuine moral  responsibility, 
this  is  once  again  a  discussion  of  why  freedom,  or  free  will,  is 
required for responsibility. 
 See Kane (2002: 4), which is intended as an introduction to the free will problem. 11
See  also  his  (1996)  for  Kane’s  own  statement  of  libertarianism  and  associated 
discussion of the ‘significance’ of free will.
 Van Inwagen (1983) and O’Connor (2000). 12
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In cases like this, my prescription for the term ‘free will’ will 
not change matters substantively: the problem is already framed in 
terms  of  a  feature  of  agency  which  some  philosophers  argue  is 
necessary for moral responsibility. The substantive debate between 
compatibilists  and  incompatibilists  can  then  proceed  via  a 
discussion of whether the ‘ability to do otherwise’ is something that 
is or is not compatible with determinism, it being the thing that is 
required for moral responsibility. 
In  fact,  van  Inwagen  is  more  certain  about  moral 
responsibility than he is about the incompatibility of the ability just 
mentioned: taking the fact of moral responsibility to be ‘a datum’, 
he notes that if science turned up proof that the world was in fact 
deterministic,  he  would  then—and  only  then—become  a 
compatibilist.  Which is to say that, if determinism turned out to 13
be true,  this  would show that  free will  must  be compatible  with 
determinism, because free will  is a necessary condition for moral 
responsibility  (and  moral  responsibility  is,  by  hypothesis, 
established).  Whatever  one  makes  of  the  ‘datum’  claim,  the 
connection between ‘free will’ and moral responsibility here is quite 
clear.
 van Inwagen (1983: 223).13
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2.2.2 Compatibilism and Revisionism
Compatibilism  is  the  view  that  free  will  is  compatible  with 
determinism. In fact, compatibilists often talk about ‘free action’, to 
emphasise  that  the  conditions  which  are  relevant  to  establishing 
whether an action was free are things like absence of constraint, or 
whether the action was performed under duress, and so forth. The 
reason seems to be that talk of ‘free will’ implies a strange faculty of 
the mind called ‘the will’, which would  presumably have unusual 
metaphysical  properties  (such  as  being  metaphysically 
indeterministic).14
The  best  way  of  making  sense  of  a  purported  distinction 
between ‘free action’ and ‘free will’  that I  can see is by way of a 
variation on Locke’s classic example of the sleeping man.  Imagine 15
 ‘Metaphysically indeterministic’ just means genuinely, robustly indeterministic. 14
That is, where the very nature of the phenomenon involved is not deterministic, as 
opposed to the indeterminism being a function of a particular, limited, epistemic 
vantage point.
 The original can be found in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. (Book 2, 15
Chapter 21, Section 12). The variation was invented by Kevin Timpe, in his Internet 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy article “Free Will”, Section 1. (Last accessed 7/3/16).
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that there is a woman, Allison, who is wondering whether or not to 
walk the dog. Before she makes a decision, she takes a nap. While 
she  is  asleep,  a  blizzard  moves  through  the  area  and  makes  it 
physically impossible for her to leave the house. Upon waking, she 
decides to walk the dog. One might now use the distinction to say 
that Allison had free will (in making the decision to walk the dog), 
but  not  freedom  of  action  (she  could  not  in  fact  carry  out  the 
action).16
The classical  compatibilist  (Hobbes,  Hume)  view is  that  all 
there is to freedom is ‘freedom of action’, because all that matters is 
that one can do what one decides to do. Allison is not free to walk 
the dog, because there is a blizzard. In this context, insisting on the 
notion of ‘free will’ amounts to the claim that there is more to the 
question of whether Allison is free than whether there is a blizzard 
(for  example).  And  it  is  at  this  point  that  the  discussion  of 
indeterminism usually begins.
 On my view, this distinction is basically redundant. Is Allison ‘free’ to walk the 16
dog?  This  can  mean  either  of  two  things.  (1)  Is  she  morally  responsible  for 
walking / not walking the dog? Here is  is  plausibly relevant that the action is 
made physically impossible, but it depends on your theory of MR. (2) Is Allison, 
qua agent, capable of walking the dog? Yes, but she cannot exercise that capacity in 
this particular situation.
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Compatibilists and incompatibilists can in fact agree on the 
claim that ‘freedom requires the ability to do otherwise’: they will 
simply  disagree  about  the  metaphysics  of  the  abilities  involved. 
Incompatibilists  typically  claim  that  such  an  ability  is  not 
compatible  with  determinism,  because  it  requires  that  the  agent 
have the ability to do otherwise, holding fixed the laws of nature and 
the  actual  past  right  up  until  the  moment  of  choice  or  action  — 
something that cannot happen if determinism is true. On the other 
hand, some philosophers  have interpreted these abilities in a way 17
that does not require determinism to be false. Importantly, however 
‘ability’ is characterised here, both parties can agree that the ability 
to do otherwise is required for moral responsibility.
Finally,  consider recent revisionist  answers to the ‘free will’ 
issue. There is an argument, due to Vargas, designed to support the 
case  for  a  revised conception of  ‘free  will’,  which challenges  the 
incompatibilist’s  claim  that  the  freedom  required  for  moral 
responsibility  should  be  construed  incompatiblistically.  The 18
argument is roughly this: we hold people morally responsible, and, 
on the basis of certain moral judgments (e.g. acting wrongly), we 
 Vihvelin (2013) and Nelkin (2011).17
 See Vargas (2009: 51-2).18
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take  steps  to  inflict  punishment  on these  people  — for  example, 
through  the  prison  system,  or  even  through  the  use  of  capital 
punishment. The justification for inflicting this punishment is that 
they  are  morally  responsible  for  a  certain  act;  and  to  be  morally 
responsible,  as  we  have  seen,  is  to  meet  certain  freedom 
requirements. 
Given that the incompatibilist construes these requirements 
in a way that makes them dependent on the falsity of determinism
—and on the truth of various other metaphysical claims, regarding 
the location and role of indeterminism in the brain, for example—
and given that we do not have good empirical evidence that such 
conditions are actually met (so the argument goes), we are in the 
troubling position of meting out punishment, along with moralised 
praise  and blame,  without  strong evidence that  people have met 
these requirements. Vargas writes: 
A concrete  example  may  make  this  point  clearer.  Consider 
Fiery. Fiery is a skeptical subject of a significant moral blame, 
and likely, punishment. Perhaps she faces the death penalty, if 
that  is  permissible,  and  if  not,  then  some  very  significant 
censure  where  that  variety  or  some  large  quantum  of  that 
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censure  (whether  blame  or  punishment)  depends  on  the 
presumption  of  her  being  a  libertarian  agent.  Now,  let  us 
imagine that Fiery demands to know why such treatment is 
justified.
Her libertarian persecutor must acknowledge that we 
have no evidence to support  the hope that  underwrites  our 
treatment  of  her—that  is,  the  hope  that  Fiery  is,  indeed,  a 
libertarian  agent.  But  Fiery  will  surely  protest:  the  mere 
possibility that she deserves some extra quantum of blame or 
punishment beyond that required for say, rehabilitation, does 
not,  by itself,  make such treatment  justified.  After  all,  Fiery 
insists,  there is  also a chance that  she—and everyone else—
might  not  be  libertarian  agents.  Indeed,  this  strikes  her 
(especially  now!)  as  considerably  more  plausible  than  her 
prosecutor’s insistence that libertarianism is true.19
Vargas  thus  concludes  that  if  the  empirical  evidence  does  not 
ultimately come out in favour of libertarianism, then it would turn 
out  to  be  “grossly  unjust  to  hold  her  accountable  to  any  degree 
 Vargas (2013: 7-8).19
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beyond the degree  of  blame and punishment  warranted by non-
libertarian considerations.”  20
He suggests  that  we should revise  our  ordinary concept  of 
free  will  and  eliminate  the  contentious  commitments  to 
indeterminism. He disagrees with the standard compatibilist  that 
what we actually mean when we talk about free will  in ordinary 
contexts  is  something  that  was  never  incompatible  with 
determinism in  the  first  place  (we  might  just  be  confused about 
what we are actually committed to): rather, he acknowledges that 
our ordinary thinking does have certain incompatibilist  ‘strands’, 
but that—in light of both (i) empirical plausibility, and (ii) the fact 
that we can get a workable conception of moral responsibility by 
invoking  only  features  that  happen  to  be  compatible  with 
determinism—we  should  just  revise  our  ordinary  concepts  and 
eliminate any lingering incompatibilist commitments. 
He thus claims that our concept of ‘free will’ is mostly as the 
compatibilist  has  it,  but  contends  that  there  are  parts  of  our 
conception  of  ‘free  will’  which  nonetheless  remain  committed  to 
incompatibilism. Thus, he thinks that our existing conception is not 
 Vargas (2013: 8).20
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wholly  consistent,  and  for  that  reason  we  should  revise  it  — in 
favour of compatibilism.
What  is  interesting  about  Vargas’s  approach  is  that  he  is 
guided in his revisionism by the constraints of developing what we 
might call a ‘normatively adequate’ conception of free will. That is, 
when  deciding  how  to  revise  the  concept,  he  suggests  that  we 
ought to take into consideration the implications for our practises 
of  moral  responsibility  and  justice,  in  particular,  the  practise  of 
blame  and  punishment.  As  the  above  argument  suggests,  he 
believes that we should revise the concept so that it is compatible 
with  determinism,  because  he  believes  this  position  is  better 
supported  by  what  empirical  evidence  we  do  have  regarding 
human  agency,  as  well  as  the  thought  that  holding  on  to  the 
incompatibilist  conditions  could have troubling consequences  for 
our systems of justice, and more generally, our practices of blame 
and punishment.
In some ways, my own proposal here is similar to Vargas’s 
revisionism about the compatibility / incompatibility issue, except 
that  I  am concerned with  our  use  of  the  term ‘free  will’  and its 
connection  to  both  moral  responsibility  and  agency.  As  I  briefly 
suggested above, if there is a folk conception of the term ‘free will’ 
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it is—as Vargas believes—probably an inconsistent one. That is, the 
(folk) meaning of ‘free will’ has strands that are tied up with moral 
responsibility and the conditions for praise and blame, but also has 
strands which have little to do with moral responsibility at all, and 
are simply about features of agency. So the overarching prescription 
with  which  I  began  this  chapter  is  a  revisionary  one:  revise  the 
concept of free will in favour of moral responsibility. The case for 
this revision is, like Vargas’s, a pragmatic one: most of the time this is 
how it is already used. 
Furthermore,  and  most  importantly  for  my own view,  the 
benefits of this revision will be seen in the clarity that it brings on 
the rest of the cases,  i.e. the aspects of our existing folk conception 
that are not primarily about moral responsibility. After this chapter, 
I  have  little  more  to  say  about  moral  responsibility:  what  is 
interesting to me is what is left over when those issues are set aside 
— that is,  certain issues about agency that have, I  claim, become 
obscured by their entanglement in ‘the free will debate’.
2.3 Moving Beyond ‘Free Will’
The foregoing discussion has been fairly abstract. In the remainder 
of  this  chapter  I  will  attempt  to  make  things  more  concrete  by 
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considering a potential objection to my way of classifying the free 
will issue. By showing how this putative counterexample fails, and 
is in fact a good example of the utility of my own view, I will have 
made the issues more tangible by demonstrating an existing ‘case 
study’ in my way of framing the free will issue.
2.3.1 Objections to my view
What this very brief survey of the literature indicates is that, across 
a  wide  range  of  views  about  ‘the  free  will  problem’,  including 
views that are straightforwardly opposed to each other, there is a 
common thread: the view that free will is in some way implicated 
in  our  concept  of  a  morally  responsible  agent.  Specifically,  it  is 
taken to be a  metaphysical condition  for the correct attribution of 
moral  responsibility  to  some agent  (for  some action).  There  may 
also be epistemic and situational conditions as well, although I will 
not consider them here, as they do not change the substance of my 
claim — I  am not  concerned with the  actual  conditions  of  moral 
responsibility  at  all,  but  rather  am pitching my argument  at  one 
level of abstraction from that debate, as it were.
Now,  libertarians  suppose  that  we  in  fact  meet  this 
metaphysical condition, and that it has incompatibilist satisfaction 
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requirements.  Hard incompatibilists  such as Pereboom agree that 
meeting this condition requires the falsity of determinism — they 
simply  disagree  that  we  meet  it.  Thus,  on  this  way  of  putting 
things,  the  hard  incompatibilist  says  that  we  ‘lack  the  free  will 
required  for  moral  responsibility’,  i.e.  we  fail  to  meet  a 
metaphysical  condition  that  is  necessary  for  being  morally 
responsible agents.
Many  compatibilists  also  share  the  view  that  there  is  a 
certain  metaphysical  condition—i.e.  having  free  will—which  is 
necessary  for  us  to  be  morally  responsible:  but  they  hold  that 
meeting that  condition is  perfectly  compatible  with  the  truth (or 
indeed the falsity) of determinism. Often this type of view is put in 
terms  of  the  ‘ability  thesis’  indicated  above,  where  ‘free  will’  is 
characterised  as  the  ability  to  do  otherwise,  and  that  ability  is 
interpreted  as  being  compatible  with  determinism.  As  we  saw 
there, the disagreement between this type of compatibilist and the 
incompatibilist  is  not  about  whether  agents  need  to  meet  this 
metaphysical condition, but rather it is about whether meeting that 
condition  is  compatible  with  the  truth  of  determinism,  and  this 
turns on the particular analysis of abilities that is given in each case. 
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For  example,  consider  the  recent  work  by  the  ‘new 
dispositionalists’, which is aimed at providing a theory of abilities 
that is compatible with determinism, such that the compatibilist can 
agree (pace Frankfurt-style objections) that the agent must have the 
ability  to  do  otherwise,  without  requiring  the  falsity  of 
determinism.21
Finally,  the  revisionism developed by Vargas,  for  example, 
ends  up  in  a  position  similar  to  the  type  of  compatibilism  just 
indicated  (e.g.  claims  that  there  are  metaphysical  conditions  on 
being  morally  responsible,  and  they  are  compatible  with 
determinism), but does not claim that this is an accurate reflection 
of  our  ‘folk’  conception  of  free  will.  That  is,  unlike  the 
compatibilist, who effectively claims that everything we ordinarily 
believe to be required for free will and moral responsibility in fact 
turns  out  to  be  compatible  with  the  truth  of  determinism,  the 
revisionist  just  accepts  that  we  probably  do  have  incompatibilist 
intuitions  about  these  matters.  They  simply  claim that  intuitions 
must  give  way  to  theory.  The  revisionist  goes  on  to  ‘prune’  the 
 See,  for  example,  the  recent  monograph  by  Kadri  Vihvelin  (2013).  For  a 21
discussion of the ‘new dispositionalists’,  and the origin of that label, see Clarke 
(2009).
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concept of free will by eliminating those incompatibilist intuitions, 
guided  explicitly  by  the  demand  for  a  normatively  adequate 
account of the ‘freedom’ that is required to justify our attributions 
of moral responsibility. 
I  have suggested that ‘free will’  is usually understood as a 
metaphysical condition that is required for the possibility of moral 
responsibility  (more  precisely:  for  an  agent  to  be  morally 
responsible for an action).  My claim is that we should drop the 22
term  ‘free  will’  and  straightforwardly  investigate  what  these 
conditions  are.  This  simplifies  the  theoretical  constraints  on  the 
theory:  first,  determine  what  the  most  adequate  theory  of  moral 
responsibility is,  and then whatever conditions (X) turn out to be 
necessary for ‘being morally responsible’ on that view are what we 
investigate when we are interested in whether some action is ‘free’. 
There is no need to look elsewhere for clues as to what ‘free will’ 
might be.
One possible  objection to this  way of  characterising things 
might  begin  by  pointing  to  the  so-called  ‘semicompatibilism’ 
 Other than actions, agents may be thought to be potentially morally responsible 22
for omissions or outcomes. I will simply discuss the case of actions in what follows 
because  I  do  not  believe  the  present  issues  are  significantly  affected  by  the 
differences between such cases as actions or omissions, etc.
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developed  by  John  Fischer,  and  sometimes  in  conjunction  with 
Mark Ravizza: this form of compatibilism is notably different from 
the kind indicated above (the compatibilist-abilities view), because 
it denies that free will—conceived as the ability to do otherwise—is 
necessary  for  moral  responsibility.  Thus,  Fischer  agrees  with  the 
incompatibilists  that  this  ability  is  not  compatible  with 
determinism;  but  at  the  same  time,  he  claims  that  moral 
responsibility  is  compatible  with  determinism,  because  the  facts 
that  are  relevant  to  this  question are  only facts  about  the ‘actual 
sequence’, and not what alternative possibilities there are.  23
At  first,  the  claim that  ‘free  will  is  not  required for  moral 
responsibility’  seems to fly directly in the face of  the argument I 
have been making here, part of which was the suggestion that most 
of the literature already takes ‘free will’ to mean something like ‘the 
conditions required for moral responsibility’. Now it seems that a 
prominent philosopher writing about these issues holds exactly the 
opposite view.
However,  this  is  not  the  case.  Firstly,  of  course,  I  could 
simply emphasise the revisionary nature of my argument and say 
‘so much the worse for Fischer’s view’. Indeed, I only claimed that 
 See Fischer (1994) and the essays collected in (2006); Fischer and Ravizza (1998). 23
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‘most’ of the literature already made the connection, not that it was 
unanimously held. This would be a valid response, but in fact there 
is a stronger claim to make: I suggest that, on the contrary, Fischer’s 
view  is  basically  an  example  of  my  own  suggestion  put  into 
practise,  albeit not explicitly under that rubric.  Hence, examining 
the Fischer case will both deflect this putative objection to my view, 
and at the same time help the positive case for it.
2.3.2 Fischer and Semicompatibilism
According to semicompatibilism, moral responsibility is compatible 
with  determinism (as  well  as  indeterminism):  as  Fischer  puts  it, 
“Our  fundamental  nature  as  free,  morally  responsible  agents 
should not depend on whether the pertinent regularities identified 
by the physicists have associated with them (objective) probabilities 
of  100  percent  (causal  determinism)  or,  say,  98  percent  (causal 
indeterminism).”  Fischer  believes  that  the  possibility  of  moral 24
responsibility  should  not  ‘hang  by  a  thread’,  awaiting  the 
deliverances of  theoretical  physics.  At the same time,  he believes 
that the freedom to do otherwise is not compatible with determinism, 
pointing  to  the  variations  on  the  ‘consequence  argument’ 
 Fischer (2006: 5).24
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developed  by  incompatibilists  such  as  van  Inwagen.  Thus 25
‘semicompatibilism’ is, roughly, the view that moral responsibility 
is  compatible  with  determinism,  even though the  freedom to  do 
otherwise  (as  the  incompatibilist  traditionally  characterises  it)  is 
not.
This way of putting things is slightly unorthodox, and so it 
does  not  straightforwardly  fit  the  characterisation  I  have  given 
above.  I  have pointed out the way in which much contemporary 
work views ‘free will’ as a metaphysical condition for the licensing 
of  moral  responsibility;  but  Fischer  distinguishes  what  is  often 
thought  of  as  the  primary  ‘metaphysical’  characterisation  of  free 
will—that is, ‘the freedom to do otherwise’—as being distinct from 
the question of moral responsibility (by claiming that ‘free will’ is 
neither  necessary  nor  sufficient  for  agents  to  be  morally 
responsible). So it might seem as though my attempt to eliminate 
the term ‘free will’ puts me at risk of conflating issues that should 
not be run together in this way.
In fact, things become much clearer if we avoid using terms 
like  ‘free  will’  and  ‘freedom’  to  describe  Fischer’s  view  (or  any 
view).  We  could  use  the  term  ‘free  will’  to  mean  ‘the  ability  to 
 Fischer (1994) deals with these incompatibilist arguments.25
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otherwise’,  which  seems  to  be  a  fairly  common  move  when 
articulating the view that morally responsible agents must have the 
ability  to  do  otherwise  (indeed,  it  is  sometimes  phrased  as  ‘the 
freedom to do otherwise).
But  on  this  way of  speaking,  we would be  then forced to 
describe Fischer’s view as the claim that ‘free will is not required 
for moral responsibility’, which hardly makes the view clearer; nor 
does it  do anything to help one understand what is  required for 
moral responsibility on Fischer’s view.
Why  not  distinguish  two  kinds  of  freedom?  These  might 
correspond to the two types of control  that Fischer outlines in his 
theory of responsibility: guidance control and regulative control. In 
his terms, ‘regulative control’ is the kind that affords the freedom to 
do otherwise that he believes is not compatible with determinism; it 
is only the less metaphysically demanding ‘guidance control’ that is 
required for moral responsibility, and this remains compatible with 
determinism  because  it  is  concerned  only  with  ‘the  actual 
sequence’, rather than what could or would happen under certain 
conditions.
But  these  moves  add  nothing  of  substance  to  the  debate. 
Dropping the term ‘free will’  altogether for a moment,  we might 
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say that Fischer’s semicompatibilism is concerned with articulating 
the conditions that agents must meet to be morally responsible for 
their  actions,  and these conditions include various constraints on 
their  actual  situation  (in  this  case,  facts  about  their  ‘reasons-
responsive  mechanism’,  i.e.  whether  they  are  appropriately 
responsive to reasons, including moral reasons), and the ‘ability to 
do  otherwise’  is  not  one  of  those  conditions.  Hence,  if  you  had 
simply  taken  ‘free  will’  to  be  ‘the  ability  to  do  otherwise’,  you 
would now be able to say that Fischer believes that ‘free will is not 
required for moral responsibility’.
Indeed,  we should  also  avoid  using  the  term ‘freedom’  to 
describe  that  which  Fischer  claims  is  incompatible  with 
determinism:  instead,  we  should  say  that  he  has  identified  one 
possible feature of agency  (viz. the ‘ability to do otherwise’), which 
turns out to be incompatible with determinism — but, according to 
semicompatibilism, this is not one of the features that is required 
for moral responsibility. If agents in the actual world do not possess 
this ability (for example, if determinism were true), this would not 
be a barrier to the legitimate attribution of moral responsibility to 
those agents, although it may have other implications for agency. 
And the  traditional  debate  about  whether  agents  can be  morally 
—  !   —50
responsible  for  their  actions,  without  access  to  ‘metaphysically 
open’ alternative possibilities (i.e. the ability to do otherwise) need 
not be significantly affected.
If  we  wish  to  retain  the  term  ‘free  will’,  then  clearly  the 
distinctions  just  made  can  be  maintained  by  stipulating  the 
meaning  of  the  term  in  the  way  that  I’ve  suggested  above.  For 
Fischer, then, ‘free will’ is guidance control, because it is guidance 
control  that  is  necessary  for  moral  responsibility.  By  contrast, 
regulative  control  is  something  that  requires  the  ability  to  do 
otherwise: this is not free will, but it may or may not be a valuable 
feature of agency for some other reason. 
The  fact  that  it  is  possible  to  explain  the  substance  of 
Fischer’s view without using the term ‘free will’ only supports the 
argument  of  the  present  chapter.  As  noted earlier,  it  is  really  an 
open question whether or not we should retain the term ‘free will’ 
at  all:  certainly  it  is  not  necessary  to  retain  the  term  in  order  to 
continue  any  of  the  substantive  discussions  that  I  have  been 
considering here. 
Fischer’s  semicompatibilism  actually  provides  us  with  a 
good case study in the possibility of dropping the term (or at least 
stipulating a  clear  use for  it).  Firstly,  Fischer  does not  claim that 
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‘free will’ is what’s necessary for moral responsibility, whether that 
is construed as compatible or incompatible with determinism: what 
is  required,  on his  view, is  an appropriately functioning reasons-
responsive  mechanism.  Of  course,  one  might  disagree  with  this 
view  about  what  is  necessary  and  sufficient  for  an  agent  to  be 
morally responsible for an action, but in this case it is clear where 
the disagreement lies. One might disagree with this view, insisting 
that a certain kind of ability to do otherwise really is required for 
genuine moral responsibility: but in this case, the disagreement is 
about which facts are relevant to an agent’s moral responsibility — 
facts only about the actual situation, or certain modal facts about the 
available possibilities at that time.26
In fact, dropping the term ‘free will’ from this debate allows 
a more fine-grained discussion of the relevant issues. It may be that 
agents  meet  certain  conditions  that  justify  one  aspect  of  moral 
 Indeed, one could dispute the characterisation of ‘the actual sequence’ as being 26
something that can be properly described without reference to any modal facts: in 
short, one might argue that in order to properly understand what does happen in a 
situation,  one must understand certain facts about what can happen there.  (See 
Steward  2009:  88  for  more  on  the  “entanglement  of  modality  with  the 
characterisation of actuality”.) My point here is just that this discussion could only 
be clarified by carrying on the argument without the use of ‘freedom’ terms.
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responsibility—for  example,  a  consequentialist  approach  to 
punishment—while  at  the  same  time  failing  to  meet  further 
conditions  that  would  be  required  for  other  aspects  such  as 
moralised praise and blame, and genuine ‘desert’. In this way, the 
question whether agents  are morally responsible  is  not  an all-or-
nothing question: to put it differently, the question whether agents 
meet ‘the’ condition necessary for moral responsibility (previously 
picked out by the term ‘free will’) is not the right question to ask, 
because there are several conditions which correspond to different 
kinds of (or features of) moral responsibility, and no one of these 
ought to be prioritised over the other.
Furthermore,  it  even  remains  possible  to  engage  with  the 
various incompatibilist  ‘consequence arguments’,  as Fischer does, 
without  using  the  term  ‘free  will’  (or  similar).  The  consequence 
argument  describes  an  ability,  which  is  usually  described  as  the 
ability  ‘to  do  otherwise’,  or  ‘choose  otherwise’,  and  purports  to 
show that this ability is incompatible with determinism. To obtain 
the  further  conclusion  that  ‘free  will  is  incompatible  with 
determinism’ it is of course necessary to add the premise that ‘“free 
will”  is  “the  ability  to  do  otherwise,  holding  fixed  the  laws  of 
nature and the past”’, or some similar premise, in order to make the 
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connection. As I suggested above, if one believes that this particular 
ability to do otherwise is actually a necessary condition for genuine 
moral responsibility, then the consequence argument is going to be 
very important anyway, even without the additional premise.
Assume that the consequence argument is sound: there is an 
ability,  described  in  the  consequence  argument,  that  is  indeed 
incompatible with determinism. What is important to recognise is 
that  the  ability  currently  being  discussed—that  is,  ‘ability’ 
according to the traditional incompatibilist—is simply one among 
many related  abilities  that  are  relevant  to  dissuasions  of  agency, 
action,  and  moral  responsibility.  According  to  my  view,  the 
traditional incompatibilist position can therefore be redescribed as 
the view that this ability is necessary for moral responsibility, and 
that such an ability is not compatible with determinism. 
One standard compatibilist response, which became popular 
after  Frankfurt’s  seminal  paper,  is  to  deny that  the  ability  to  do 
otherwise is necessary for moral responsibility at all: in the present 
terms, of course, we should say that an ability to do otherwise is not 
necessary, viz. the ability that the traditional incompatibilist has in 
mind when they talk about the ‘ability to do otherwise’ (and which 
is not compatible with determinism). 
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Indeed, Fischer’s view is often described simply as the claim 
that  ‘the  ability  to  do  otherwise  is  not  required  for  moral 
responsibility’.  And  this  interpretation  has  apparently  been 27
supported  by  Fischer’s  defence  of  various  Frankfurt-style 
examples. But, as Christopher Franklin has argued, if we allow that 
there are multiple senses of ‘ability’, we can see that Fischer in fact 
only  disputes  the  necessity  of  the  particularly  ‘strong’  kind  of 
ability  to  do  otherwise  just  indicated.  He  nonetheless  requires 28
some  kind  of  ability  to  do  otherwise,  or  access  to  some  kind  of 
alternative  possibilities,  but  not  the  kind  usually  picked  out  by 
standard incompatibilists (the ‘strong’ kind).
The  so-called  ‘Frankfurt  cases’  are  counterexamples  to  the 
Principle  of  Alternative  Possibilities  (PAP),  which  is  simply  the 
claim that we have already encountered above: that an agent must 
have  the  ability  to  do  otherwise  (thus  having  ‘alternative 
possibilities’ available) in order to be morally responsible. Frankfurt 
cases  purport  to  show that  there  are  cases  in  which  an  agent  is 
intuitively responsible for some action A, but where they could not 
 For example, Campbell (2011: 89).27
 Franklin (2015).28
—  !   —55
have  avoided  doing  A (or  choosing  to  do  A).  Hence  the  PAP 29
cannot be right, according to the argument.
The Frankfurt case itself is really a template for constructing 
any number of similar cases: the details of any given case are not as 
important as the structure of the example. The basic idea is in fact 
very similar to Locke’s ‘sleeping man’ example that we considered 
above.  Here  is  a  basic  Frankfurt  case:  Jones  is  a  Democrat,  and 
always votes Democrat in the relevant elections. Black is some kind 
of interested third party who wants to ensure that Jones definitely 
votes  Democrat  in  the  coming election,  so  he  inserts  a  device  in 
Jones’s brain in order to monitor the relevant decision process.  If 
Jones should show any signs of voting other than Democrat, Black 
will activate a control mechanism in the device and thereby ensure 
that  Jones  votes  Democrat.  As  it  happens,  Jones  does  not  even 
consider  an alternative,  and votes  Democrat  anyway.  Thus Black 
never needs to activate the device, and hence does not intervene in 
Jones’s decision or action at all.
The intuitive response to this case is that Jones is responsible 
for  his  vote  —  even  though  he  could  not  have  done  otherwise. 
 Frankfurt’s original paper is (1969). Fischer’s overview of the Frankfurt cases can 29
be found in Fischer (2010).
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Fischer’s way of putting this is to say that it’s the ‘actual sequence’ 
that matters for responsibility, and this is part of his claim that an 
agent need not have the (strong) ability to do otherwise in order to 
be moral  responsible.  By contrast,  the central  feature of  Fischer’s 
account is that an agent is morally responsible only if they have an 
appropriately functioning reasons-responsive mechanism. And this 
is a matter of what occurs in the actual sequence, rather than in the 
realm of alternative possibilities. 
Yet Franklin points out that, for Fischer, what it means for an 
agent’s ‘reasons-responsive mechanism’ to be sufficiently sensitive 
to  reasons,  and  for  it  to  respond  appropriately,  must  be 
characterised  in  modal  terms.  Whether  an  agent  has  a  properly 
‘reasons-responsive’  mechanism  is  evaluated  by  asking  whether 
there  is  a  possible  world  in  which  the  mechanism  does  respond 
appropriately  to  reasons,  i.e.  by  asking  whether  there  is  ‘‘some 
possible world in which there is a sufficient reason to do otherwise, 
[and] the agent’s  actual  mechanism operates,  and the agent does 
otherwise.”  30
The only difference with regard to the usual discussions of 
‘alternative possibilities’ in the literature is that this possible world 
 Fischer (2006: 68).30
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need not be the ‘closest’ possible world. By contrast, the traditional 
incompatibilist  holds  a  view  of  abilities  (i.e.  the  ‘strong’  view) 
according to which we must hold fixed everything about the actual 
past apart from the choice or action in question (i.e. the choice or 
action that is  supposed to be ‘free’)  if  we are to say whether the 
agent had the ability ‘to do otherwise’ — if determinism is true,  of 
course, there are no such worlds.
Secondly, for Fischer, the agent’s responsibility is grounded in 
the  ‘responsibility’  of  the  reasons-responsive  mechanism:  an 
instance of a general move that is common to reductionists about 
agency.  In  this  case,  the  agent  is  responsible  in  virtue  of  the 
functioning of her reasons-responsive mechanism. This move, from 
mechanism to agent, is fairly uncontroversial unless one is a strict 
antireductionist  about  agency  (e.g.  one  holds  an  ‘agent  causal’ 
view).  Thus  the  agent  must  have  some  kind  of  ability  to  do 
otherwise,  because  the  reasons-responsive  mechanism must  have 
such an ability (or disposition).  31
Yet, at no point is it helpful to pick out one of these abilities 
and  privilege  one  of  them  with  the  label  ‘free  will’.  In  fact,  the 
 For more on the connection between ‘ability’ and ‘disposition’ in this debate, 31
refer to the ‘new dispositionalists’ cited above.
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traditional  characterisation  of  ‘free  will’  as  the  ability  to  do 
otherwise  might  actually  confuse  the  issue,  with  the  implicit 
suggestion that there is only one ability in this area that is relevant 
to the question. The primary issue is what must be true about an 
agent if they are to be morally responsible for their actions. Even if 
one  insisted  on  retaining  the  term  ‘free  will’  in  this  context,  it 
would  need  to  be  defined  after  the  investigation  into  agents’ 
abilities  just  noted:  once  it  was  determined  which  ability,  or 
abilities,  were  required  for  moral  responsibility,  then  one  could 
stipulate that such an ability constituted free will — because ‘free 
will’  just  refers  to  whatever  conditions,  if  any,  are  required  for 
moral responsibility (if there are no such conditions, then one is a 
‘free will skeptic’, i.e. a skeptic about moral responsibility).
The further advantage of proceeding in this way is that one 
can  sidestep  debates  about  whether  one  has  accurately 
characterised the ‘folk’ conception of ‘free will’ in the account. The 
revisionist  approach  offered  by  Vargas  already  goes  some  way 
towards  this  kind  of  view,  but  nonetheless  there  remains  some 
pressure to avoid revising the term too far from the common ‘folk’ 
conception in order to be seen as a plausible revision of that term, 
and not  simply the  introduction of  a  new term.  An ‘eliminative’ 
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view does not have this limitation: since it does not use the term 
‘free will’  at all,  there is no obligation to demonstrate that one is 
remaining  sufficiently  faithful  to  the  folk  usage  for  the  view  to 
count as plausible. 
Instead, such a view would have us discuss the metaphysical 
and  ethical  issues  directly,  by  (i)  investigating  the  metaphysical 
features of  agency,  and (ii)  determining what must  be true of  an 
agent for her to be an appropriate subject of the different forms of 
moral  responsibility  —  without  concern  for  whether  this 
description ‘deserves’ the name ‘free will’. If anyone suggests that 
one  is  not,  after  all,  discussing  free  will,  but  something  else 
altogether, one could simply ask them why they were interested in 
an  analysis  of  free  will  in  the  first  place,  and  refer  them  to  the 
operational definition of ‘free will’ given above, which connects the 
term  to  the  discussion  of  which  conditions  are  necessary  for 
morally responsible agency.
2.4 Conclusion
I  suggest  that  Fischer’s  semicompatibilism,  far  from  being  a 
problem  for  my  view,  can  actually  be  seen—with  a  few  small 
amendments—as a good example of the progress that can be made 
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on  these  issues  without  a  reliance  on  the  term  ‘free  will’,  and 
instead  with  a  focus  on  the  conditions  required  for  moral 
responsibility:  which,  in  Fischer’s  case,  takes  the  form  of  a 
discussion  about  different  forms of  control  that  agents  may have 
with regard to their actions. It would only be a step backwards to 
try and artificially constrain Fischer’s  work with the language of 
the classical ‘free will’ debate.
The term ‘free will’ could in principle be dropped altogether, 
but for various practical purposes, it may be better to simply retain 
it and stipulate that it is a technical term. This stipulation involves 
making the operational move suggested above, and defining ‘free 
will’ in terms of whatever conditions or properties turn out to be 
necessary for morally responsible agency.
In the remainder of this work, I will have little more to say 
about  moral  responsibility  (and  hence  about  free  will,  as  I 
understand it).  What I  will  do next  is  look more closely at  what 
substantive issues get  ‘left  over’  when we set  aside the concerns 
about  moral  responsibility  noted  above  —  that  is,  issues  which 
have so far become entangled with the ‘free will debate’ but which 
are  not  directly  concerned with  moral  responsibility  in  the  ways 
that I have considered above. These issues turn on some important 
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and  interesting  features  of  agency,  and  I  will  make  the  case  for 
considering them independently of ‘the free will debate’ and of the 
related concerns about determinism and indeterminism which have 
become so essential to discussions of ‘free will’. 
3Control and Sourcehood
3.1. Introduction
When  we  drop  the  term  ‘free  will’  from  our  philosophical 
vocabulary,  and  then  look  to  find  some  issue,  not  involving  the 
term  ‘free  will’  or  its  cognates,  that  the  relevant  parties  to  the 
debate substantially disagree over, we find that the most common 
disagreement  is  about  the  conditions  necessary  for  moral 
responsibility.  Put  simply:  most  of  the  time,  people  worry  about 
‘free  will’  because  they  worry  about  whether  or  not  we  can  be 
morally  responsible.  I  cited  various  sources  of  evidence  for  this 
claim in the previous chapter,  ranging across  incompatibilist  and 
compatibilist  views,  and certain revisionist  views about free will. 
The point was to illustrate the common connection between the use 
of  the  term  ‘free  will’  and  concerns  about  moral  responsibility 
across a range of the most popular positions that have been taken in 
the ‘free will debate’.
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With that established, the question addressed here is whether 
there is anything more to ‘free will’  that does not relate to moral 
responsibility  in  this  way.  In fact,  as  I  suggested in the previous 
chapter,  we  do  find  some  claims  in  the  literature  that  seem  to 
attribute an importance to ‘free will’ (or ‘free action’) that does not 
directly follow from its connection to moral responsibility.
These  issues  concern  a  certain  central  feature  of  agency, 
which I am going to call ‘agential control’. The term ‘control’ already 
appears in the literature on free will and moral responsibility, but I 
am  stipulating  the  present  term.  Rather  than  use  the  phrase 
‘agential control’ each time, in order to mark this distinction, I will 
simply  note  here  that,  unless  specified  otherwise,  my use  of  the 
term ‘control’ should be read as shorthand for ‘agential control’.
Agents necessarily control their actions in this way. Strictly, it 
would be more precise to say that  it  is  the behaviour,  or  ‘bodily 
motion’, that is under the intentional control of the agent, and it is 
this causing-of-behaviour-by-the-agent which is an  action.  That  is, 
when an agent’s behaviour is under her intentional control in the 
right way (to be spelled out later), this constitutes the agent carrying 
out an action — and we can say about this behaviour that ‘it was 
under her control’. I will often simply say that ‘the action was under 
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her control’, or that she ‘controlled the action’. This should be read 
as a convenient shorthand for the longer, but more precise, claim.
Reading these  issues  (i.e.  ‘free  will’  issues)  as  being about 
control  is,  of  course,  a  stipulation  of  mine  —  but  it  is  one  that 
enables us to tie together several themes common in the literature, 
and to get a better perspective on what the problem really is. One of 
the reasons that these issues have not been addressed in this way is 
that the dialectic of ‘free will’ tends to obscure the distinction that I 
am making here. 
This is because on anyone’s account, ‘free will’ is something 
had by agents, not something equivalent to agency itself (agency is a 
more or less implicit precondition for free will). By contrast, control 
is a matter of the basic metaphysics of agency. So one of the basic 
‘conceptual housekeeping’ tasks in this chapter is to point out that 
the terminology of ’free will’ has obscured an important distinction 
between  issues  about  moral  responsibility  and  issues  about  the 
metaphysics of agency.
I will make these claims more concrete in the remainder of 
this chapter, but the basic claim can be quickly stated here. In the 
free will debate, there are two areas where this notion of control is 
doing  unnoticed  work  in  the  background:  in  the  notion  of 
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‘sourcehood’ or ‘being the source of the action’, and in the woefully 
misunderstood notion of ‘agent causation’. These issues are about 
agency, and the control that agents have over their actions.  They 1
are  not  primarily  about  moral  responsibility,  and  hence  are  not 
about  ‘free  will’  in  that  sense  at  all  — contrary to  how they are 
usually presented.  The only sense in which they are ‘about’  free 2
will—i.e., about moral responsibility—is the sense in which agency 
is a basic prerequisite for any action at all.
3.2 Sourcehood and Agent Causation
When the great  importance of  free will  needs to be stressed it  is 
usually  the  notion  of  moral  responsibility  that  gets  pressed  into 
service.  But  sometimes an alternative explanation is  given for  its 
importance, and then terms such as ‘sourcehood’, ‘authorship’, or 
 See  the  point  above  regarding  this  locution:  “controlling  their  actions”.  I 1
frequently use this technically incorrect formulation for the purposes of clarity.
 Of course, I don’t favour the term ‘free will’ at all, but it’s open to someone to 2
accept what I say here and argue that ‘free will’ means both things, or that we can 
define two kinds of ‘free will’ — the kind that is about moral responsibility, and the 
kind that is about agential control. Or to stipulate that ‘free will’ is about moral 
responsibility only, and the latter issue is simply about agency. If forced to choose, I 
would prefer to just do without the term ‘free will’ altogether.
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‘ultimacy’ get brought out. For example, it might be claimed that a 
certain view of free will shows how we can be ‘the ultimate source of 
our actions’ in a way that we could not be without subscribing to 
that view of free will.
When  considering  the  importance  of  free  will,  Randolph 
Clarke writes the following:
Indeed, even apart from the issue of moral responsibility, the 
attributability  of  actions  and some of  their  consequences  to 
free agents may be regarded as something of value. In acting 
freely,  one  is  an  ultimate  source  of  one’s  behavior  and  of  its 
consequences,  which  may  be  attributable  to  one  as  their 
author.3
According to this view of free will, 
free  agents  are  (in  an  important  respect)  originators  of  their 
actions […] a free action may be attributable to the agent in a 
 Clarke (2003: 7). My emphasis.3
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certain  way,  and  some  of  its  consequences  may  be  so 
attributable4
It  is  the  ‘certain  way’  in  which  an  action  ‘gets  attributed  to  the 
agent’  that  is  the  focus of  this  chapter.  The question whether  an 
agent is the originator, or the ultimate source, of her actions is the 
question  whether  she  controls  those  actions  (agential  control). 
Clarke sometimes calls this the ‘condition of production’.
A second case in which control is the salient issue is that of 
‘agent  causation’.  The theory of  agent  causation has  been wildly 
unpopular in the literature on free will,  and has historically been 
associated with incompatibilism (also fairly unpopular). The basic 
idea here is that the causation that occurs when there is an action is 
different in some important respect from other kinds of causation in 
the world. Typically, the claim is that the agent is a substance cause 
of her action, whereas non-agential causes fall under the category 
 Clarke (2003: 6). My emphasis.4
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of ‘event causation’. ,  It is the agent herself, as a substance, that is 5 6
the cause of the action and not, for example, an event that involves 
the agent, or certain mental states of the agent.7
I will consider a specific instance of the agent causal account 
of action, as it features in an argument about free will. As I will go 
on to  explain,  there  are  two ‘types’  of  incompatibilist  about  free 
will:  those  who  invoke  the  agent  causal  theory,  and  those  that 
accept a fairly standard event causal model of action, although both 
remain incompatibilists about free will.  Now, there is a particular 
 As above, many of the more plausible versions of agent causation note that agents 5
cause  movements  or  changes  in  their  bodies  (or  mental  states),  and  it  is  that 
causally complex event that is an action — as opposed to the claim that agents as 
substances cause their actions.
 This is only one account of the uniqueness of agent causes. Other, less plausible, 6
accounts have it that the causal relation itself is somehow metaphysically special, or 
that agents are uncaused causes. 
 Some care should be taken here,  because even if  the agent  is  somehow a sui 7
generis cause ‘of her action’, there still must be some event that occurs at that time, 
viz. the event of the agent’s agent-causing the action. Note that the view suggested 
above, on which it is a bodily motion that the agent directly causes, makes more 
sense of  this:  there  is  an event,  and it  is  the  agent’s  ‘agent-causing’  the  bodily 
motion — this  event is  an action. To preempt my later argument:  this is  why I 
suggest that it is causal integration  that matters, and not what it is  that does the 
causing, so to speak.
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type  of  argument  that  challenges  the  coherence  of  the 
incompatibilist position in general, one that targets the reliance on 
indeterminism. This type of argument comes from the perspective 
of those who think free will is compatible with determinism, so the 
upshot  is  supposed  to  be  that  incompatibilism  is  incoherent  in 
principle, and a compatibilist account is to be preferred.
There  have  been  several  particular  instances  of  this 
argument, going under such informal names as ‘the luck objection’, 
the ‘chance objection’, or the ‘Mind argument’. Derk Pereboom calls 
it the ‘Humean Challenge’. For present purposes, we can group all 
of these together according to the general form that they share — 
criticism of the reliance on indeterminism as a necessary feature of 
the account of ‘free will’. I will call this collection of arguments the 
coherence problem for incompatibilism. 
Here is the dialectical situation: agent-causal incompatibilists 
often  defend  their  view  against  event-causal  incompatibilists  by 
claiming that the latter cannot respond adequately to the coherence 
problem. They claim that only by accepting the agent causal theory 
can we ensure that  the agent  has  a  special  kind of  ‘control’  (not 
agential control) over her non-deterministically caused actions, and 
it  is  (only)  this  kind  of  ‘control’  that  is  sufficient  to  resist  the 
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coherence problem. Hence we can save incompatibilism from the 
coherence problem, but only by being agent causal incompatibilists.
The  notion  of  agent  causation  thus  becomes  tied  to  a 
particular defence of incompatibilism, which is a theory about free 
will, and so it then seems that agent causation is something that has 
primarily to do with free will. Plainly, the notion of agent causation 
here is connected to an idea of ‘control’, and the very idea of agent 
causation is such that it already involves the notion of an agent in 
some sense.  However,  it  is  standardly addressed only within the 
context  of  the  free  will  debate:  it  is  more  or  less  universally 
assumed that  agent  causation is  an incompatibilist  concept.  With 
one  or  two  recent  exceptions,  the  theory  of  agent  causation  has 
historically been adopted only by incompatibilists about free will. 
Now,  these  two  issues  are  directly  connected  (sourcehood 
and agent causation), since both concern the way in which agents 
control their actions. I suggest that agent causation, like the notion 
of sourcehood, is really a particular kind of response to problems 
that  threaten  control  (agential  control).  And  both  typically  get 
presented as part of an incompatibilist theory of free will, which is 
a mistake: the notion of control is not partisan in this way, because 
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the notion of agency is not partisan — everyone, compatibilist and 
incompatibilist alike, needs an account of agency.
In what follows, I  unpack both of these debates and argue 
that they turn on the notion of agential control — they concern the 
metaphysics of agency. The problem is that they have been co-opted 
into  the  free  will  debate,  and it  has  been assumed that  they  are 
artefacts of a specific sort of incompatibilist view of ‘free will’. In 
fact,  the  issues  should  concern  both  compatibilists  and 
incompatibilists  about  ‘free  will’  (that  is,  about  the  conditions 
necessary  for  moral  responsibility).  This  is  because  they  are  not 
about free will, but about agency.
One possible reason for this confusion is as follows. If you 
think that ‘sourcehood’ is part of free will (hence required for moral 
responsibility),  you  might  think  up  cases  in  which  the  relevant 
notion of ‘sourcehood’ was absent, in an effort to show that agents 
in that condition could not be free (hence not morally responsible). 
But  if  ‘being  the  source  of  your  actions’  actually  picks  up  on 
features  needed for  control,  then in  the  absence of  those  features 
there  is  going  to  be  a  problem  for  agency  —  and  agency  is 
necessary for moral responsibility, and of course for ‘free will’ (such 
as it is). So it might indeed be possible to evoke intuitions of non-
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responsibility or ‘non-freedom’ in such cases, but not for the reason 
that is supposed.
There  are  are  at  least  three  important  consequences  of 
recognising that the issues here are concerned with agency. Firstly, 
the issues are nonpartisan: both compatibilists and incompatibilists 
about free will  need to have a theory of  control.  As a result,  the 
agent  causal  incompatibilist  loses  an  important  dialectical  move 
against event causal versions of incompatibilism. 
Secondly,  since  these  issues  have  been  tied  up  with  the 
particular motivations of the free will debate, they have not been 
exposed to the body of  literature in the philosophy of  mind and 
action which directly concerns such issues. It is likely that doing so 
will be illuminating, because there is much important work being 
done on agency in other contexts.
Thirdly,  and  most  strikingly,  since  agent  causation, 
sourcehood,  ultimate  responsibility,  etc.,  are  really  just  different 
ways of getting at the notion of control, it turns out that if certain 
incompatibilist  arguments are correct,  and ‘sourcehood’ or ‘agent 
causation’ really is not compatible with determinism, then agency is 
not compatible with determinism. I address the question whether 
we actually have good reason to think that agency is incompatible 
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with  determinism  in  the  next  chapter,  in  the  context  of  Helen 
Steward’s views on agency. The task here is simply to point out that 
this is the logical consequence of recognising that these ‘free will’ 
terms (sourcehood, agent causation) are really picking up on basic 
features of agency, viz. control.
The argument proceeds as follows.  First  I  address a recent 
view which has been called ‘source incompatibilism’, and which is 
placed in contrast to the more traditional ‘leeway incompatibilism’. 
This new version of incompatibilist free will is notable for its claim 
that  alternative  possibilities  are  not  what  is  necessary  for  moral 
responsibility,  but  rather  it  is  whether  or  not  the  agent  is  the 
ultimate source of her actions that matters.
I  consider  one  of  the  most  influential  arguments  for  this 
claim, due to Derk Pereboom, called the ‘Four-Case Manipulation 
Argument’. This manipulation argument is designed to show that 
moral  responsibility  is  incompatible  with determinism because  if 
determinism is true, then the agent is not in control of her actions, 
which are determined by sources outside of her in a responsibility-
undermining way. Hence ‘being the source of your actions’ is not 
compatible with determinism, and free will  (moral responsibility) 
requires us to be the source of our actions in this sense. Following a 
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recent response to Pereboom, I argue that the manipulation in the 
Four Case argument actually undermines agency, and this is what 
leads to the impression that moral responsibility is ruled out.
I then turn to the notion of ‘agent causation’ as it features in 
the  defence  of  certain  incompatibilist  views.  Such  agent  causal 
incompatibilists  invoke  the  thesis  of  agent  causation  in  order  to 
defend their account against the coherence problem. According to 
the  coherence  problem,  incompatibilism  is  incoherent  or  empty 
because  the  presence  of  indeterminism  undermines  the  agent’s 
‘control’  over  their  actions,  or  more  generally,  because  it  at  least 
fails to enhance their ‘control’ vis-à-vis compatibilist accounts.
Contrary to this view, I suggest that agent causation is, quite 
rightly,  a  response to  perceived difficulties  with control,  but  that 
this control is a central feature of agency (agential control). It is not 
therefore something that is only of importance to those who believe 
‘free will’ is incompatible with determinism, and are looking for a 
way  to  accommodate  indeterminism  into  their  account  without 
leaving  themselves  open  to  the  coherence  problem.  Hence  the 
theory of agent causation is of concern to both compatibilists and 
incompatibilists about free will (something which has recently been 
recognised by a small number of authors, but for different reasons).
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3.3 Source Incompatibilism
First, consider the related notions of ‘sourcehood’, ‘origination’, or 
‘being the source’ of your actions. One place that these ideas show 
up is  in discussion of  a particular kind of  incompatibilism about 
free  will,  which  has  been  called  ‘source 
incompatibilism’  (distinguished  from  so-called  ‘leeway 
incompatibilism’). 
The  primary  difference  between  these  ‘types’  of 
incompatibilism  is  based  on  what  it  is  that  is  supposed  to  be 
incompatible  with  determinism.  In  what  is  taken to  be  the  more 
traditional  type  of  incompatibilism—‘leeway’  incompatibilism—it 
is supposed that the agent must have a certain kind of alternative 
possibility  open  to  her  at  the  time  of  action.  Specifically,  this 
alternative  possibility  is  such  that  it  is  not  compatible  with 
determinism. 
The name given to this view derives from the fact that the 
agent must have some kind of ‘leeway’ with respect to their choice 
in some given situation: according to this view, if determinism were 
true, there would be no leeway to do otherwise in a given situation, 
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because there would be no ‘genuine’ alternative possibilities.  Thus, 8
the central feature of this account is adherence to the ‘principle of 
alternative possibilities’ (PAP) as a necessary condition for free will.
By  contrast,  ‘source  incompatibilism’  has  been  gaining 
traction since the introduction of Frankfurt’s ingenious method for 
constructing  counterexamples  to  PAP  (so-called  ‘Frankfurt-style 
Counterexamples’).  This  form  of  incompatibilism  focuses  much 
more closely on the causal origination of the action: it addresses the 
kind of ‘control’ the agent has over the action.
Frankfurt’s  basic argument was that  PAP is  false:  an agent 
can be morally responsible for an action even if she could not have 
done otherwise. I take no stand here on whether Frankfurt’s claim 
is true, although it has been widely accepted. Clearly, compatibilists 
have  taken  Frankfurt’s  argument  against  PAP  to  support  their 
position: if it turns out that alternative possibilities (at least the kind 
which are incompatible with determinism) are not in fact required 
for  moral  responsibility,  then  the  leeway  incompatibilist’s  main 
argument in support of their position has been defeated, because 
they had claimed that an agent is free (‘morally responsible for their 
actions’) only if they have alternative possibilities in this sense.
 Only, it seems, the truth of various counterfactuals.8
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However,  source  incompatibilists  have  also  accepted 
Frankfurt’s  argument.  They  claim  that  what  is  important  is  not 
whether agents have alternative possibilities available to them, but 
whether  they  are  the  source  of  their  actions.  For  example,  they 
might  accept  that  the  imagined  agent  in  a  Frankfurt-scenario  is 
morally  responsible  for  her  actions,  even  though  (as  Frankfurt 
points out) they could not have done otherwise, because that agent 
was still the source of her action in that scenario — and that’s what 
matters for ‘free will’, not alternative possibilities. 
The  crucial  incompatibilist  move  here  is  to  insist  that  the 
relevant sense of ‘ultimate source’ is  such that one cannot be the 
ultimate source of  an action if  determinism is  true.  According to 
Michael McKenna:
Source  incompatibilists  hold  that  determinism does  rule  out 
free will.  But it  does so,  not  because it  rules out alternative 
possibilities,  but  instead,  because,  if  true,  the  sources  of  an 
agent's actions do not originate in the agent but are traceable 
to factors outside her.9
 McKenna (2003: 201-2). Emphasis in original.9
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McKenna  suggests  that,  according  to  the  Source  Incompatibilist, 
determinism rules  out  free will  because it  would have the result 
that “the sources of an agent's actions do not originate in the agent 
but are traceable to factors outside her.”
The  ‘origination’  that  McKenna  describes  in  this  passage 
sometimes  gets  called  ‘sourcehood’.  It  is  this  notion  that  I  am 
challenging here. I claim that what is important about ‘sourcehood’ 
or ‘origination’ is really a feature of agency, but that it is misleading 
to think about these problems under the guise of such metaphors as 
‘the  source’  or  ‘origin’.  Hence,  the  terminology here  obscures  an 
important issue, and in my view the problem is better addressed by 
replacing such terms with that of ‘agential control’.
To briefly preempt the conclusion of this chapter, the point is 
that terms like ‘source’ and ‘origin’,  and phrases like ‘originating 
within  the  agent’,  are  all  suggestive  of  a  certain  special  location 
within the agent. This is symptomatic of a decades-long fixation on 
causal determinism, where there is a felt need to ‘break the chain’ of 
causation that  apparently  leads ‘outside the  agent’  into  the  deep 
past where no moral responsibility (or ‘free will’  for that matter) 
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existed.  By contrast,  my notion of agential control takes it to be 10
causal  integration  rather  than  causal  source  that  is  important  for 
agency.
To  make  things  more  concrete,  I  will  now  consider  a 
particular example from the free will  literature:  Derk Pereboom’s 
‘Four-Case Manipulation Argument’  (4CA),  which is  billed as  an 
argument against compatibilist views of free will, and which turns 
on questions of ‘sourcehood’ or ‘origination’ of this kind.
3.3.1 The Four-Case Manipulation Argument
The standard reference for Pereboom’s 4CA is the version given in 
Living Without Free Will (2001).  Pereboom presents the 4CA as an 11
argument  against  compatibilism:  it  is  designed  to  show  that 
determinism would rule out moral responsibility in a way that is 
 The point being, it seems, that where such chains are present, responsibility is 10
transmitted  along  the  chain  from  earlier  times  to  later  times.  If  there  is  no 
responsibility at earlier parts, because no human beings existed, then how can the 
agent be responsible at later times? So goes the general worry.
 The version found in Chapter 4 of Pereboom (2001) is the one I will refer to, but 11
also  see  the  more  recent  (2014).  None  of  the  changes  in  later  modifications 
materially  affect  the  following  discussion  here,  and  some  of  the  commentary 
discussed  below  use  the  (2001)  version,  so  I  rely  on  that  presentation  of  the 
argument.
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similar to the covert manipulation of an agent. That is, Pereboom 
hopes to show that agents cannot be responsible for “decisions that 
are alien-deterministic events.”  He intends to show that 12
if an agent’s decision is an alien-deterministic event, he cannot 
be its source in the way required for moral responsibility.13
 The  reference  to  ‘alien-deterministic’  events  here  is  important, 
because  the  problematic  causal  determination  in  these  cases  is 
determination by ‘sources outside the agent’: either in the case of 
covert manipulation by other agents, or, according to Pereboom, in 
a ‘normal deterministic world’.
In  terms of  structure,  the  4CA is  intended to  be  a  general 
argument that works against any possible version of compatibilism, 
and in that sense it offers a ‘family’ of arguments, or a framework 
for constructing arguments in response to any new modifications to 
the  compatibilist’s  proposal.  As  Pereboom  notes,  the  majority  of 
compatibilist  accounts  are  built  on  what  he  calls  ‘causal 
integrationist  conditions’  (CI-conditions).  These  conditions  are 
 Pereboom (2001: 90).12
 Ibid. My emphasis.13
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what  I  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter:  they  are  what  the 
compatibilist takes to be the conditions necessary for an agent to be 
morally  responsible.  Hence,  having  ‘free  will’  according  to  the 
compatibilist  is  a matter of being an agent who meets the causal 
integrationist conditions.
Pereboom intends to  show that  compatibilist  CI-conditions 
are  not  sufficient,  because  we  can  generate  scenarios  in  which 
agents  meet  those  conditions,  but  intuitively  fail  to  be  morally 
responsible.  The upshot of Pereboom’s argument is that we must 
add a further condition—sourcehood—in order for the agent to be 
morally  responsible,  and  this  condition  is  not  compatible  with 
determinism.  Hence  no  version  of  compatibilism  can  succeed, 
because  the  condition  required  for  responsibility  is  specifically 
incompatible with determinism.
The  4CA  claims  to  take  any  of  the  proposed  causal 
integrationist conditions, and show that it  is  nonetheless possible 
for agents meeting those conditions to be covertly manipulated. Now 
while some might take this demonstration in itself to repudiate the 
compatibilist’s claim that those conditions are sufficient for moral 
responsibility,  Pereboom  goes  on  to  construct  a  series  of 
generalising  cases  which  move  from  the  case  of  covert 
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manipulation to the final case of a ‘normal compatibilist agent’ in a 
deterministic  world.  The  point  is  to  show  not  just  that  some 
particular version compatibilism is internally problematic (because 
the  CI-conditions  are  consistent  with  manipulation),  but  that,  if 
determinism  is  true,  all  our  actions  are  like  those  under 
manipulation, because determinism is relevantly similar to covert 
manipulation.
It will be helpful to have Pereboom’s statement of Case 1 to 
work with, since this is the most important case,  from which the 
other cases generalise. In the following extract I have highlighted 
the five CI-conditions that Pereboom includes, which he takes to be 
representative of the main compatibilist positions presently on offer 
in the philosophical literature:
Case 1.  Professor Plum was created by neuroscientists,  who 
can  manipulate  him  directly  through  the  use  of  radio-like 
technology, but he is as much like an ordinary human being as 
is  possible,  given this  history.  Suppose these  neuroscientists 
“locally”  manipulate  him  to  undertake  the  process  of 
reasoning  by  which  his  desires  are  brought  about  and 
modified – directly producing his every state from moment to 
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moment. The neuroscientists manipulate him by, among other 
things,  pushing  a  series  of  buttons  just  before  he  begins  to 
reason  about  his  situation,  thereby  causing  his  reasoning 
process to be rationally egoistic. Plum is not constrained to act 
in the sense that  he does not  act  because of  an irresistible 
desire  –  the  neuroscientists  do  not  provide  him  with  an 
irresistible desire – and he does not think and act contrary to 
character  since  he  is  often  manipulated  to  be  rationally 
egoistic.  His  effective  first-order  desire  to  kill  Ms.  White 
conforms  to  his  second-order  desires.  Plum’s  reasoning 
process  exemplifies  the  various  components  of  moderate 
reasons-responsiveness.  He  is  receptive  to  the  relevant 
pattern  of  reasons,  and  his  reasoning  process  would  have 
resulted in different choices in some situations in which the 
egoistic reasons were otherwise. At the same time, he is not 
exclusively rationally egoistic since he will typically regulate 
his behavior by moral reasons when the egoistic reasons are 
relatively weak – weaker than they are in the current situation.
The ‘generalisation strategy’ employed in the argument begins with 
this case. Pereboom believes that everyone will have the intuition 
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that  an  agent  in  this  scenario  clearly  would  not  be  morally 
responsible for her actions, because of the covert manipulation. The 
argument  then  gradually  moves  through  a  series  of  slightly 
different  cases  until  we  get  to  Case  4,  in  which  “physicalist 
determinism is true, and [the agent] is an ordinary human being”.14
The argument  has  been subject  to  a  lot  of  discussion,  and 
responses  to  it  have  generally  been  divided  into  two  categories: 
‘soft  line’  and  ‘hard  line’  responses.  The  4CA  presents  the 
compatibilist with a problem: if the agent (‘Professor Plum’) in Case 
1 is clearly not responsible for his actions, and if Plum in Case 4 is 
just  a  normal  agent  in  a  world  where  determinism is  true,  then 
either  Plum  in  Case  4  is  not  responsible  (and  compatibilism  is 
false),  or  the  compatibilist  must  point  to  some relevant  difference 
between the cases, with respect to the ‘problematic’ determination. 
According to Pereboom, there is no relevant difference between the 
kinds of determination in each of the cases. Hence, the problem in 
Case 1 ultimately generalises to Case 4. The soft-liner has to show 
where, in the transition from Case 1 to Case 4, Plum starts being 
morally responsible.
 Pereboom (2001: 115).14
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The soft  line response to the 4CA thus shares the intuition 
that  Pereboom is  trying to  evoke in Case 1  of  the argument:  the 
intuition that Plum is not responsible in that case, because of the 
manipulation.  The  soft-liner’s  task  is  to  show  that  this  case  is 
importantly different from Case 4, which is just a case in which we 
suppose the truth of determinism, but where everything else is just 
as we normally suppose the world to be. 
For example, the soft-liner could show that although Plum’s 
responsibility is undermined in the early cases of manipulation, this 
is  because Plum has not  in  fact  met  all  of  the compatibilist’s  CI-
conditions. In other words, they must claim that Pereboom has not 
accurately  described  the  compatibilist’s  vision  of  a  morally 
responsible agent in setting up the 4CA. If these other conditions 
were  added,  this  reply  goes,  then we would no longer  have  the 
intuition that Pereboom wishes to invoke, i.e. that such an agent is 
not responsible, and the 4CA could not get off the ground.
A prima facie problem with the soft line response is that the 
incompatibilist opponent simply adds in that new condition to their 
description  of  Plum in  Case  1.  The  strength  of  the  4CA,  and  of 
manipulation arguments in general, is that they appear to be open-
ended  in  this  sense:  whatever  the  causal  conditions  are  that  the 
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compatibilist deems necessary can simply be included, and a new 
form of manipulation devised such that the new conditions get ‘put 
into place’ by the relevant intervention.
For this reason, McKenna has been particularly influential in 
advocating a hard line  response to the problem. In short, the hard 
line response turns the argument around, and aims to show that 
Plum  in  Case  1  is  responsible  for  his  actions,  because  the 
manipulation there  is  not  relevantly  different  to  determinism (as 
Pereboom  argues)  —  and  determinism  is  not  a  barrier  to 
responsibility, by definition, for compatibilism. Here, the hard liner 
accepts the generalisation claim (that the determination in each case 
is  not  relevantly  different),  but  takes  this  to  show  that  the 
responsibility that is present in the deterministic case (which is just a 
statement  of  compatibilism)  actually  generalises  to  Case  1, 
featuring manipulation.
While  this  is  an  impressive  attempt  to  bite  the  bullet,  my 
argument  will  be  that  there  is  a  deeper  problem  with  the 
manipulation  described  in  Case  1:  it  undermines  Plum’s  agency. 
Hence,  as  well  as  offering  a  more  robust  form  of  the  soft  line 
response,  this  will  also  serve  to  demonstrate  the  problem  with 
thinking in terms of the ‘source’ or ‘origin’ of the action as being 
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important for agency, as Pereboom sets things up: instead, we shall 
see that these issues are about control, and a proper understanding 
of control reveals that it is causal integration rather than causal source 
that matters for agency. And while the notion of sourcehood is tied 
up with  the  standard ‘free  will’  metaphysics  of  uncaused causes 
and  metaphysical  indeterminism,  causal  integration  is 
straightforwardly approachable from the philosophy of mind, as I 
will explore further in later chapters.
3.3.2 Responding to the Four-Case Argument
While  Pereboom  obviously  intends  the  4CA  to  count  against 
compatibilism, in the context of his overall position he intends the 
argument to count against event-causal incompatibilism as well. His 
own view is that only agent causal incompatibilism can account for 
free  will  and  moral  responsibility.  However,  according  to 
Pereboom,  agent  causation  is  highly  implausible  given  our  best 
theories about the physical world, and hence we do not in fact have 
free will, and are not in fact morally responsible for anything (hard 
incompatibilism). 
Nevertheless,  it  is  Pereboom’s  view  that  an  agent  causal 
incompatibilist account is the only view that could account for these 
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things, if it were empirically plausible. The principle on which this 
argument  turns  is  what  he  calls  a  “claim  about  origination”, 
captured here by Principle O:
(O)  If  an  agent  is  morally  responsible  for  her  deciding  to 
perform an action, then the production of this decision must 
be something over which the agent has control, and an agent 
is not morally responsible for the decision if it is produced by 
a source over which she has no control.15
Pereboom  argues  that  Principle  O  not  only  counts  against 
compatibilism, as set out in the 4CA, but also that it counts against 
event-causal incompatibilism, since he believes that an agent could 
not have the requisite control over a nondeterministic event.
I  will  not  consider  Pereboom’s  claims against  event  causal 
incompatibilism here, because it is the same argument that I discuss 
below in a more general context, when I consider the use of ‘agent 
causation’  as  a  means  of  responding  to  the  various  coherence 
objections. Pereboom, like other incompatibilists, does not believe 
that  an  agent  could  have  the  relevant  control  over  a 
 Pereboom (2001: 4).15
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nondeterministic  event  unless  they  had  a  special  agent  causal 
power.
The important point to note here is Pereboom’s suggestion 
that having the requisite control over the action requires that the 
agent be the causal source or origin of the action. If one thinks that 
what matters for agency is the causal source or origin, the theory of 
agent causation certainly seems to be a possible solution. However, 
I will argue that Pereboom’s statement of the problem in the 4CA 
encourages a false dilemma, as a result of seeing the issue of control 
as one about origination. 
By  contrast,  in  the  following  chapters,  I  will  develop  an 
alternative  account  of  agency.  This  metaphysics  of  agency  fully 
expands on my notion of control: rather than seeing control in this 
sense as an answer to the ‘problem of origination’ discussed so far 
(as  Pereboom  encourages),  it  would  be  better  thought  of  as  a 
reframing  of  the  problem  itself,  or  a  demonstration  that  a  third 
alternative is possible, thus refusing to accept the dilemma set up 
by the 4CA.
Now, the aim in the present chapter is simply to show that 
the 4CA, which is typically presented as a problem for free will and 
moral responsibility in the light of determinism, actually rests on 
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certain assumptions about agency. To put this point the other way 
around: recognising that the metaphysics of agency is relevant here 
has  implications  for  the  philosophy  of  free  will  and  moral 
responsibility,  because when we have a correct theory of agential 16
control, this automatically rules out certain kinds of manipulation, 
and invalidates a powerful argument in the free will literature — 
but not because of anything about moral responsibility, but because 
of our theory of agency.
If  the manipulation in the 4CA suppresses agency,  as I  am 
suggesting, then, since any account of compatibilist CI-conditions is 
inseparable from a workable theory of agency, no compatibilist (or 
indeed incompatibilist) account could be subject to a manipulation 
argument of this kind. This is because agency itself is a matter of 
causal integration. The conditions that the compatibilist identifies 
as being necessary conditions for an agent to be morally responsible 
place  various  particular  constraints  on  this  causal  integration,  as 
Pereboom notes. But there is a more basic sense in which an agent 
must be causally integrated in order to be an agent at  all:  this is 
what the thesis of agential control says. Now there is an argument 
against the 4CA.
 Of course, in my view, the addition of ‘free will’ here is redundant.16
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1. Agency  is  a  prerequisite  for  anyone’s  account  of  moral 
responsibility  or  ‘free  will’,  compatibilist  or  incompatibilist, 
including Pereboom’s own view.
2. According to the thesis of agential control,  agency necessarily 
requires causal integration of a certain kind.
3. The manipulation described in Case 1 of the 4CA destroys this 
causal integration.
4. Therefore, the 4CA has failed to establish that there is a possible 
agent  who satisfies  the  compatibilist’s  requirements  on moral 
responsibility,  and  who  is  subject  to  covert  manipulation, 
contrary to the stated premises of the argument.
5. The 4CA is invalid.
The task now is to show that the manipulation proposed in 
Case 1 actually suppresses agency. Someone who is subject to that 
manipulation would not be an agent: at the very least, they would 
not be an agent with respect to any behaviour occurring while they 
are subject to the manipulation, which, for the present argument, is 
the relevant occasion.
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Kristin  Demetriou  has  argued  that  the  manipulation 
Pereboom  describes  in  this  case  suppresses  Plum’s  agency,  and 
hence the argument fails as an argument against the compatibilist 
CI-conditions  for  free  will  and  moral  responsibility.  Demetriou 
makes this  claim in the service of  a general  soft  line response to 
Pereboom.
In fact, John Fischer had already questioned whether Plum, 
manipulated as he is from his birth, could have ever developed a 
‘coherent  self’,  and  whether  this  is  what  undermines  his 
responsibility  (this  not  being  the  case  in  the  straightforward 
deterministic  world).  The  claim  that  Plum  might  not  have  a 17
‘coherent self’ is in some respects similar to the claim that he is not 
an  agent.  Clearly,  then,  other  philosophers  have  recognised  that 
there  is  something  curious  about  the  extent  to  which  Plum  is 
manipulated  in  the  example,  something  that  extends  beyond 
‘merely’ questioning his culpability.
I  believe  that  the  most  important  point  to  take  from 
Demetriou’s argument is that, while it may seem as though we can 
simply  posit  a  kind  of  manipulation  that  brings  about  ‘causal 
integrationist  conditions’  such  as  ‘constancy  of  character’  or 
 See for example, Fischer and and Ravizza (1998: 234-5, n. 28).17
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‘having  a  reasons-responsive  mechanism’,  this  is  only  because 
insufficient care has been taken to understand how these conditions 
relate to agency, which is itself  a matter of causal integration. We 
can not simply assume that the proposed manipulation in Case 1 
does  not  interfere  with  agency  itself:  as  Demetriou  argues,  such 
manipulation is in fact antithetical to agency, and, for that reason, 
one cannot simultaneously suppose that such manipulation takes 
place, and that the compatibilist CI-conditions are satisfied. As she 
puts it (where PlumX is to be read as Plum-in-Case-X):
However,  even  if  Plum1  and  Plum4  have  exactly  similar 
physical  and  qualitative  states,  this  does  not  ensure  that 
Plum1 and Plum4 have the same status in terms of agency.18
To  illustrate,  she  constructs  a  pair  of  diagrams,  which  will  be 
familiar to those used to reading the literature on mental causation, 
to represent the differences between Plum1  (when manipulated by 
‘neuroscientists’)  and  Plum4  (who  is  simply  an  agent  in  a 
deterministic world):
 Demetriou (2010: 608).18
—  !   —94
Fig. 3.1  Plum in Normal Deterministic World
  
Fig 3.2  Plum Subject to Manipulation
In  these  diagrams,  B  represents  the  physical  state  of  Plum  (the 
“brain state”), M represents the mental state, and NS represents the 
neuroscientists  who  are  manipulating  Plum.  The  solid  arrows 
represent  causal  relationships,  and  the  vertical  dashed  arrows 
represent some kind of supervenience relationship.
The compatibilist  holds  that  Plum4 is  a  normal  agent  in  a 
deterministic world. While Demetriou does not go into great detail 
about  this  form of  agency,  enough is  said  to  convey the  general 
attempts to defend the existence of a morally relevant diﬀerence between
these scenarios, supporters of the 4-CA have been less than impressed
because, hitherto, the metaphysical underpinnings of this diﬀerence have
not been adequately exposed. However, now that we know that the only
interpretations of Case 1 which generate the intuition that Plum1 is not
morally responsible are also those in which the neuroscientists win the
competition for causal control over Plum1’s states, it is possible to expose the
fundamental diﬀerence between the causal relations that obtain in the viable
interpretations of Case 1 and those that obtain in Case 4. We have seen that
when the neuroscientists win the competition for causal control of Plum1’s
states, it is because they unilaterally initiate changes in those states. With that
in mind, consider the following diagrams illustrating the causal relations
between the Plums’ bodily/brain states (B), the phenomenological mental
states (M) associated with (B), and the manipulative neuroscientists (NS):8
A deep diﬀerence between Plum1 and Plum4 is immediately apparent:
Plum1 is not a causally integrated entity in the same way as Plum4.10
Figure 2a. Plum as Causally Regulated by Neuroscientists (Case 1).9
Figure 1. Plum as Normal Human Person in a Causally Deterministic World
(Case 4).
8This style of diagram is often used in philosophy of mind to represent diﬀerent visions of mental
causation. I believe that my arguments are eﬀective regardless of one’s preferred theory of mental
causation, so I leave it to the reader to fill in and deal with the unrelated challenges resulting from his/her
views on mental causation.
9One might wonder how information about Plum1’s states is transmitted to the neuroscientists in this
scenario, given that such transmission presumably would be causal and no causal route running from Plum1
to the neuroscientists is represented. To clarify, the lack of a causal arrow here simply reflects the lack of a
direct causal relation between Plum1’s bodily state and the subsequent button-pressing by the neuroscientists.
That is, I do not want to deny the presence of a causal chain which could account for the neuroscientists
knowledge of Plum1’s every state. What this diagram is designed to show is that Plum1’s states are not the
proximate causes of any of the neuroscientists’ button-pressings (while, on the other hand, the proximate
cause of any one of Plum4’s states is his own prior state). That is, Plum1’s states do not, on their own,
causally necessitate that the neuroscientists press the buttons that they do. Rather, they press the buttons
they do as a causal result of their own, independent reasoning—meaning that they are free to decide, for
reasons all their own, which state to cause in Plum1 at any given moment of the manipulation.
10This diagram will be useful even if one wishes to argue that Plum1 might have causal integration between
some of his states even though his reasoning process and behaviour, owing to the causal input of the
neuroscientists, is diﬀerent than it would have been. In such cases, Figure 2a could be seen as scoping down
on the precise location of the failure of agency that occurs where the neuroscientists causally regulate the
isolated area of Plum1’s brain/body which constitutes his reasoning process. (Of course, it is now highly
suspect to call the causally disjointed series of states at issue a ‘reasoning process’.) This narrowing of scope
does not aﬀect my argument, of course, for the states constituting one’s reasoning process are the most
central to one’s agency (at least the robust sort required for moral responsibility), and so a failure of causal
integration among these states alone would be suﬃcient to undermine Plum1’s agency.
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Plum1 is not a causally integrated entity in the same way as Plum4.10
Figure 2a. Plum as Causally Regulated by Neuroscientists (Case 1).9
Figure 1. Plum as Normal Human Person in a Causally Deterministic World
(Case 4).
8This style of diagram is often used in philosophy of mind to represent diﬀerent visions of mental
causation. I believe that my arguments are eﬀective regardless of one’s preferred theory of mental
causation, so I leave it to the reader to fill in and deal with the unrelated challenges resulting from his/her
views on mental causation.
9One might wonder how information about Plum1’s states is transmitted to the neuroscientists in this
scenario, given that such transmission presumably would be causal and no causal route running from Plum1
to the neuroscientists is represented. To clarify, the lack of a causal arrow here simply reflects the lack of a
direct causal relation between Plum1’s bodily state and the subsequent button-pressing by the neuroscientists.
That is, I do not want o deny the pres ce of a causal chain which could account fo the neuroscientists
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10This diagram will be useful even if one wishes to argue that Plum1 might have causal integration between
some of his states even though his reasoning process and behaviour, owing to the causal input of the
neuroscientists, is diﬀerent than it would have been. In such cases, Figure 2a could be seen as scoping down
on the precise location of the failure of agency that occurs where the neuroscientists causally regulate the
isolated area of Plum1’s brain/body which constitutes his reasoning process. (Of course, it is now highly
suspect to call the causally disjointed series of states at issue a ‘reasoning process’.) This narrowing of scope
does not aﬀect my argument, of course, for the states constituting one’s reasoning process are the most
central to one’s agency (at least the robust sort required for moral responsibility), and so a failure of causal
integration among these states alone would be suﬃcient to undermine Plum1’s agency.
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features  —  the  important  thing  is  to  compare  it  to  the 
representation of what Plum’s agency would have to look like for 
the manipulation described in Case 1 to occur as intended.
Demetriou’s  main  problem with  Plum1 is  that  he  is  not  a 
causally  integrated entity  in  the  same way as  Plum4,  and so we 
ought  to  question whether  ‘Plum1’  is  really  an  agent  at  all.  At 19
least,  there  certainly  appears  to  be  something  defective  about 
Plum’s  agency  in  this  case.  In  Plum4,  there  is  supervenience 
between the  M level  and the  B  level,  but  there  is  also  causation 
across time: from B1 → B2 and from M1 → M2 and so forth. That is, 
Plum’s earlier states causally impact his later states. 
By contrast, in Case 1, we are told by Pereboom that Plum’s 
states  are  brought  about  (caused)  ‘moment-to-moment’  by  the 
neuroscientists  and their  technology.  The  most  charitable  way of 
reading this claim for Pereboom’s argument, such that it does not 
turn the 4CA into a nonstarter, is that the manipulation will result 
in something like Plum1 above. 
Demetriou  goes  to  some  length  to  consider  the  different 
ways of interpreting the ‘moment-to-moment’ claim, and settles on 
this  as  the  most  hermeneutically  viable  option.  Briefly,  if  Plum’s 
 Demetriou (2010: 607).19
—  !   —96
own states compete with NS, then either Plum ‘wins’ (thus he is not 
manipulated,  and  4CA  cannot  get  started)  or  NS  wins  causal 
‘control’  (and we have the diagram above). Similarly, if Plum and 20
NS together overdetermine the causation of Plum’s states, then we do 
not clearly have manipulation either — since, by definition, Plum’s 
own state-causation would be independently sufficient for bringing 
about his later states. 
Hence the argument can only get started if we assume that 
NS  causes  Plum’s  states  in  the  way  represented  in  the  diagram 
above. Of course, this diagram represents Plum’s own mental states 
here (M1, M2 . . .) as being epiphenomenal. Indeed, the diagrams in 
Figures 3.1-2 are similar to those texts in the philosophy of mind 
which  address  various  difficulties  for  mental  causation  and 
epiphenomenalism.
The  problem  is  that  this  kind  of  manipulation  actually 
undermines agency. There is no causal integration between Plum’s 
own mental and physical states over time. There is a succession of 
 Note  that  ‘control’  here  means  something  like  Pereboom’s  understanding  of 20
‘control’. One of my main arguments is that control is not a matter of standing in 
relation to oneself in something like the way NS stands to Plum.
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‘time-slice’ mental and physical states, each individually caused by 
the external agents. As Demetriou puts it:
Plum1’s physical and qualitative mental states are not causally 
efficacious  in  bringing  about  his  subsequent  physical  and 
mental states; Plum1’s states are, rather, the end effects of the 
causal powers expressed by the neuroscientists.21
The  diagram  for  Plum4  tells  us  very  little  about  what  view  of 
agency  is  being  supposed  here.  One  way  of  reading  it  is  as  a 
simplistic ‘causal theory’ of action, according to which actions are 
the result of behaviour being appropriately caused by intentional 
mental states. Demetriou may or may not have something like this 
in mind: the important point here is that causal structure matters for 
agency.  Since  the  diagram  for  Plum4  is  rather  ‘bare-bones’,  it  is 
consistent  with  several  more  detailed  views,  including  the  one  I 
will go on to present in later chapters. In principle, then, there is 
nothing  wrong  with  Demetriou’s  diagram  for  the  agent  in  the 
deterministic world, it is simply under-described as it stands.
 Demetriou (2010: 608).21
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The lesson to take from the 4CA is that the metaphysics of 
agency is  more important  to  these problems than has previously 
been appreciated. In some sense, the Source Incompatibilist is right 
to question whether Plum could really ‘be the source’ of his action 
in  these  cases,  since  there  is  certainly  something defective  about 
Plum’s  agency  in  Case  1,  and  it  may  be  this  which  drives  the 
intuition of non-responsibility here.
But the problem is not one of causal origination, it is one of 
causal integration. Pereboom’s argument would have us believe that 
we are genuinely responsible for our actions only if we can manage 
to stand in the same relation to our  actions as the neuroscientists 
stand  in  relation  to  Plum’s.  In  Case  1,  Pereboom  supposes  that 
everyone  will  share  the  intuition  that  Plum  is  not  responsible, 
because the neuroscientists ‘are in control’.
Hence,  in  order  to  be  genuinely  responsible,  Plum  would 
have  to  occupy  the  position  that  is  thus  occupied  by  the 
neuroscientists:  but  this  is  impossible  on  the  deterministic  event 
causal picture, because there is always some prior set of states or 
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events  which  cause  the  later  states.  Therefore,  the  only  way of 22
satisfying this  origination  or sourcehood requirement (apparently 
needed for control), is by being a substance-cause of your actions 
for  which  there  is  no  prior  sufficient  cause  —  hence 
nondeterministic  agent  causation,  Pereboom’s  favoured  view  of 
‘free will’, emerges as the apparent solution to the problem he has 
set for the compatibilist.
By contrast,  the view of agency presented in later chapters 
takes causal integration to be what matters for agency and control: 
in particular, that what matters is that there is the relevant causal 
integration between intentional  mental  states,  consciousness,  and 
behaviour.  The  point  here  is  that  focus  on  ‘origination’  is  a  red 
herring, brought about by a mistaken impression of what is needed 
for  an  agent  to  ‘control  their  actions’.  As  I  will  show  in  later 
chapters, causal integration of the right kind is sufficient to sustain 
a robust (and nonreductive) account of intentional agency, which is 
compelling in its own right.
 This  counts  against  deterministic  and  indeterministic  event  causal  pictures, 22
because in both cases there is always some prior event-cause, whether it causes its 
effects with probability 1, or < 1.
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Finally,  before  moving  on  to  consider  the  second example 
from  the  free  will  literature,  it  is  worth  pointing  out  some 
implications of the above reading of the 4CA. In particular, there is 
an  outstanding  point  regarding  the  ‘generalisation’  claim  that  is 
involved in  Pereboom’s  argument.  So  far  I  have  argued that  the 
4CA cannot get started, because the manipulation involved in Case 
1 suppresses agency,  and hence the CI-conditions cannot be met, 
contrary  to  the  stated  assumptions  of  the  argument.  But  the 
generalisation claim itself  is  an important part  of  the 4CA, and I 
have not directly addressed it.
The  potential  difficulty  here  is  that  one  might  accept  that 
Pereboom’s proposed manipulation in Case 1 does suppress Plum’s 
agency,  but  also  retain  the  generalisation  claim:  viz.,  that  the 
manipulation in Case 1 is not relevantly different from determinism. 
Hence  it  appears  as  though  the  4CA becomes  an  argument  for 
agency incompatibilism! If the problematic determination in Case 1 
is such that Plum is not an agent, and if the generalisation strategy 
remains valid, then all of our actions are like this if determinism is 
true, and agency is incompatible with determinism.
The response of course is to block the generalisation claim. 
As with the comments above, once we recognise that it is not causal 
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origination  or  sourcehood  that  matters,  but  rather  causal 
integration, we can see that there are relevant differences between 
the kinds of determination involved in each case. 
Note  that  the  problem  with  Case  1  was  not  the  fact  that 
determinism  is  true:  the  problem  is  the  kind  of  intervention  on 
Plum’s  states  carried  out  by  the  neuroscientists.  Because  of  the 
manipulation, the causal integration required for Plum’s agency is 
destroyed  (all  of  his  mental  and  physical  states  are  caused 
independently of each other). Put simply, it doesn’t matter whether 
they cause Plum’s states deterministically or otherwise, the fact that 
they cause them at all (in this way) is what makes the trouble for 
agency.
By contrast, in Case 4 the ‘determination’ involved is simply 
the fact of physical determinism. There is no mention of external 
agents  manipulating Plum. The exact  causal  relations that  obtain 
will  depend  on  the  theory  of  agency  that  we  are  supposing,  of 
course, but there is nothing about determinism which, in principle, 
interferes  with  causal  integration,  because  deterministic  causal 
integration is still integration.
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3.5 Agent Causation
I  noted above that  Pereboom intends the Four Case argument to 
apply not just to the compatibilist,  but also to the incompatibilist 
who takes an ‘event causal’  view of action.  Although there is  no 
single ‘event causal’ incompatibilist view, the general target here is 
any account in which the standard view of action is simply taken for 
granted. Since the standard view of action is generally supposed to 
be  some  kind  of  causal  theory  (the  so-called  ‘Causal  Theory  of 
Action’),  such views are ‘event causal incompatibilist’  views. The 
‘theory of action’ is the general view one has about how actions are 
produced, or come about: e.g. whether actions are events, whether 
they are caused by mental states such as belief and desire, and the 
relation  between  bodily  motions  and  the  action  itself.  Such 
questions  are  not  specific  to  ‘the  free  will  problem’,  but  are 
independent philosophical questions.
Hence  the  most  basic  way  in  which  incompatibilists  can 
disagree with compatibilists here is by insisting that the causation 
of  behaviour  by  mental  states,  which  for  the  compatibilist  is 
sufficient for free and morally responsible action, must actually be 
an instance of nondeterministic—probabilistic—causation in order to 
be responsible action (i.e. ‘free’ as they put it). There need not be 
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any  other  disagreement  other  than  regarding  the  presence  of 
indeterminism (somewhere) in the story of action. This is perhaps 
one  of  the  more  common  ways  in  which  compatibilists  and 
incompatibilists  dispute  the  free  will  problem.  For  example, 23
Clarke  writes,  when  comparing  compatibilist  views  on  ‘control’ 
with incompatibilist views:
My  aim  is  to  compare  the  degree  of  control  that  an  agent 
might possess if her behaviour is deterministically produced 
with what might be possessed by an otherwise similar agent 
in  the  production  of  whose  behaviour  there  is  some 
indeterminism. The proper comparison requires that we look 
at agents who are similar except for the indeterminism.24
The compatibilist standardly raises the coherence problem against 
such  incompatibilist  views.  To  see  the  force  of  this  problem, 
 This  is  ‘event  causal  incompatibilism’.  See for  example Robert  Kane’s  classic 23
account in (1996). Wiggins (1973) gives an early and clear example. An interesting 
recent version of this type of view is Balaguer (2010). As for compatibilism, that 
view has almost never been associated with anything other than the standard view 
of action, and so is by default ‘event causal compatibilism’.
 Clarke (1995: 125). My emphasis, but Clarke’s sense of ‘control’.24
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consider  van  Inwagen’s  example  of  a  thief  who is  torn  between 
robbing the poor box, or refraining from doing so.  According to 25
the incompatibilist view, it must be metaphysically open whether or 
not he will rob the box, right up until the point at which he acts. He 
has  some  reasons  for  taking  the  action,  as  well  as  reasons  for 
refraining. There will be some probability attaching to each course 
of action, such that we can say he is more likely to do one rather than 
the other (or perhaps that they are equally likely).
Glossing over many of the details for the moment, we can see 
that when he acts, the desires and beliefs he had, which constituted 
the reasons he had for so acting, caused the action. Assume he chose 
to commit the crime. Then the reasons he had for doing so (a need 
for money, a belief that he could get away with it, etc.) are in fact 
the causes of the action. Had he refrained instead, the reasons he 
had for refraining would have been the cause of his behaviour. This 
is an instance of nondeterministic causation, but otherwise exactly 
matches the compatibilist’s view of what happens when an agent 
acts. (Also note that it is not the theory of nondeterministic event 
causation  per  se  that  is  the  problem  here  —  in  general,  such 
probabilistic causation is uncontroversial.)
 Van Inwagen (1983).25
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The  point  is  that  there  are  possible  compatibilist  and 
incompatibilist  views  of  free  will  that  only  differ  in  respect  of 
whether or not they require indeterminism. That is, only in terms of 
whether the casual connections between the relevant mental states 
and  behaviour  are  deterministic  or  nondeterministic.  They  may 
otherwise be identical theories of action, including any epistemic or 
situational conditions that may be involved. 
The  coherence  problem  is  this:  since  by  hypothesis  the 
incompatibilist  agent may have reasons for doing A, and reasons 
for not doing A, it seems that once we have determined what the 
relevant probabilities are for each course of action, there is nothing 
else the agent can ‘contribute’ that further determines which action 
she takes, i.e. which of the various possible reasons actually  cause 
the relevant behaviour.  So it  is  in that sense ‘a matter of  chance’ 
whether A or not-A occurs, and not ‘up to the agent’ which event 
occurs.
To put it  another way, all  of  the ‘agential  resources’  of  the 
causal  theory  have  been  exhausted  at  the  point  at  which  the 
probabilities attaching to each set  of  reasons has been fixed.  By 26
 We need not  assume that  anyone  can  fix  exact  probabilities  to  the  range  of 26
potential choices in actual practise.
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hypothesis, the agent cannot have a further reason for settling which 
of  the  possible  actions  occurs,  because  her  reasons  have  already 
‘run  out’  once  their  relative  weightings  have  been  established. 
There can literally be ‘no reason’ why the agent did A rather than 
not-A: that is, no way of answering the contrastive question why A 
rather than not-A. What can be given a reason is ‘why the agent did 
A’, namely, their reasons for doing A — and this would be true if 
they had done not-A instead, namely their reasons for refraining.27
Hence, this type of challenge has sometimes been referred to 
as  the  problem  of  reduced  control.  According  to  this  view,  the 28
introduction of  indeterminism into the causal  story,  compared to 
the otherwise-similar compatibilist story, can only reduce the control 
that  the  agent  has  over  her  action,  because  it  introduces  a 
(contrastive) explanatory demand that cannot be given a reasons-
based answer — it cannot be given any explanation, other than ‘it 
was a matter of chance’.
In  the  case  of  determinism,  it  is  suggested,  this  question 
cannot arise: the agent’s mental states cause the relevant behaviour 
 See Levy (2005) for a forceful challenge to the incompatibilist along these lines.27
 Here  and  while  discussing  the  literature  on  ‘reduced  control’,  the  sense  of 28
‘control’ is not my specific sense of the term: it is used in the same way that the 
authors discussed here also use the term.
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with a probability of 1, and there is no further contrastive question 
available. Therefore the compatibilist apparently does not face the 
problem of reduced control.  When the agent does action A for the 29
reasons that they had, that  is the answer to the question why the 
agent did A. There is  no further contrastive question that can be 
asked.
However,  this  is  not  in  fact  the  best  formulation  of  the 
coherence objection, since it seems to commit the compatibilist to 
the truth of determinism. That is, it seems to make compatibilism 
require  determinism.  This  combination  of  views  has  historically 
been called soft determinism, but most contemporary compatibilists 
take  it  as  a  virtue  of  their  account  that  it  is  compatible  with 
determinism, but does not require it.
Christopher Franklin has made this  point  explicit.  Rather 30
than focusing on the potential reduction of control, he suggests that 
we  focus  on  what  he  calls  the  ‘problem  of  enhanced 
control’  (although  it  would  be  better  named  the  problem  of  ‘no 
 The  compatibilist  might  nonetheless  say  that  the  agent  ‘could  have  done 29
otherwise’  — see  the  footnote  above  (n.  23)  in  reference  to  the  so-called  ‘new 
dispositionalists’, e.g. Vihvelin (2013). Also see Clarke (2009) for the origin of that 
term.
 Franklin (2011b).30
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enhanced  control’).  The point here is that we may assume for the 
sake of argument that the introduction of indeterminism into the 
incompatibilist’s account does not reduce or eliminate control, since 
there are arguably ways of building indeterminism into the account 
which do not obviously threaten control: that is, they do not make 
the view obviously worse off than a relevantly similar compatibilist 
view.31
The important question is what indeterminism—considered 
by  itself—could  possibly  add  that  improves  the  compatibilist 
account, i.e. that secures something important for free will (moral 
responsibility)  that  cannot  be  had  by  the  rival  compatibilist 
account.  Since  the  only  thing  that  the  compatibilist  cannot  in 
principle help themselves to is indeterminism, it has to be shown 
how the bare fact of indeterminism turns a non-responsible agent 
into a responsible one. It does not seem as though the mere absence 
of something like deterministic causation can perform this kind of 
‘alchemy’.32
 Although whether indeterminism in those places is  useful  at  all  is  a  separate 31
question: that is the point of the problem of enhanced control. The ways in which 
indeterminism  can  be  added  which  do  not  make  the  view  worse  off  than 
determinism mostly seem to make the indeterminism irrelevant to the action.
 Gary Watson uses this term.32
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At this point, the agent causal incompatibilist concedes that 
this  does  look  like  a  problem  for  event  causal  versions  of 
incompatibilism, but that their own view can accommodate it. They 
agree that, at best, the mere absence of determinism does not seem 
to secure any more control for the agent, and at worst it seems to 
threaten the coherence of the resulting view (reduced control).
However,  the  argument  goes,  agents  that  have  an  ‘agent 
causal  power’  can  be  properly  responsible  for  nondeterministic 
outcomes of this kind. Contrary to the challenge from the coherence 
problem, it is not simply the addition of ‘mere indeterminism’, but 
the introduction of the agent causal power with indeterminism that 
satisfies the incompatibilist’s demand.
Being an ‘agent cause’ in this sense is usually characterised 
by  the  notion  of  substance  causation:  on  this  view,  agents  as 
substances cause their actions.  It may be that the agent is the only 33
cause  of  the  action,  or  that,  like  Randolph  Clark’s  ‘hybrid’ 
incompatibilist view, the agent’s reasons are also partial causes of 
 Actually,  the  more plausible  versions  of  agent  causation do not  suggest  that 33
agents cause their actions,  but rather that the agent’s action is constituted  by the 
agent-as-substance causing some behaviour. I will sometimes speak of the agent 
causing an action for the sake of convenience.
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the  action.  In  either  case,  the  additional  element  is  the 34
involvement  of  a  substance-cause  that  is  the  agent,  and  which 
directly causes the action qua substance. 
Because  of  the  special  kind  of  ‘origination’  that  being  an 
agent  cause confers,  it  is  possible  to  be fully responsible  for  any 
nondeterministically  caused  actions,  whichever  one  ultimately 
occurs.  There  is  no  ‘matter  of  chance’,  since  the  contrastive 
explanatory demand is  answered by pointing out  that  it  literally 
was the agent who produced and originated the action — and this 
fact is supposed to undercut any further demands for explanation, 
including those which lead to  the accusations of  ‘chanciness’.  To 
put it simply, when faced with the contrastive explanatory demand 
of why the agent did A rather than not-A, although a further reason 
cannot be given—by hypothesis—the fact that it was the agent qua 
substance cause that caused the action somehow throws more weight 
behind that outcome.
As I have suggested in response to Pereboom’s argument, the 
basic problem with the agent causal incompatibilist’s approach is 
that it fails to recognise that there is conceptual space between ‘the 
agent  is  in  control’  and  ‘the  agent  is  the  source  /  origin’.  The 
 Clarke (2003: Ch. 8).34
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assumption is that control just is being the source or origin of the 
action,  i.e.  in  the  way  that  Pereboom  had  supposed  that  the 
neuroscientists  were  in  control  of  Plum.  As  we  saw  there,  this 
naturally  leads  to  the  thought  that  the  only  way  for  the  agent 
herself to be in control is to stand in that kind of relationship to her 
own actions — and that can apparently only be satisfied by being a 
substance cause of the action. 
But  this  is  also  to  misunderstand the  nature  of  the  ‘agent 
causal  theory’,  that  is,  what the real  reasons are for  accepting or 
repudiating the agent causal account. As Franklin has observed, the 
final  step  in  the  agent  causal  incompatibilist’s  argument  simply 
assumes  that  the  agent  causal  power  is  only  available  to  the 
incompatibilist.  But  this  is  not  argued  for.  Without  this 35
assumption, the response to the coherence objection fails on its own 
terms: the compatibilist could simply adopt the agent causal theory. 
In  that  case,  we  would  have  an  analogue  of  the  original 
comparison between event causal compatibilism and event causal 
incompatibilism. The relevant comparison now would be between 
agent causal incompatibilism and agent causal compatibilism, where 
once again the only difference between the two views, in principle, 
 Franklin (forthcoming).35
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is  the  bare  fact  of  indeterminism.  Thus  the  agent  causal 
incompatibilist  would  face  the  problem  of  no  enhanced  control, 
because the agent causal compatibilist would also be able to throw 
metaphysical weight behind the causation of an action, beyond the 
‘mere’ possession of reasons for that action.
In  the  original  comparison  between  compatibilism  and 
incompatibilism, the notion of ‘agent causation’ was invoked by the 
incompatibilist as a way of avoiding the coherence problem. But as 
Franklin  points  out,  this  only  works  if  agent  causation  is  only 
available to the incompatibilist, and whether this is so depends on 
the reasons for adopting the agent causal theory. If  those reasons 
mean that the compatibilist can also adopt the agent causal theory, 
then the incompatibilist has lost an important dialectical move.
Franklin’s  own  answer  is  that  in  fact  the  best  reason  for 
considering agent causation of this kind is to avoid reductionism 
about  the  self.  He  argues  that  identity  theories  (e.g.  a  Humean 
‘bundle theory’ ) and identification accounts (e.g. those offered by 36
Velleman and Bratman ) face certain internal difficulties, and the 37
 Olson (2007: Ch. 6).36
 Velleman (2000); Bratman (2000).37
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agent causal  theory is  an alternative to those views,  vis-a-vis the 
metaphysics of the self / agent. 
Hence, according to Franklin, “if anyone should be an agent 
causalist, then everyone should be an agent causalist.”  That is, if 38
the anti-reductionist arguments for agent causation are sound, then 
this is a reason for both compatibilists and incompatibilists to adopt 
the theory, because those reasons concern the reductionism, and do 
not specifically concern free will and moral responsibility.
My view is that the notion of ‘agent causation’ is a mistaken 
response to the problem of control — or better, it is an appropriate 
response to a mistaken conception of what the problem of control 
really is (origination vs. integration). 
What is needed is to show how the agent is in control of her 
actions—simpliciter—and  it  is  for  this  reason  that  the  agent 
causalist gets something right in her criticism of the ‘causal theory 
of action’.  Others have also observed that the so-called ‘standard 
story’ of action has a certain problem with accounting for the role of 
the  agent  in  the  production  of  action.  Franklin’s  reference  to  the 
reductionist theories of the agent given by Velleman and Bratman, 
therefore,  is  apt:  there  is  a  difficulty  here,  and  the  agent  causal 
 Franklin (forthcoming).38
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theory represents one possible response. Compare the identification 
response that is exemplified by Velleman and others:
The  agent  is  moved  to  his  action,  not  only  by  his  original 
motive  for  it,  but  also  by  his  desire  to  act  on  that  original 
motive,  because  of  its  superior  rational  force.  This  latter 
contribution to the agent’s behaviour is the contribution of an 
attitude that performs the functions definitive of agency; it is, 
therefore,  functionally  speaking,  the  agent’s  contribution  to  the 
causal order.39
But  the  point  here  is  that  this  problem—the  problem  of  ‘self 
determination’,  as  Velleman puts  it—is not  simply a  problem for 
‘free’  agency,  or  ‘full  blooded’  agency  as  Velleman  (and  indeed 
Franklin) have it: it is a problem for agency as such. 
The  problem of  identifying  the  agent’s  contribution  to  the 
aetiology of action, indeed, how the agent fits in to the causal order 
at all, is not simply a problem that arises for some special instance 
of  agency  —  whether  that  is  the  ‘freedom  relevant’  part  that 
occupies  the  literature  on free  will,  or  the  ‘self  determining’,’full 
 Velleman (2000: 141). My emphasis.39
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blooded’  exercises  of  autonomous,  rational  agency that  Velleman 
and others  are  concerned with.  It  is  quite  simply the  need for  a 
theory of agential control.
With  that  in  mind,  we  can  see  that  the  problem  of  ‘no 
enhanced  control’  is  not  one  that  uniquely  arises  for  the  event 
causal incompatibilist. It is made explicit by the unique explanatory 
demands that are placed on that account, certainly, but it actually 
reflects a tension in the causal theory of action. In that sense, it is a 
problem for the compatibilist just as much as the incompatibilist, 
and this is where Franklin is exactly right. 
Thus we get the strange ‘metaphysicalisation’ of Velleman’s 
functional role for the agent (viz. a desire to act in accordance with 
reasons, which thereby ‘throws weight behind’ the rational choice 
itself)  which manifests  itself  as  the  agent  causal  incompatibilist’s 
response to the coherence problem that we encountered above — 
the  thought  that  being  a  special  substance-cause  of  one’s  action 
somehow avoids the contrastive explanatory demand placed on the 
incompatibilist  by giving the actual  reasons-based outcome more 
‘oomph’.
As  for  the  problem of  explaining  agency  vis-a-vis  what  is 
lacking on the ‘causal theory of action’, the agent causal theory is 
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one  possible  response  to  this  problem,  and has  historically  been 
invoked by incompatibilists about free will rather than those drawn 
to  compatibilism.  But  as  I  said  above,  this  fails  to  recognise  the 
conceptual space between ‘the agent is in control’ and ‘the agent is 
the source / agent-cause’. 
In the next three chapters, I develop an alternative theory of 
agency that shows how the agent can have control in a robust sense 
that  is  lacking on the basic  causal  theory of  agency,  but  without 
invoking  substance  causation  in  the  way  historically  associated 
with ‘agent causation’. It puts aside the mistaken view of control as 
‘causal  origin’,  and focuses  on  what  actually  matters  for  agency, 
which is causal integration.
3.6 Conclusion
The  previous  chapter  outlined  my  general  argument  against  the 
existing dialectic of ‘the free will problem’. I claimed that there is no 
reason to retain the terminology of ‘free will’, since nearly all of the 
substantive issues that get discussed in those terms are shown to be 
about  the  conditions  necessary  for  moral  responsibility.  ‘Free’ 
agency in this sense is just morally responsible agency, and ‘having 
free will’ is having a certain disposition or ability to act in a morally 
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responsible  manner.  Redundant  though  it  is,  however,  the  term 
‘free will’ is best retained as a technical term, stipulated in the way 
that I have suggested above. 
Rather  than  go  on  to  develop  a  theory  of  moral 
responsibility,  in  this  chapter  I  have picked up on the secondary 
issue that has played a role in the free will problem. This issue has 
been  mistaken  for  an  aspect  of  ‘free  will’,  one  that  does  not 
apparently relate to moral responsibility in the way I just noted. In 
fact, it is about agency. Specifically, it is about a central feature of 
agency that I’m calling ‘agential control’.
I  discussed two places in the free will  literature where the 
notion of ‘sourcehood’ or ‘agent causation’ have played important 
dialectical  roles,  and suggested that  we should instead see  these 
issues as turning on the notion of control. In my sense, ‘control’ is 
something  central  for  agency,  and  so  both  incompatibilists  and 
compatibilists need to account for it. Hence, the incompatibilist has 
lost an important dialectical move against the compatibilist.
‘Source incompatibilists’  and ‘agent causal incompatibilists’ 
are mistaken to think that ‘being the source of an action’ and ‘being 
an  agent  cause’  are  properties  that  are  somehow  unique  to 
incompatibilism about free will: i.e., that they confer some special 
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advantage  on  the  incompatibilist’s  view of  free  will.  In  fact,  the 
only  plausible  way  of  reading  these  terms  is  such  that  they  are 
ways of getting at the notion of control that I have been insisting on 
in this chapter. 
In the next three chapters, I expand on the notion of agential 
control. In essence, the theory of agential control is really just the 
theory of agency itself, given how I have been using the term here. 
Control is central to agency. I said above that it is not ‘causal origin’ 
or  ‘source’  (as  Pereboom  and  others  have  claimed)  which  is 
important  for  agency,  but  rather  causal  integration.  The  theory  of 
agency I develop in later chapters builds on this claim: agency is 
(roughly)  a  matter  of  the  right  causal  integration  between 
intentionality, phenomenal consciousness, and behaviour.
Chapter 4 makes a start at fixing the notion of agency that I 
am arguing for, and canvases the range of uses to which the term 
has been put. It picks up on Helen Steward’s view of agency, which 
shares some important characteristics with the view I will go on to 
defend.  It  also  offers  an  opportunity  to  consider  the  question 
whether  agency  is  incompatible  with  determinism,  which  was 
briefly flagged earlier in this chapter. Then chapters 5 and 6 go on 
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to  develop  the  two  central  strands  of  my  theory  of  agency: 
intentional realism, and phenomenal consciousness, respectively.
4Folk Psychology and Agency
4.1 Introduction
I have already suggested that the theory of agency I am presenting 
has something important to do with ‘causal integration’. In fact, I 
went as far as to suggest that there is a sense in which agency is 
causal integration — of the right kind. Hence, one of the principal 
tasks ahead is to spell out exactly what ‘the right kind’ of causal 
integration is, and why that matters for agency.
First, I will make some introductory remarks on the notion of 
agency  as  it  appears  in  the  existing  literature.  In  particular,  one 
finds that the concept of agency is closely associated with two other 
concepts in the literature—that of substance (particularly substance 
causation), and that of moral responsibility (already noted)—and for 
that reason I wish to separate out, as much as is possible, the notion 
of  agency  itself  from these  two  closely  associated  concepts.  One 
way to  do  this  is  to  look at  the  ‘limit  cases’  in  which  agency is 
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strongly associated with one or the other of these related notions, 
and then to find an appropriate middle ground for talking about 
agency itself.  Even if  there  are  no actual  philosophers  who have 
taken quite these extreme positions on the matter, the point is that 
all of the features I mention are parts of actually existing theories. 
First, there is the view according to which agency is strongly 
associated,  perhaps  constitutively  connected,  to  the  concept  of 
moral responsibility. This view has historically been associated with 
the  rationalist  tradition,  especially  with  Kantianism,  and  can  be 
called the moral agency view.  According to the moral agency view, 1
agents  are  the  bearers  or  subjects  of  moral  responsibility.  Those 
things that are not possible subjects of moral responsibility (that are 
not ‘subject to the moral law’) are not, properly speaking, agents at 
all.
It should be clear that, given the foregoing discussion, this is 
not the view of agency that I have in mind. I do not believe that 
agency  is  constitutively  connected  to  the  notion  of  moral 
responsibility:  this is far too narrow  a use of the term ‘agency’ to 
capture much of importance beyond what is already contained in 
 Although not put quite as bluntly as I have here, see Korsgaard (2009) for an 1
example of this general line of thought.
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the notion of moral responsibility itself. It seems to me that there is 
a very obvious sense in which it must be possible for something to 
be  an  agent  without  it  being  even  a  possible  bearer  of  moral 
responsibility.2
As I said, perhaps no one actually endorses this view in the 
strictest  sense,  but  it  remains true that  many accounts  of  agency 
seem  to  be  weighted  very  heavily  in  the  direction  of  morally 
significant agency, e.g. with a focus on the capacity to respond to 
specifically moral  reasons. Part of my general argument here is to 
show  that  there  is  a  sense  in  which  agency  can  be  usefully 
considered independently of these concerns, i.e.  without bringing 
in the notion of morally significant agency, or moral reasons, at all.
Looking  in  other  ‘direction’,  as  it  were,  we  find  the  term 
‘agency’ strongly associated with the notion of substance causation, 
i.e. the view according to which agency is primarily exemplified by 
simple cases of substance causation. We might call this the substance 
view  of agency. According to the substance view, many inanimate 
substances are agents (in addition to people and other animals). For 
 The question of whether it can be an object of moral significance is not the issue 2
here. This is the distinction between a ‘moral agent’ and a ‘moral patient’, as it is 
sometimes put.
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example, Alvarez and Hyman even go so far as to defend the view 
that  such  inanimate  substances  can  be  considered  agents  that 
perform actions.  They characterise the term ‘agent’ very generally as 3
something that ‘makes things happen’ causally. Hence, any kind of 
substance causation is at the same time ‘agent causation’, and any 
such substance is an ‘agent’. 
On this view, agency is very widespread, because anything 
that  has  causal  powers  or  liabilities  is  an  agent  (arguably,  all 
substances).  For  example,  a  volume  of  acid  is  an  agent  when  it 
dissolves a lump of zinc, and a bomb is an agent when it collapses a 
bridge. In fact, this view seems to make agent causation equivalent 
to substance causation.
Indeed,  if  one  believes  that  there  cannot  be  substances 
without causal powers or liabilities, then there is by definition no 
substance that is not at the same time an agent.  On this view, of 
course, the notion of agency becomes rather empty, as it becomes 
impossible  to  distinguish  between  agents  and  things  that  are  not 
agents  (because  there  are  none).  I  take  it  that  if  there  is  any 
commonsense  understanding  of  agency,  a  large  part  of  that 
 Alvarez and Hyman (1998).3
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conception is that not everything is an agent: some things are ‘just 
things’.
Consider the definition of agent causation provided by Lowe 
in  a  textbook  on  metaphysics,  which  is  intended to  capture  this 
‘substance’ view of the term:
An ‘agent’, in the sense intended here, is a persisting object (or 
‘substance’)  possessing  various  properties,  including,  most 
importantly, certain causal powers and liabilities.4
It is interesting to note that this ‘substance view’ of agency actually 
goes together, in a way, with the ‘moral agency’ view noted above. 
What I mean by this is that once the term ‘agency’ as been allowed 
to apply to the notion of substance causation in this way, the term 
becomes rather useless as far as making any important distinctions 
goes — yet such philosophers will  no doubt still  wish to make a 
distinction, as it were, between us and a volume of acid. And what 
might the important distinction consist in? The ability to respond to 
reasons, perhaps especially moral reasons. The volume of acid may 
 Lowe (2002: 198), and see in particular Chapter 11. See also Lowe (2008: Chs. 6-8).4
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be an agent  (it  may only  be  “an agent”),  but  we are  full  blooded 
agents in some important sense.
Where  does  this  leave  us?  The  point  to  take  from  this 
discussion  is  that  thinking  of  agency  in  terms  of  substance 
causation  as  such,  as  some  philosophers  have  done,  leaves  us 
without the ability to make important distinctions in places where 
there are strong practical and commonsense reasons to do so. 
It  thus turns out that thinking of agency along the lines of 
substance  causation  ends  up  leading  back  to  the  first  way  of 
characterising what is important about agency anyway: the focus 
on moral reasons, and specifically moral agency. My problem with 
that way of characterising things is that it is also too ‘narrow’. In 
fact, my full argument against the ‘moral agency view’ is found the 
whole of what follows, since I intend to show that there is a non-
arbitrary  way  of  characterising  agency  that  does  not  depend  on 
moral reasons.
In  what  follows,  then,  I  will  develop  this  non-arbitrary 
middle  position:  a  useful  concept  that  agency  that  stands  on  its 
own, such that we can understand and talk about agents that are 
not even possible moral subjects,  while at the same time being able 5
 Again, I do not suggest that such beings might not be objects of moral concern.5
—  !   —126
to  clearly  and  easily  distinguish  between  agency  and  ‘mere’ 
substance causation. 
I  would like to begin the discussion by focusing on Helen 
Steward’s view of agency. This is for two reasons. Firstly, the thesis 
of ‘agency incompatibilism’ was mentioned in the previous chapter 
as a possible consequence of the generalisation strategy employed 
by Pereboom.  Now,  although I  argued against  the  generalisation 
strategy on its own terms, it is also worth saying a little more about 
why  I  believe  that  we  do  not  currently  have  strong  reasons  to 
suppose that agency must be incompatible with determinism.
The second, and most important, reason for beginning with 
Steward’s  view  is  that  it  is  a  highly  interesting  and  plausible 
account  of  agency   —  incompatibilism  notwithstanding.  It  falls 
neatly between the two extreme views that I just mentioned. It does 
not connect agency to the notion of moral responsibility in the way 
mentioned above, and neither does it limit the attribution of agency 
to the relatively small class of adult, rational human beings. On the 
other hand, it does not cast the net so widely as to leave us open to 
the problems noted above. So with that caveat, I believe Steward’s 
view of agency is an excellent place to begin.
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4.2 Agency Incompatibilism
As part of her account of Agency Incompatibilism, Steward argues 
that we all share a certain innate concept of agency. As I understand 
it, the claim is that we are all in possession of this concept, and we 
‘automatically’  apply  this  concept  to  certain  features  of  our 
experience.  Thus  her  argument  at  this  point  is  not  meant  to 
establish a thesis about agency, but instead it is meant to establish a 
thesis about our concept of  agency,  i.e.  basically a thesis about our 
psychology,  and the  way in  which  we  apply  certain  concepts  to 
experience.  Steward  claims  that  the  agency  concept  has  at  least 
these four important features:
(i) an agent can move the whole, or at least some parts,  of 
something we are inclined to think of as its body;
(ii) an agent is a centre of some form of subjectivity;
(iii) an agent is something to which at least some rudimentary 
types of intentional state (e.g. trying, wanting, perceiving) 
may be properly attributed;
(iv) an agent is a settler of matters concerning certain of the 
movements of its own body […] i.e. the actions by means 
of  which  those  movements  are  effected  cannot  be 
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regarded merely as the inevitable consequences of  what 
has gone before.6
Steward’s  overall  argument  about  agency is  that:  (1)  the  concept 
articulated  above  in  points  (i-iv)  is  part  of  our  natural  ‘folk 
psychology’,  and  that  (2)  if  this  concept  of  agency  applies  to 
anything at all, then it applies to many animals as well as human 
beings.  As I see it, the ‘agency incompatibilism’ component of her 7
theory of agency comes in primarily with point (iv).
I argue that Steward’s defence of claim (1) is strongest with 
regard to points (i-iii), and for the claim that we do in fact have a 
concept  of  this  kind,  which  may  have  evolved  to  enable  us  to 
categorise certain entities we meet with in experience differently to 
others. Indeed, I am also inclined to agree with claim (2), that we 
often  apply  something  like  this  concept  of  certain  nonhuman 
animals,  but  that  we  ‘draw  the  line’,  conceptually  speaking, 
roughly  at  this  point  —  although  at  what  specific  point  on  the 
spectrum of living and non-living things we in fact draw the line is 
 Steward (2012: 71-2).6
 Steward (2012: 74).7
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probably not a question that we can answer.  As part of (2), Steward 8
makes  a  strong  case  for  the  claim  that  any  good  reasons  for 
believing in non-reductive agency in the case of humans (usually 
called  ‘agent  causation’),  also  give  us  reason  to  believe  in  such 
agency in the case of other, nonhuman animals. 
What has not yet been shown, I argue, is that the concept of 
agency includes a commitment to metaphysical  indeterminism of 
the kind Steward claims is necessary to satisfy (iv). I argue that the 
evidence  Steward provides  is  inconclusive  for  the  claim that  the 
concept  of  agency  involves  a  commitment  to  metaphysical 
indeterminism.
4.2.1 The folk theory of mind and the concept of agency
In Chapter 4 of her book, Steward takes on the task of articulating 
what she believes the concept of agency involves. As already noted, 
she believes this includes at least (i-iv), although she does not rule 
out that there may be other features that she has not noticed.  9
One early example involves imagining watching a large farm 
animal, such as a cow or sheep, engaged in its normal activities. She 
 I  do not  at  this  point  take  a  stand on the  question whether  it  is  merely  our 8
concept, or the boundary itself, between agent and non-agent that is a ‘fuzzy’ one.
 Steward (2012: 71, n. 4).9
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claims that a “normal and unprejudiced human being” will find it 
“almost  impossible  to  avoid  looking  upon  [the  animal]  as  an 
agent.”  For example, if the cow were to suddenly move from one 10
side  of  the  field  to  the  other,  we  would  find  it  quite  natural  to 
hypothesise  that  it  did  so  because  “the  grass  looked  better  over 
there, or because it was shadier, or because it wants to be nearer its 
calf, which has wandered off in that direction.” In other words, we 
would  find  it  almost  impossible  to  avoid  interpreting  that 
behaviour as intentional. We are also inclined to “think of such an 
animal as a creature that can, within limits, direct its own activities 
and that has certain choices about the details of those activities.”11
Steward claims that our natural reaction to the activity of the 
animal  discussed  here  is  best  explained  by  appeal  to  certain 
research  in  developmental  psychology.  This  research  claims  that 
there  are  ‘domain-specific’  cognitive  systems  that  are  “designed 
from the outset to facilitate the application of mental concepts to 
certain of the entities we meet with in experience.”  12
For example,  it  is  claimed that  these cognitive systems are 
implicated  in  answers  to  several  important  questions  in 
 Steward (2012: 75).10
 Steward (2012: 75).11
 Ibid.12
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developmental psychology: e.g. the question of how young children 
can learn so much so fast,  or  how they can reliably generate the 
concepts  necessary  to  learn  a  human  language.  Such  domain-
specific  ‘modules’  are  supposed to aid in the acquisition of  such 
skills or knowledge. Steward argues that a similar processes must 
be at work here, playing an essential role in the attribution of mind 
and intentional behaviour to both fellow human beings and other 
nonhuman animals:
Both naturalistically inclined philosophers and developmental 
psychologists have argued that if infants and young children 
were restricted only to  the sorts  of  reasoning and empirical 
evidence  that  philosophers  have  permitted  themselves  in 
attempting solutions to the so-called problem of ‘other minds’, 
it is impossible to see how they would ever manage to come 
by the system of interpretation by means of which the young 
child in fact effortlessly manages to encode certain motions as 
purposive  actions,  and  treats  them  as  revelatory  of  mental 
functioning.13
 Steward (2012: 76).13
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This view of how we come to ‘encode certain motions as purposive 
actions’ is sometimes referred to as the ‘folk theory of mind’, ’folk 
psychology’,  or  ‘intuitive  psychology’.  Steward  argues  that  the 
concept  of  agency  she  defends  is  a  central  part  of  this  folk 
psychology, and that it has a “modular basis in the human mind.”  14
One of the main questions regarding this capacity to ‘mind-
read’  is  whether  it  should  be  regarded  as  involving  a  theory, 
analogous  to  the  intuitive  concepts  deployed  to  explain  the 
physical world (i.e. ‘folk physics’), or whether it should be seen as a 
kind of mental simulation, a form of modelling based on one’s own 
mental processes as an analog. Steward does not officially take a 
stand on this issue, but does note that the ‘theory theory’, as it is 
called,  does  not  sit  well  with  her  other  claims  about  the  causal 
theory of action, because of the implicit tendency to view ‘mental 
states’  as  unobservable  particulars  that  are  invoked  to  causally 
explain the occurrence of outwardly observable ‘raw behaviour’.  15
Part of Steward’s claim is that it is not, properly speaking, certain 
‘unobservable particulars’ that come to cause actions, but rather the 
agent herself. 
 Steward (2012: 71).14
 Steward (2012: 76-7; see also 77, n.13).15
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This  is  Steward’s  first  substantive  claim about  agency.  She 
claims that  the  conceptual  framework that  children  acquire  does 
not in fact view intentional activity in this way: i.e., as the causation 
of outward behaviour by mental states or events (as she believes 
the ‘theory theory’ is implicitly committed to).  16
Although it is mentioned in several places, it is not clear how 
important the modularity claim is to Steward’s account of agency. In 
any  case  I  do  not  make  any  specific  claim  that  the  important 
concepts here must have a modular basis in the human mind. What 
seems to be the main point is that there is a concept of a minded 
entity which is the subject or possessor of certain mental states:
Such  things  as  beliefs  and  desires,  according  to  our  folk 
theory,  have  to  be  had;  beliefs  require  believers  and  desires 
desirers.  This  ownership relation,  moreover,  is  not  merely a 
matter of the states in question being located inside a given 
animal body; it is a matter of their being ascribed to something 
whose informational and motivational properties those states 
describe […].17
 It is not clear that the ‘theory theory’ is in fact committed to this—or any—view 16
about the causal aetiology of action.
 Steward (2012: 77).17
—  !   —134
She goes on to claim that the ‘minded entity’ which is the possessor 
of  these  mental  states  is  itself  regarded  as  the  cause  of  the 
movements and changes in its body that constitute an action. This 
is opposed to the view according to which it  is the mental states 
themselves (when they are conceived as particulars) which are the 
causes  of  those  movements.  This  second  point  reflects  a 
commitment  to  something  like  agent  causation  in  the  folk 
conception.
Finally,  she  adds  the  requirement  for  metaphysical 
indeterminism. This is part of feature (iv) indicated above, which 
requires  that  agents  are  settlers  of  various  matters  at  the  time of 
action. The term ‘settling’ is a technical term for Steward. An agent 
‘settles  a  matter’  by  acting:  through  performing  the  action,  the 
agent thereby settles a matter that was not previously settled. The 
way in which this term is defined by Steward entails a commitment 
to metaphysical indeterminism of the kind that is not compatible 
with physical determinism. 
To  properly  appreciate  what  is  involved  in  this  notion  of 
‘settling’, it will be necessary to consider the role that it is designed 
to play in Steward’s overall argument for Agency Incompatibilism. 
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After getting clear about the notion of settling, and the work it is 
supposed to do, I will return to consider the evidence Steward cites 
in defence of her concept of agency, especially for the defence of 
(iv).
4.2.2 ‘Settling’ and Agency Incompatibilism
The  notion  of  ‘settling’  is  central  to  the  defence  of  Agency 
Incompatibilism.  It  is  the  feature  of  Steward’s  concept  of  agency 
that  she  claims  involves  a  commitment  to  metaphysical 
indeterminism.  What  is  important  about  agency,  according  to 
Steward, is that certain things can be ‘up to’ an agent, in a way that 
nothing can be ‘up to’ a thing which is not an agent. 
Considering  an  imagined  reply  on  the  part  of  the 
compatibilist, Steward denies that something being ‘up to someone’ 
can just  be  a  matter  of  that  thing depending causally  on certain 
mental states of the person, such as choices or intentions: 
Being an agent  in  respect  of  some particular  action,  that  is, 
cannot simply be a matter of possessing certain internal states 
that bring about some relevant type of bodily movement ‘in 
the right kind of way’. For it is simply not necessary, in order 
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that some question or matter be up to me, that I should want a 
given outcome or intend it or choose it. What I have to be able 
to do, I shall argue, is to settle that matter.18
What gets settled is not a particular action or a particular event: it is 
the  answer  to  a  range  of  ‘questions’  that  are  open  until  the 
performance  of  the  action.  For  example,  Steward  considers  the 
action of buttering toast at a particular time. Strictly speaking, it is 
not that action which is ‘up to’ the agent, and neither is it the action 
that gets settled. It would not be right to say that ‘my buttering of 
the toast was up to me’. The right thing to say instead is that “the 
fact that there was such a buttering around the relevant time was up 
to me.”  Hence, what gets ‘settled’ by the particular act of buttering 19
the  toast  is  the  answer  to  questions  that  concern  things  like: 
whether or not there will be a toast buttering, when and where it 
will happen, whether I will use my right or left hand, etc.
The notion of something being ‘up to us’ is used by Steward 
to  characterise  what  is  special  about  agency.  Agents  are  those 
entities that things can be up to, and nothing can be up to an entity 
 Steward (2012: 26).18
 Steward (2012: 37).19
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that is not an agent. In order to explicate this notion of ‘up to us’, 
Steward  invokes  the  technical  term  ‘settling’.  While  no  explicit 
definition of settling is given in the book, a useful reconstruction is 
given by Clarke:
(S) An action a that is performed at time t settles at t whether p 
iff (i) either it is impossible that a be performed then and the 
actual laws of nature hold and p, or it is impossible that a be 
performed then and the actual laws hold and not-p,  and (ii) 
there  is  nothing  existing  at  any  time t’  prior  to  t  such  that 
either it is impossible that that thing exist at t’ and the actual 
laws hold and p, or it is impossible that that thing exist at t’ 
and the actual laws hold and not-p.20
In other words, the action a  settles the question whether p  if  and 
only if the occurrence of a suffices for its being the case that p, or its 
being the case that not-p, and nothing else suffices for its being the 
case that p or not-p.  It is thus important to note how the notion of 21
‘settling’ applies directly to the world, as it were, and not merely to 
 Clarke (2014). 20
 Ibid.21
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our knowledge of the world: we should be careful that the locution 
of ‘answering a question’ does not mislead in this regard. It is not 
that the question is ‘open’ because we don’t know if there was a toast 
buttering at some time t. Instead: that there was a toast buttering at 
time t is a fact that is settled by the performance of the action, along 
with the other relevant details of the action (whether it was done 
with the right hand, etc.).
On this point,  we see why it  is important for Steward that 
her  notion  of  settling  involves  a  commitment  to  metaphysical 
indeterminism.  This  is  because  Steward  believes  that,  if 
determinism were  true,  for  any  given  time  there  would  be  some 
prior  conditions  which  sufficed  for  everything  occurring  at  that 
time.  As  Steward  puts  it,  everything  would  have  been  already 
‘settled’  at  the  beginning  of  time  (if  there  was  a  beginning). 
Therefore, if determinism is true, nothing can be settled by agents 
when they act, because those questions are already settled. Hence, 
nothing can be ‘up to’ an agent in her sense. Since it is constitutive 
of agency that something  be up to the agent at some time (feature 
iv), this means that if determinism is true, there are no agents.
The  first  problem  for  this  argument,  as  Steward 
acknowledges,  is  that  it  seems  possible  to  understand  the  term 
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‘settling’ in a way that is compatible with the truth of determinism. 
And it is also possible to understand what it means for something 
to be ‘up to’ an agent in a way that is compatible with the truth of 
determinism. For example, one might point out that the falling of 
the third domino in a series settles the question of whether the fourth 
domino will fall, even though the falling of the first domino already 
ensured  the  falling  of  the  fourth.  One  could  explicate  this  point 
with  the  following  counterfactual:  if  the  third  domino  had  not 
fallen, then the fourth domino would not have fallen.
The problem for Steward’s account is that it seems possible 
to  find  perfectly  ordinary  ways  to  use  these  words  and  phrases 
which  do  not  entail  any  commitment  to  metaphysical 
indeterminism. Hence, merely appealing to such locutions as ‘up to 
us’,  ‘settling the matter’,  as well as other familiar terms from the 
free will literature such as ‘power to refrain’ and ‘open alternative’, 
will not by itself support the claim that agency requires the falsity 
of  determinism,  because  both  compatibilist  and  incompatibilist 
readings of these terms are available. 
What Steward needs to do is argue that her stipulated way of 
understanding the term ‘settling’ is the right one for talking about 
agency. This is where the material in Chapter 4 of her book comes 
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in.  As  noted  in  the  previous  section,  Steward  aims  to  use  the 
evidence from psychology, as well as appeals to intuition, to argue 
that we have a concept of agency which includes the commitment 
to metaphysical indeterminism. If this can be done, then she will be 
able to argue on that basis that her use of ‘settling’ is the right one 
for thinking about agency, because it is the one implied by our folk 
psychological commitments.
The  empirical  evidence  regarding  our  core  conception  of 
agency will provide evidence in support of her claim. It will not, as 
she  points  out,  constitute  a  “knock  down argument”,  but  it  will 
count in favour of her claims about agency. I will now argue that 
the evidence is at present inconclusive with regard to feature (iv), 
and thus  it  has  not  been  established that  our  concept  of  agency 
contains this requirement.
4.2.3  Experimental  evidence  for  an  incompatibilist  concept  of 
agency
One of the most initially promising pieces of research that Steward 
considers  is  a  paper  by  Shaun  Nichols.  In  this  paper,  Nichols 22
draws on experimental  evidence to  argue that  young children in 
 Nichols (2004).22
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fact  deploy  a  concept  of  ‘agent  causation’.  This  concept  has  the 
following two features, according to Nichols’ account:
(a) An agent is a causal factor in the production of an action.
(b) For a given action of an agent, the agent could have not 
caused it. Roughly, the agent could have done otherwise.23
The  second  claim  is  to  be  understood  in  a  way  that  makes  it 
incompatible  with  determinism.  Hence,  if  Nichols’  argument  is 
right, then Steward will be able to use this evidence to support her 
defence  of  feature  (iv),  because  both  involve  a  commitment  to 
indeterminism.  Unfortunately,  as  she  notes,  Nichols’  case  for  (b) 
suffers from the same problem that I argued affects Steward’s own 
account  of  incompatibilist  ‘settling’:  one  cannot  rule  out 
compatibilist interpretations of the data that Nichols cites, and so it 
has  not  been  established  that  the  children  studied  do  have  an 
incompatibilist  conception of  ‘could have done otherwise’,  rather 
than one that is compatible with determinism.
For  example,  one  experiment  reported  by  Nichols  was 
designed  to  test  whether  children  are  committed  to  interpreting 
 Nichols (2004: 475).23
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agents as possessing feature (b), while denying such attributions to 
inanimate objects.  The point  was to test  whether children regard 
agents differently to ‘things’  in being able to ‘do otherwise’  than 
they actually do.
For instance, in one of the agent cases, children were shown a 
closed box with a sliding lid. The experimenter said, ‘See, the 
lid is closed and nothing can get in. I’m going to open the lid.’ 
At this point, the experimenter slid the lid open and touched 
the bottom of the box. Then the child was asked, ‘After the lid 
was  open,  did  I  have  to  touch the  bottom,  or  could I  have 
done  something  else  instead?’  In  the  parallel  thing-case, 
children were shown the closed box with a ball resting on the 
lid. The experimenter said, ‘See, the lid is closed and nothing 
can  get  in.  I’m  going  to  open  the  lid.’  At  this  point,  the 
experimenter slid the lid open and the ball fell to the bottom. 
Then the child was asked, ‘After the lid was open, did the ball 
have to  touch the bottom, or  could it  have done something 
else instead?’24
 Nichols (2004: 483).24
—  !   —143
Nichols  reports  that  every  subject  reported  that  the  agent  could 
have done otherwise, while all but one reported that the thing ‘had 
to’  do what it  did.  The immediate objection to interpreting these 
results  as  supporting  incompatibilist  features  of  agency  is 
highlighted  by  Steward.  She  points  out  that  no  compatibilist  is 
likely  to  deny  that  people  view  agents,  when  performing  some 
action,  as  being able to do otherwise in a  way that  a  billiard ball 
could not.  This result is consistent with everything a compatibilist 25
might say is true about agency, so it is inconclusive.
Nichols is aware of this potential weakness, and thus goes on 
to  discuss  the  findings  from  a  second  experimental  set-up.  This 
time the children were were asked a similar set of questions about a 
human agent who has to make a choice between two flavours of 
ice-cream. The imagined agent is called ‘Joan’, and in the scenario 
described to the children she in fact chooses vanilla. The children 
are once again asked whether Joan could have done otherwise, or 
whether she had to choose vanilla. 
However, this time the experimenters attempted to rule out 
compatibilist  ways of  understanding this  question,  by asking the 
children to  imagine  that  “everything in  the  world  was  the  same 
 Steward (2012: 84).25
—  !   —144
right up until she chose vanilla,” and then asking them if she had to 
choose vanilla.  This case is then compared to two further cases in 26
which the children are once again given the instruction to imagine 
that  ‘everything  in  the  world  is  the  same’  until  the  event  in 
question: first, one in which the example features a pot of water put 
on  the  stove  to  boil,  and  second,  an  event  in  which  the  agent 
performs a morally significant action (stealing a candy bar). 
The  results  showed  that  more  children  gave  deterministic 
answers for the physical cases than the moral ones. However, there 
was no significant difference between the responses in the physical 
cases and the ‘spontaneous’ one (choosing a flavour of ice-cream).27
This  second  experiment  does  not  support  the  claim  that 
children  deploy  a  concept  of  agency  that  is  committed  to 
metaphysical indeterminism, or which features a notion of ‘could 
have done otherwise’ that must be construed incompatiblistically. 
The first problem is the same one that I have raised already. It is not 
clear  how  the  children  understood  the  instruction  to  ‘hold 
everything in the world fixed’. This is a problem that Steward also 
raises  against  Nichols.  For  example,  she  questions  whether  the 
 Nichols (2004: 487).26
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children  might  have  imagined  everything  was  the  same  in  the 
world,  but  not  in  the  agent.  Quite  possibly,  the  children  didn’t 
realise that they were required to hold fixed the relative weightings 
of the agent’s desires.28
The  second  problem,  of  course,  is  simply  that  the  results 
were  inconclusive.  Although  there  was  a  significant  difference 
between  the  physical  cases  and  moral  cases,  there  was  no 
significant difference between the children’s responses to the agent 
making a choice about ice-cream and their responses to the water 
boiling  on  the  stove.  This  is  especially  disappointing  for  the 29
proponent of  incompatibilism about agency,  because it  is  cases of 
such ‘ordinary’ choice that make up the vast majority of our actions 
as  agents.  If  these  results  could  be  used  to  support  any  kind  of 
incompatibilism, it would be some kind of incompatibilism about 
moral responsibility, but not agency.
Interestingly, two pilot studies conducted with adults, using 
the same experimental set-up, did reveal a statistically significant 
difference between these two cases. More participants claimed that 
the agent could have done otherwise when choosing ice-cream and 
 Steward (2012: 84).28
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that the water had to boil. However, as Nichols acknowledges, the 
high  standard  deviation  in  these  results  suggests  that  there  is 
considerable  variation  among  individuals  with  regard  to  their 
intuitions about these cases.  30
Although a little more promising, the difficulty here is that 
one would expect far less variation if these intuitions resulted from 
a  ‘folk  psychology’  that  is  supposed  to  be  innate,  roughly  as 
Steward  supposes.  A  wide  variation  such  as  this  is  better 31
explained by the hypothesis that our concept of agency is acquired 
or learned, and is the result of various environmental, educational, 
or situational factors. Indeed, this would be much like the way in 
which Steward goes on to suggest that we acquire the ‘mechanistic 
world view’ that  she claims has come to obscure our own innate 
conceptual  framework  (i.e.  the  innate  folk  psychology  which 
characterises  agency  in  the  non-deterministic  way  that  she 
proposes). She writes:
 Nichols (2004: 488, n. 7).30
 Nichols also raises a similar ‘nativist’ suggestion about the origins of this concept 31
of  agency,  although  he  only  considers  it  as  one  of  several  possible  origin-
explanations.
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I  regard the source of our deterministic intuitions as largely 
cultural.  I  believe  we  have  them  not  because  of  any  innate 
tendency  to  construe  agency  deterministically,  but  rather 
because of such things as the huge success of the seventeenth-
century scientific revolution; the impressive results of sciences 
such as genetics and molecular biology, which have looked to 
explain  properties  of  wholes  in  terms  of  properties  of  their 
parts;  and  the  invention  of  the  computer  and  the  resulting 
temptations of mechanistic models of animal life.32
Possibly,  Steward could argue that  the  wide individual  variation 
that Nichols observed with the adult study is in fact a result of the 
culturally-acquired  deterministic  intuitions  obscuring  our  innate 
tendency  to  encode  things  as  (indeterministically  conceived) 
agents.  That  would explain  why the  higher  variation  was  found 
with the adult group, but not with the children’s group, given that 
the latter would not yet have had time to acquire the deterministic 
world view.
In any case, it is not enough to show that a concept of agency 
is consistent with the experimental data, as the indeterministic view 
 Steward (2012: 80).32
—  !   —148
of agency was already being considered as a possible ‘contender’. 
The point of citing this research was to swing the balance in favour 
of the incompatibilist’s view, by showing it to be the more plausible 
way to interpret the claims of ‘settling’, ‘up to us’, and ‘could have 
done otherwise’. I conclude that this has not been done and that the 
experimental  evidence  for  the  claim  that  folk  psychology  is 
committed to an incompatibilist agency concept is unconvincing at 
the present time.
4.2.4 Intuitions about the concept of agency
To  recap  the  argument  so  far:  It  was  objected  that  the  term 
‘settling’ (and a range of similar terms) can be used in ways that are 
not committed to indeterminism. Hence, it is not enough to simply 
establish the claim that agency must involve ‘the settling of certain 
matters’,  or  that  genuine  agency  involves  at  least  some  matters 
being ‘up to us’. Assuming those claims are true, this nonetheless 
falls short of a defence of the specifically incompatibilist component 
of  Steward’s  claims  about  agency,  because  those  claims  can  be 
perfectly well read along compatibilist lines.
The defence of  the Agency Incompatibilism claim depends 
on being able to argue for the empirical claim that folk psychology is 
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committed to a concept of non-deterministic agency.  If true, this 33
would support the claim that we should understand key terms like 
‘settling’ in an incompatibilist sense, and would therefore support 
Agency Incompatibilism in general. 
Other than the empirical evidence from psychology that was 
considered in  the  previous  section,  Steward also  appeals  to  “the 
intuitions of individuals about what their folk psychology appears 
to involve […] and the not inconsiderable evidence that is provided 
by  the  historical  persistence  and  recalcitrance  of  the  free  will 
problem.”  34
Whether  the  historical  persistence of  the  free  will  problem 
supports  Steward’s  view  that  our  folk  psychology  involves  a 
fundamental tension between determinism and agency in the way 
that  she  imagines  is  questionable.  Indeed,  one  of  my  main 
arguments in this project is that the free will problem is in need of 
restructuring, not least because of its historical persistence. On the 
contrary,  the  history  of  the  free  will  problem  demonstrates  that 
there is no clear consensus about whether determinism is a problem 
 Steward  (2012:  548-50).  Here  and  elsewhere  when  I  say  ‘non-deterministic 33
agency’, or something similar, I mean ‘a concept of agency that is such that agency 
is not compatible with determinism’.
 Steward (2012: 80).34
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for anything—recall Peter Strawson’s remark that he does not know 
what  the  thesis  of  determinism is —and that  people’s  intuitions 35
about  free  will,  moral  responsibility,  agency,  determinism,  etc., 
probably differ widely. 
Nonetheless, some people do have incompatibilist intuitions, 
and  Steward  is  one  of  them.  She  claims  that  some  of  these  are 
expressed in Chapter 4 (before turning to discuss Nichols’ work). 
What if anything do they tell us about folk psychology, and how we 
should conceptualise the activity of agents? I will argue that, when 
it comes to the kind of determinism that is in question in debates 
about action, it  is all  too common for there to be a conflation (or 
ambiguity)  between the notions of  determinism and reductionism, 
and that this ambiguity itself may contribute to the very historical 
persistence of the free will problem that Steward notes.
Indeed,  at  one  point,  Steward  seems  to  come  close  to 
claiming that it is not in fact determinism, but a certain mechanistic, 
or  reductionist,  view  of  human  beings  that  is  the  source  of  the 
problem she is discussing. She writes:
 Strawson’s  famous  opening  line  from  his  now  classic  essay  ‘Freedom  and 35
Resentment’ (1962: 1).
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It is not universal determinism per se which really constitutes 
the thing with which agency is most specifically in tension. It 
is  rather  a  more  localised  variant  of  the  thesis,  born  of  a 
conception of agency itself as a phenomenon which must be 
neatly superimposable over, or at least very straightforwardly 
supervenient  upon,  the  various  intuitively  lower-level  and 
impersonally  describable  phenomena  that  we  know  have 
something very important to do with it, which generates the 
real problem.36
Of course, Steward remains an incompatibilist, and she does claim 
that  determinism  itself  is  a  problem  for  agency.  But  there  are 
several  points  at  which  she  appeals  to  intuitions  to  support  this 
claim, where the intuition being invoked is either more to do with 
reductionism, or is equivocal between the two (that of determinism, 
and that of reductionism).
Return  to  the  main  example  given  earlier  in  Steward’s 
discussion of our folk concepts, that of a large farm animal moving 
across a field. Steward writes: 
 Steward (2012: 10).36
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It  is  most  unlikely  that  anyone  not  already  encumbered  by 
theoretical  prejudices  would  suppose  it  had been caused to 
make its  trek across the field by a strictly reflex action or a 
simple stimulus–response mechanism. The activity of a cow or 
a sheep, I suggest, simply does not look as though it could be 
explained by such means.37
This appears to be the expression of an intuition (“simply does not 
look as though …”). Yet from this point, the conclusion reached is 
that  we must  instead view the animal’s  activity according to the 
indeterministic conception of agency.
I submit that it goes deeply against the grain to suppose that 
each exact detail of each movement orchestrated by an animal 
was settled at any point prior to a period broadly concurrent 
with what we think of as the period of the animal’s action.38
However, the intuition expressed in the first extract is about certain 
forms of reductionism, or mechanism. That the animal’s activity is 
 Steward (2012: 75). Emphasis in original.37
 Steward (2012: 75).38
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not  the  result  of  “a  simple  stimulus-response  mechanism,”  or  a 
“strictly reflex action.” Both of these points are neutral with regard 
to determinism (or indeterminism).
Steward  cites  the  historical  persistence  of  the  free  will 
problem as evidence that  people do possess  strong indeterminist 
intuitions  of  the  kind she  supposes  result  from possession of  an 
incompatibilist concept of agency. 
One way of bolstering the argument, though, is by appealing 
to the very persistence of the free will problem, and the ease 
with which it can be explained to the uninitiated, which might 
themselves be regarded as reasons for wondering whether any 
account of folk psychology that simply proposes that actions 
are events conceived of as being deterministically caused by 
prior mental states can really be quite right.39
In this passage, it is not clear whether the intuition being expressed 
is:
 Steward (2012: 79).39
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(A) Any account of folk psychology that simply proposes that 
actions are events conceived of as being deterministically 
caused […] cannot be quite right.
Or:
(B) Any account of folk psychology that simply proposes that 
actions are events  conceived of  as  being […] caused by 
prior mental states cannot be quite right.
So we seem to have a situation where, if one were to agree with the 
claim in  the  original  text,  this  might  indeed be  because  one  has 
incompatibilist  intuitions  about  actions  being  deterministically 
caused events — but it might be because one has anti-reductionist 
intuitions about actions being a matter of causation by prior mental 
states. 
A similar ambiguity occurs here:
[M]ental  states  are  simply  not  thought  of  by  our  folk 
psychology,  I  maintain,  as  independent  causally  efficacious 
entities. They are thought of rather as features of a substantive 
entity—an agent—which must act if any bodily movement is 
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to  result  from its  desires  and beliefs  and whose  actions  are 
thought  of  as  explicable  by  appeal  to,  but  not  as 
deterministically caused by, those desires and beliefs.40
Compare:
(A) The  claim  that  mental  states  are  not  independently 
causally  efficacious  entities,  but  rather  features  of  a 
substantive  entity,  “whose  actions  are  thought  of  as 
explicable by appeal to, but not as […] caused by, those 
desires and beliefs.”
(B) The  claim  that  actions  of  the  substantive  entity  are 
thought of as not deterministically caused by those desires 
and beliefs.
According to (A), the intuition being expressed is that the actions of 
a  substantive  entity  are  not  caused  by  desires  and beliefs  (i.e.  by 
particular mental states). It might not matter, for example, whether 
determinism is true as long as the actions of this entity are explicable 
by reference to desires and beliefs, but not caused by them. 
 Steward (2012: 77).40
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On  the  other  hand,  according  to  (B),  the  intuition  being 
expressed is  that  the  actions  of  this  substantive  entity  cannot  be 
deterministically  caused  by  —  whatever  it  might  be  that  causes 
them. The intuition here is that it  is the bare fact of determinism 
that causes problems for action. 
Indeed, both of these claims (A and B) appear to be running 
themes  in  Steward’s  book,  and  it  is  clear  that  the  most 
hermeneutically viable reading of the last passage I just cited is to 
read Steward as intending both  claims.  The problem even here is 
that, when it comes to intuitions, it is hard to know which aspect is 
really driving the feeling of  intuitive agreement when the claims 
are blended together in this way.
In  any  case,  it  is  clear  that  Steward,  and  many  other 
philosophers  working  on  the  free  will  problem,  do  report 41
incompatibilist intuitions about the relation between human action 
and determinism. I confess to having such intuitions myself. But it 
is not clear to what extent these intuitions occur outside of the cabal 
of professional philosophers. The ‘experimental philosophy’ studies 
 For  example,  Vargas  (2013)  considers  the  probability  that  philosophers  have 41
mixed intuitions about this issue, with some harbouring both incompatibilist and 
compatibilist  intuitions.  Nichols  (2006)  makes  a  similar  claim  about  ‘folk’ 
intuitions.
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that have probed that question are limited in number, and usually 
require philosophical interpretation. The difficulty is that the notion 
of  incompatibilism,  as  philosophers use the term, is  itself  a  highly 
‘philosophical’ concept (i.e. it requires an amount of philosophical 
competence to even understand a sentence containing the term).
Hence,  I  submit  that  the  evidence  from  intuition  is  once 
again  inconclusive,  and  does  not  support  the  claim  that  folk 
psychology is committed to indeterminism in agency. I noted above 
that  some  experimental  studies  found  that  adults  have  widely 
differing  intuitions  about  these  matters.  The  present  argument 
shows,  firstly,  that  it  is  very  easy  to  conflate  claims  about 
determinism and claims  about  reductionism.  If  this  is  true,  then 
there  is  further  reason  to  be  cautious  when  citing  the  intuitions 
people have regarding determinism, because they may in fact  be 
intuitions about reductionism or mechanism, and not determinism.
Secondly, it shows that the subtlety of the concepts involved 
(viz.  incompatibilism,  and specifically  metaphysical  indeterminism 
in action) means that there will  always be difficulty in surveying 
the general population about such matters without first requiring a 
minimal amount of philosophical competence or explanation, and 
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hence undermining the claim that these are ‘prephilosophical’, folk 
intuitions about the matter in question.
4.3 The Evidentiary Role of Folk Psychology and Intuition
In the previous sections, I have considered a range of evidence for 
the claim that there is a particular concept of agency that we are in 
fact committed to, as a result of certain cognitive modules that are a 
natural part of our development — a ‘folk psychology’ that is more 
or less innate. Steward claims that, properly understood, this folk 
psychology includes a conception of agency itself that, among other 
things,  views  agency  as  something  that  is  not  compatible  with 
determinism.
In  the  previous  section  I  raised  several  broadly  empirical 
concerns: I doubted that we do in fact have such a conception of 
agency, based on the fact that the evidence from experiment, as well 
as from more traditional appeals to intuition, is not compelling. But 
there is a more general, methodological question to consider: what 
is  the  relation  between  the  structure  of  our  folk-psychological 
concepts, on the one hand, and actual metaphysics on the other? In 
this case, of course, the question concerns the relation between the 
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folk  psychological  conception  of  agency  just  mentioned,  and the 
metaphysics of agency itself.
4.3.1 Debunking
Why examine  folk  psychology when the  philosophical  task  is  to 
develop a metaphysics of agency? For Steward, there are at least two 
reasons. As explained in Section (4.2.2), it is intended to support her 
specifically incompatibilist reading of the technical term ‘settling’. 
The task is to use the empirical data to support the claim that folk 
psychology  is  committed  to  an  incompatiblistically-construed 
conception of  ‘settling’,  i.e.  that  the  folk  conception of  agency is 
such  that  we  naturally  interpret  agents’  actions  as  involving  a 
metaphysically indeterminate process. 
The role that the empirical data is supposed to play here is 
this:  when  deciding  between  which  is  the  more  plausible 
interpretation  of  the  concept,  the  incompatibilist  reading  or  the 
otherwise equivalent compatibilist reading, the fact (if it is a fact) 
that folk psychology is committed a concept which has as part of its 
content  the  incompatibilistically-construed  notion  of  ‘settling’ 
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thereby  supports  that  interpretation  of  settling  when running  the 
argument for Agency Incompatibilism.42
Secondly, I take it that this claim about folk psychology is to 
be  used  as  part  of  the  more  general  philosophical  argument, 
directly in favour of Agency Incompatibilism. The fact that we have 
such intuitions about agency, and that we in fact experience certain 
phenomena  (actions)  as  indeterminate  processes  (as  the  Agency 
Incompatibilist claims they really are), thereby counts as evidence for 
the metaphysical claim that this is how agency in fact works. Hence, 
the  more  general  appeal  to  empirical  psychology  and  cognitive 
science is meant to play a role in a philosophical argument about 
some metaphysical feature of the world. Specifically, it is meant to 
provide evidentiary support in favour of a particular metaphysical 
hypothesis.
The  relation  between cognitive  science  and metaphysics  is 
the  subject  of  some debate.  In  this  particular  case,  the  argument 
moves from (i) the fact that we are disposed to judge that X, or that 
we have an experience as of X in certain situations—which is taken 
to  be  the  result  of  certain  ‘hardwired’  features  of  our  cognitive 
system—to (ii) the metaphysical claim that X. (Or to the claim that X 
 See, in particular, the argument in Steward (2014: 547-50).42
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is  more  likely  to  be  true  than  some  rival  hypothesis.)  But  the 
assumption  that  discovering  empirical  facts  about  our  cognitive 
systems  or,  more  generally,  our  psychology,  could  be  used  as 
evidence in support of metaphysical hypotheses about the state of 
the world is at  least open to doubt.  And indeed I  will  now raise 
some doubts about that assumption in more detail.
Here  is  an  alternative  perspective  on  the  relation  between 
cognitive science and metaphysics:  debunking. There is a famous 
line of argument in normative ethics which takes the existence of 
(e.g.) cognitive scientific evidence of the kind noted in (i) to actually 
count  as  evidence  against  the  existence  of  the  phenomenon  in 
question (X). In ethics, this argument usually takes the form of an 
undermining or debunking argument. 
For  example,  it  might  be  shown  that  certain  moral 
judgments,  which  are  ostensibly  taken  to  be  the  products  of 
reasoned  deliberation  about  the  facts,  are  directly  influenced  by 
basic affective systems responding to seemingly irrelevant features 
of the situation in which the judgment is made, such as whether the 
subject is seated at a clean or a filthy desk.  Hence, it is claimed 43
that  the  moral  judgment  is  undermined,  because  we  do  not  in 
 Schnall et al. (2008).43
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general believe that the aesthetic condition of the desk is a morally 
relevant factor that should influence the judgment. In addition, the 
subjects were of course unaware that the condition of the desk was 
influencing their judgment. Here we have a case where facts about 
our  psychology  and  cognitive  systems  seem  to  undermine  the 
judgments we make about a certain phenomenon.
A more  general  form  of  this  argument  is  the  evolutionary 
debunking argument: the claim is that certain intuitions about moral 
problems, or the existence of general moral traits or virtues, such as 
altruism, can be shown to exist as a result of evolutionarily more 
ancient systems. If these systems evolved as a result of the pressure, 
as Richard Joyce puts it, for our ancestors to “make more babies” 
then this fact is supposed to undermine the normative force of such 
intuitions or virtues.  Joyce writes about moral thinking in general:44
It  is  naive to assume that these natural  prosocial  tendencies 
extend  to  non-cognitive  feelings,  behavioural  dispositions, 
inclinations, aversions, and preferences, but not to beliefs. But 
acknowledging beliefs under the influence of natural selection 
raises epistemological concerns, for the faithful representation 
 Joyce (2006: 222).44
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of  reality  is  of  only  contingent  instrumental  value  when 
reproductive  success  is  the  touchstone,  forcing  us  to 
acknowledge that if in certain domains false beliefs will bring 
more offspring then that is the route natural selection will take 
every  time.  Moral  thinking  could  very  well  be  such  a 
domain.45
Even  more  specifically,  Joshua  Greene  argues  that 
deontological  ethical  judgments  are  driven by primarily  emotional 
responses  (and  hence  not  by  reasoning),  while  consequentialist 
ethical  judgments  are  the  product  of  different  psychological 
processes that are more ‘cognitive’ and, for that reason, are more 
likely to be the result of ‘genuine’ moral reasoning.  For example, 46
Greene  suggests  that  there  is  a  (debunking)  evolutionary 
explanation  for  the  observed  disparity  in  consensus  about  two 
 Joyce (2006: 222).45
 Greene  (2008).  For  a  similar  view  about  the  status  of  moral  intuitions,  an 46
important line of argument is found in Singer (2005) and his classic book on the 
topic (now revised 2011). Singer does not argue against deontological ethics in the 
way Greene does: his more specific argument is that we ought to carefully discern 
which intuitions are the product of ‘distorting’ evolutionary pressures, and which 
are the product of reason, since we cannot do without intuitions altogether.
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similar  problems  in  normative  ethics:  the  trolley  problem  and  the 
footbridge problem. 
The trolley problem is a familiar device in normative ethics, 
in which a person is asked to make a moral judgment about what 
they believe they ought to do in the situation that is described.  In 47
this thought experiment, the person being tested is asked whether 
they ought to flip a switch that will divert a runaway trolley away 
from  five  people  who  would  otherwise  be  killed.  However,  by 
redirecting the runaway trolley in this way, it will be diverted on to 
a  second track where  it  will  end up killing a  single  person.  The 
ethical dilemma is whether to save the lives of five innocent people, 
at  the cost  of  killing one innocent person.  Green reports  that  the 
philosophical and popular consensus is that it is morally acceptable 
to do so.48
In a second very similar case, sometimes called the footbridge 
case ,  the consensus appears to go the other way. In this thought 49
experiment,  everything  is  the  same  apart  from  the  fact  that  the 
 The classic source is Foot (1967). See also Thomson (1976).47
 Greene (2008) cites Fischer and Ravizza (1992) for the philosophical consensus, 48
and cites a number of papers in which people have been tested experimentally 
about these problems for the popular consensus.
 Or in the less-P.C. times of the 1970s, the ‘fat man’ case. See Thomson (1967).49
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person in question cannot simply flip a switch to divert the trolley. 
Instead, they must push a stranger off a footbridge into the path of 
the trolley, thereby stopping the train and saving the lives of five 
people (but killing the hapless stranger). Greene reports that most 
people think it is not morally acceptable to do so.50
Assuming  that  it  is  true,  as  it  seems  to  be,  that  people 
consistently  reach  different  judgments  about  these  cases,  the 
philosophical  problem  is  to  identify  a  morally  relevant  factor 
between  the  cases  that  explains  the  differing  moral  judgments. 
After all, there can be no genuinely moral difference without some 
other kind of (non-moral) difference between the cases.  51
However,  Greene  suggests  that  there  is  a  quite  different 
explanation  of  this  difference  to  be  found.  He  argues  that  the 
different intuitions about these cases are due to the difference in the 
proximity of the violence that occurs. In the trolley case, everything 
happens at a distance and all the person has to do is flip a switch. 
 Greene (2008: 43).50
 This is the notion of moral supervenience — usually attributed to R. M. Hare who 51
was one of the first to use the term ‘supervenience’ in this context, although the 
idea itself has been around for a long time. See Moore: “one of the most important 
facts  about  qualitative  difference…[is  that]  two  things  cannot  differ  in  quality 
without differing in intrinsic nature” Moore (1922: 263).
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However,  the  footbridge  case  involves  physically  pushing  a 
stranger from a bridge and effectively killing them with one’s own 
hands. 
Given  that  the  existence  and  threat  of  such  ‘personal 
violence’ is evolutionarily old, it  is plausible that we have strong 
negative emotional responses to such cases, owing to the necessity 
of living in close proximity to other creatures “who are capable of 
intentionally harming one another, but whose survival depends on 
cooperation and individual restraint.”  By contrast, the trolley case 52
triggers no such responses, because the possibility of such scenarios 
is  a  relatively  recent  phenomenon.  As  such,  Green  suggests  that 
people tend to deal with the trolley case in a ‘more cognitive’ way, 
and employ a form of cost-benefit moral reasoning.
Hence, the argument from cognitive science is this. Because it 
has been shown that the intuitions and the judgments that people 
make  about  this  situation  can  be  explained  by  reference  to 
psychological  systems  that  evolved  to  deal  with  problems  of 
survival and reproduction, this undermines their status as reliable 
sources of information about the world (including the moral facts 
about the world, in this case). As has long been pointed out, it is 
 Greene (2008: 43).52
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difficult to see why evolution would have selected for systems that 
are capable of discerning objective moral truths.  To be precise, the 53
debunking argument challenges the justificatory credentials of the 
process  by  which  the  intuitions  or  the  beliefs  in  question  are 
formed.54
In fact, the last point made above is more properly directed 
at  arguments  in  meta-ethics,  since  it  concerns  the  objectivity  of 
moral  beliefs:  the  general  form  of  argument  is  that  there  is  no 
reason  why  evolution  would  produce  systems  that  are  reliable 
trackers of objective truth, especially objective moral truths, rather 
than being sufficient only for the more limited instrumental goal of 
survival. As Schaffer puts it:
Evolution  suggests  that  human cognition  is  a  powerful  but 
flawed tool. On the one hand it is plausible that many of our 
cognitive  faculties  evolved  to  help  us  with  the  four  ‘f’s 
(feeding,  fighting,  fleeing,  and  reproduction),  and  plausible 
that this pressured our ancestors towards reliably tracking the 
environment.  On the  other  hand it  is  equally  plausible  that 
 For an important argument along these lines, see Street (2006).53
 See Nichols (2014) for the distinction between ‘best explanation debunking’ and 54
‘process debunking’ of this kind.
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many of our cognitive faculties evolved to give us quick and 
dirty  heuristics  reliable  only  for  limited  purposes  in 
evolutionarily salient contexts.55
The undermining arguments  just  outlined suggest  that  the 
evidence  from  cognitive  science  that  Steward  appeals  to  could 
actually be taken as counting against the claim that agency works 
in the way our folk psychology appears to suggest. The experiences 
as of agency, or the intuitions we have about agency, are driven by 
basic systems which have evolved to track various features of the 
environment, and categorise them differently to others. But do they 
reliably track real, metaphysical features of the world? Or are they 
instead the result  of  ‘quick and dirty heuristics’  that  are ‘reliable 
only for limited purposes in evolutionarily salient contexts’?
Is Steward open to a debunking argument? In addition, even 
if  the  claims  about  agency  are  not  suitable  for  debunking,  what 
exactly are the epistemic credentials of such sources of information 
in general? That is, to what extent can we rely on these experiences 
and intuitions (the deliverance of our folk psychology in general) as 
sources of evidence in support of a metaphysical hypothesis? What 
 Schaffer (2016: 342).55
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weight  should we assign them as sources of evidence, if we allow 
them to count at all?
4.3.2 The relation between cognitive science and metaphysics
In general, information of this kind will be relevant to metaphysical 
inquiry. However, the kind of unselective debunking approach noted 
above is  not  appropriate.  Even in normative ethics,  among those 
who  have  criticised  reliance  on  moral  intuition,  such  as  Peter 
Singer, the claims are appropriately selective: Singer argues that we 
cannot do without intuitions altogether, and so it is misguided to 
simply dismiss all reliance on intuitions as sources of information. 
Instead, what we must do is attempt to discern which intuitions or 
experiences are the product of ‘distorting’ evolutionary pressures, 
and which have a rational basis.  56
This selective approach is the right way to assess the relation 
between cognitive science (and psychology, neuroscience, etc.) and 
 Singer (2005). He writes that we must “attempt the ambitious task of separating 56
those moral judgments that we owe to our evolutionary and cultural history, from 
those that have a rational basis. This is a large and difficult task. Even to specify in 
what sense a moral judgment can have a rational basis is not easy. Nevertheless, it 
seems  to  me  worth  attempting,  for  it  is  the  only  way  to  avoid  moral 
skepticism.” (2005: 351)
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the  evaluation  of  metaphysical  claims  about  the  world.  For 
example, the mere fact that some feature of our experience (e.g. we 
experience certain entities as agents) can be shown to come about as 
the direct result  of a cognitive system that has been shaped over 
many years of evolution, under the pressures of reproduction and 
survival,  does not  for  that  reason serve to debunk or undermine 
that feature of our experience (or that intuition, or that belief …). In 
fact, all of our experiences and intuitions are enabled by cognitive systems 
which are the product of such evolutionary pressures — because human 
beings are the products of evolution. Again, this is a point that is 
put  succinctly  by  Schaffer,  in  answer  to  the  question  ‘when  to 
debunk?’
One bad answer—bad because unselective—is that an intuition 
can be debunked when one can tell  a  cognitive story about 
how it  arises.  This  is  unselective  (and thus  bad)  because  of 
course there is always some cognitive story to be told about 
every cognitive output, intuitions included. Cognitive outputs 
are not miracles. They all have causal aetiologies through our 
cognitive engines.57
 Schaffer (2016: 344).57
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Secondly, and this is a point that Steward makes herself, the 
mere fact that a system can be triggered in error does not thereby 
undermine the justificatory force of that system in general (which 
would be a kind of process debunking). We can and should regard the 
outputs of  such systems as being defeasible.  But  if  the system is 
triggered in error all the time, more often that it is accurate, then we 
would likely regard it as a unreliable process of belief formation in 
general, and this would support a debunking argument. In normal 
circumstances, however, we accept that the possibility of error does 
not  automatically  undermine  a  particular  source  of  information 
about the word: so, for example, the fact that we are subject to the 
possibility  of  perceptual  errors  or  illusions  does  not  undermine 
perception as a source of knowledge in general.
What is the right way to treat the evidentiary credentials of 
our experiences? In particular, how should we evaluate the agency 
case, where the claim is that we have an experience of other agents 
(and,  in  particular,  where  we  experience  these  agents  as 
instantiating the various properties that Steward has outlined)? 
Firstly,  the  fact  that  the  modular  systems  that  Steward 
suggests are responsible for these experiences (and perhaps also for 
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the intuitions she cites) are products of evolution does not by itself 
present a problem. It would need to be shown that either (i) the best 
explanation for our having these experiences in the way that we do 
can  be  given  in  terms  that  do  not  presuppose  the  truth  of  the 
agency theory (as we saw in the case of the filthy desk affecting the 
moral judgments, for example). 
But this has not been done, although I do not rule out the 
possibility that such challenges could be developed. This would be 
a further empirical matter.  (The fact that the concept of agency in 58
question here is one that applies almost exclusively to other animals 
is  cause  to  speculate  whether  this  system  evolved  as  a  way  of 
categorising  those  features  of  the  environment  that  are  potential 
threats.) Hence, I conclude that there is no ‘best explanation’ reason 
to dismiss these agency experiences.
Secondly,  the  way  in  which  we  come  to  have  these 
experiences is grounded in the perception of various features of the 
environment. That is,  the experience of agency Steward describes 
appears to be fundamentally a perceptual one. Although this is not 
entirely clear from the text, I believe it is a plausible reading of the 
 Again,  see  Nichols  (2014)  for  an  explanation  of  the  difference  between ‘best 58
explanation’ debunking (or undercutting / undermining) and ‘process’ debunking.
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account:  see,  for  example,  the  discussion  above  about  Steward’s 
thoughts on the ‘theory-theory’ vs. the simulation approach (which 
she favours),  and her comments on folk psychology as a ‘way of 
seeing’: 
“This way of thinking is, moreover, at the same time a way of 
seeing”59
“As I suggested above, one normally sees as cow as an agent. 
One does not judge that on balance, beliefs and desires present 
the best explanation of its behaviour.”60
For  this  reason  it  is  not  plausible  to  suggest  that  the  process  by 
which the beliefs  are formed is  an illegitimate one.  For example, 
Goldman suggests that there are some kinds of process which are 
‘essentially’ faulty, and not legitimate processes of belief formation: 
“confused  reasoning,  wishful  thinking,  reliance  on  emotional 
 Steward (2012: 93). See also the reference to Wittgenstein: “We say ‘The cock calls 59
the hens by crowing’ … Isn’t the aspect quite altered if we imagine the crowing to 
set the hens in motion by some kind of physical causation?” (1953: §493; cited in 
Steward 2012: 93 n. 37).
 Steward (2012: 77 n. 13).60
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attachment, mere hunch or guesswork, and hasty generalisation.” 
By  contrast,  forming  beliefs  on  the  basis  of  direct  perceptual 
experiences is not in general a faulty process of belief formation.
One might claim that  the perception of  agency is  in fact  a 
perceptual  illusion,  thereby  attempting  to  block  the  move  from 
perceptual experience to the justification of beliefs.  However, this 
would require a specific independent argument for the claim that 
agency perception is in fact an illusion. As we have seen above, the 
mere  fact  that  perception in  general  is  open to  the  possibility  of 
perceptual  illusions  does  not  undermine  it  as  a  source  of 
knowledge. That we might be subject to an illusion of agency in this 
or that case would not undermine the general claims about agency 
perception that Steward makes. It would need to be shown that we 
are  systematically  subject  to  a  perceptual  illusion  in  the  case  of 
agency.
Perhaps  a  better  way to  challenge  the  claim about  agency 
perception  would  not  be  to  dispute  the  process  that  leads  to  the 
belief, but to deny that the experience in question actually has the 
content that Steward claims it has. However, this would not be a 
debunking  or  undercutting  argument  any  longer:  it  would  be  a 
straightforward disagreement about the content of that experience. 
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Indeed, I suggested above that such experiences do not plausibly 
have metaphysical indeterminism as part of their content: but my 
argument  there  was  simply  that  there  is  insufficient  empirical 
evidence to  suggest  that  most  people  have an experience of  that 
kind,  on  the  basis  of  their  introspective  self-reports,  and  the 
availability  of  research  which  tests  people’s  intuitions  about 
various problem cases. 
A deeper philosophical point to make in this context, when 
evaluating  the  evidential  status  of  our  experiences,  is  that  we 
should  be  aware  of  the  possibility  that  introspective  reports  of 
experiences may be theory-laden, especially when the reports issue 
from professional philosophers working on (for example) the free 
will problem.  More importantly, Horgan and Timmons argue that 61
even  if  the  phenomenology  genuinely  has  aspects  that  are  aptly 
described  in  incompatibilist  terms—as  we  saw  with  Steward’s 
feature  (iv)  which,  it  was  claimed,  involved  metaphysically 
indeterminate settling of  matters  at  the time of  action—this  does 
not by itself mean that the phenomenology thus characterised has 
incompatibilist satisfaction conditions. They write:
 Nahmias et al. (2004: 163).61
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[I]t is one thing for the phenomenology to be aptly described 
as ‘an experience as-of having an unconditional ability to do 
otherwise in my actual circumstances’; it is another thing for 
phenomenology  that  is  thus  aptly  described  to  have 
libertarian  satisfaction  conditions  involving  the  falsity  of 
determinism.  Problematic  theory-ladenness  might  intrude 
itself  not  in  the  use  of  the  phenomenological  descriptions 
themselves,  and  not  in  the  aptness  of  these  descriptions  in 
characterising the phenomenology of  freedom, but  rather  in 
one’s  construal  of  the  intentional  content  of  the  pertinent 
phenomenology  as  thus  described  —  its  satisfaction 
conditions.62
Hence, even if it  were granted, with Steward, that we are indeed 
naturally disposed to have experiences which are aptly described as 
experiences  (as)  of  metaphysically  indeterminate  settlings  at  the 
time  of  action  (and  hence  incompatible  with  determinism),  this 
would  not  by  itself  entail  that  these  experiences  have 
incompatibilist  satisfaction  conditions  —  in  short,  it  would  not 
 Horgan and Timmons (2011: 188). They note that Nahmias et al. do not appear to 62
recognise this second, deeper form of theory-ladenness.
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entail that agency must in fact be non-deterministic in order for us 
to have the type of experiences that Steward describes (if we indeed 
have such experiences).
I  argued  above  that  there  is  not  enough  experimental 
evidence to suggest that the majority of people have experiences of, 
or intuitions about, metaphysical indeterminism being an essential 
part  of  agency.  This  is  enough  to  dispute  the  claim  that  folk 
psychology  is  committed  to  an  incompatibilist  conception  of 
agency, because the argument for that claim was based on empirical 
research and intuitions (dealt with in the previous sections). But the 
argument  by  Horgan  and  Timmons  is  an  important  one,  and 
presents a challenge to the general project of citing experiences as 
evidence in the construction of metaphysical theories. 
In particular, the contentious point in Steward’s description 
of  our  agency  experiences  is  the  feature  which  is  supposed  to 
involve metaphysical indeterminism.  Now suppose that this were 
in fact part of folk psychology. Considering that it is opposed to the 
rival  interpretation  on  which  agency  is  compatible  with 
determinism, the contentious question here is whether the content 
of  the  agency-experience  should  be  regarded  as  involving 
(metaphysical)  indeterminacy  which  presupposes  the  falsity  of 
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determinism,  or  a  kind of  indeterminacy that  is  compatible  with 
metaphysical determinism.
It  is  difficult  to  see  how  we  could  register  the  difference 
between  an  experience  as-of  one  or  the  other  kind,  without 
assuming that  the  experience  is  theory-laden in  the  way Horgan 
and Timmons suggest.  Simply put, an experience as-of the action 
being  indeterminate  in  a  metaphysically  robust  way  (settling  a 
matter not previously settled) would look the same as an experience 
of that action being indeterminate in a way that is compatible with 
determinism  (e.g.  because  I  am  utterly  unable  to  predict  the 
outcome,  it  is  experienced  as  indeterminate).  Along  these  lines, 
consider  the  story  related  by  G.  E.  M.  Anscombe  about  an 
encounter she had with Wittgenstein: 
He once greeted me with the question:  ‘Why do people say 
that it was natural to think that the sun went round the earth 
rather  than  that  the  earth  turned  on  its  axis?  I  replied:  ‘I 
suppose, because it looked as if the sun went round the earth.’ 
‘Well,’  he  asked,  ‘what  would  it  have  looked  like  if  it  had 
looked as if the earth turned on its axis?’63
 Anscombe (1959: 151).63
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4.4 Conclusion
Here is what I believe we can say about the concept of agency. We 
have  good  reason  to  think  of  agency  as  something  that  is 
instantiated  by  living  creatures  (but  not  non-living  entities), 
primarily  exemplified  by  human  beings  —  especially  given  the 
further features of agency that I will go on to consider in the next 
two chapters. 
With that  said,  one of  the interesting features of  Steward’s 
view, that I have not discussed here, is her claim that there is no 
principled  reason why agency should be  coextensive  with  human 
beings. Indeed, according to the present view, the extent to which 
the agency concept applies to nonhuman animals, for example, is 
going to be a matter of determining the extent to which they meet 
the criteria of the following chapters. Hence, the gradualism about 
agency to which Steward subscribes is itself certainly plausible, but 
it  is  not  something  that  there  is  space  to  pursue  in  the  present 
project.
For that reason, I will only consider the paradigm case, as it 
were, of agency: human beings. This should not be thought of as an 
anthropomorphic prejudice of mine — it remains an open question, 
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in  my  view,  to  what  extent,  and  to  what  degree,  agency  is 
instantiated  in  nonhuman  animals.  I  consider  human  beings 64
because  intentionality  and  consciousness  are  probably  best 
understood  in  relation  to  our  own  case,  and  it  is  enough  of  a 
challenge  to  argue  that  human  agency  is  constituted  by  the 
integration of these phenomena, as I am doing here, without raising 
any  further  contentious  questions.  To  that  end,  the  next  two 
chapters are devoted to unpacking each of these important aspects 
of the overall causal integration that constitutes agency.  
 The question of degree, of course, applies also to human beings.64
5Intentional Realism
5.1. Introduction
In  the  previous  chapter  I  made two important  claims.  First,  that 
there is a ‘folk psychology’ which characterises our default way of 
interpreting  the  behaviour  of  other  people,  and  often,  to  some 
degree  or  other,  the  behaviour  of  certain  non-human animals  as 
well.  Secondly,  that  this  folk  psychology  is  relatively  robust, 
although  it  is  open  to  correction  by  empirical  science  in  certain 
matters of detail — but not to the extent of a wholesale replacement 
of folk psychology by non-intentional theories of behaviour (e.g. at 
the level of neuroscience, for example).
In this context I considered Steward’s work on agency. Her 
work is relevant here because she makes a similar claim about the 
innateness  of  folk  psychology  as  a  means  of  understanding  and 
predicting agents’ behaviour, and also, importantly, her view meets 
the general constraints on a concept of agency that I suggested at 
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the beginning of Chapter 4. Hence, it is useful to begin exploring 
the details of my view of agency by situating this discussion in the 
context of existing literature in the area.
A large part of Steward’s account is focused on the relation 
between determinism (or  indeterminism)  and agency:  she  claims 
that indeterminism is a central part of our folk psychology — i.e. it 
is  part  of  our  innate  conception  of  agency  that  it  involves 
indeterminism. In the previous chapter, I expressed doubts that our 
folk  conception  of  agency  does  in  fact  contain  a  commitment  to 
indeterminism in this way.
A  further  set  of  claims  that  I  discussed  in  that  chapter 
concerned the general relation between such empirical facts about 
our  psychology (i.e.  how we in  fact  categorise  certain  things  we 
meet with in experience) and straightforward metaphysical claims 
about the world. I suggested that we should take the existence of 
these  cognitive  dispositions  (e.g.  to  categorise  certain  things  as 
agents) to give us a—defeasible—reason for thinking that there is a 
real metaphysical distinction to be found here, between agents and 
non-agents, which maps the distinction made by our folk concepts 
— with the above-mentioned proviso regarding correction of those 
folk concepts in matters of detail by empirical science.
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Accordingly,  this  chapter  begins  the  positive  task  of 
articulating that view of agency in more detail.  I  will unpack the 
general  view of agency as I  conceive it,  and will  point out some 
similarities—and the important differences—between this view and 
Steward’s view of agency discussed in the previous chapter. 
Aside  from  the  doubts  about  indeterminism,  I  agree  with 
Steward’s  claims  about  the  importance  of  attributing  intentional 
states such as belief and desire as a central part of the attribution of 
agency.  Hence  this  chapter  addresses  the  question  of  intentional 
realism and how it forms part of our concept of agency. I will also 
consider two objections to the very idea of intentional realism itself, 
i.e. those of eliminativism and instrumentalism. 
While  the  problem  of  eliminativism  is  relatively  quickly 
dispatched, the challenge presented by instrumentalism leads into a 
deeper  discussion  of  causation  and  its  role  in  our  concept  of 
agency: it is not simply intentional realism that matters, of course, 
but  intentional  agency.  The  conclusion  of  this  section  is  that  the 
interventionist view of causation provides a way of responding to 
the  instrumentalist  —  but  in  a  way  that  must  involve  a  causal 
contribution from phenomenal  consciousness.  Thus we come full 
circle,  back to the notion of  agency as involving both intentional 
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realism and consciousness, in a way that cannot be reduced to the 
individual contribution of either. The following chapter then takes 
up a deeper discussion of consciousness and its role in agency.
5.2 The Agency Concept
Explanation of action by reference to intentional states is central to 
our  conception  of  agency,  and  those  intentional  states  are 
characterised by the structure of our folk psychology. Thinking of 
something that can believe and desire, and can take action to achieve 
a goal or outcome that is  desired, is  to think of that entity as an 
intentional  agent.  For  example,  Kim  famously  sums  up  the 
continuing interest in the problem of mental causation by pointing 
out  that  “we care about mental  causation because we care about 
agency.”  Elsewhere he goes on to say:1
Let  us  first  review  the  reasons  for  wanting  to  save  mental 
causation—why it is important to us that mental causation is 
real. First and foremost, the possibility of human agency, and 
 Kim (2010: 257).1
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hence our moral practise, evidently requires that our mental 
states have causal effects in the physical world.2
Those  mental  states  that  Kim  takes  to  be  centrally  involved  in 
human agency are  those  such as  belief,  desire,  intention,  and so 
forth — those which make up folk psychology. Kim also notes that 
it is important for those mental states to have causal power. In fact, 
Kim makes it clear that in order to be a realist about mental states—
or  indeed  about  anything  at  all—one  must  be  committed  to  the 
causal reality of those states. This he calls ‘Alexander’s Dictum’: to 
be real is to have causal powers.  3
Even those who do not hold a causal view of action believe 
that intentional explanations are nonetheless centrally involved in 
action explanation. While those non-causal views face a number of 
difficulties  that  are  familiar  in  the  literature,  particularly  since 
Davidson’s seminal 1963 paper, I do not propose to rehearse them 
in any detail  here.  The point is that they nonetheless depend on 4
 Kim (2005: 9); see also (1998: 31) for similar remarks.2
 Kim (1993: 348).3
 Davidson (1963). A prominent recent defence of a non-causal view of action is 4
Ginet (2007).  See Clarke (2010) for a nice overview of the criticisms of Ginet’s non-
causal view, and why his responses to them do not succeed.
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such  intentional  explanations  as  a  central  part  of  how  we 
understand human action. 
Notwithstanding the many differences of detail between the 
different accounts, the received view is currently that reasons are 
(in some sense) causes: that is, the intentional explanations we give, 
involving the folk psychological predicates under discussion here, 
are  causally  involved  in  the  explanation  of  action.  The  general 
understanding is that—as Davidson pointed out—if reasons were 
not  causes,  we  could  not  explain  why  an  agent  performed  a 
particular action A for reason p rather than reason q, where both p 
and q are reasons to A. 
If,  as  the  non-causal  view  would  have  it,  we  have  an 
intentional explanation on the one hand, and a causal explanation 
on the other hand, then the reasons explanation could explain why 
the  action  happened  (normative  explanation),  but  not  why  the 
action  happened  then  (causal  explanation);  likewise,  the  causal 
explanation  could  explain  why  it  happened  then,  but  not  why  it 
happened. This much is already familiar from the literature, and I 
suggest  that  we  should  agree  with  the  principle  that  intentional 
explanations ought to be considered properly causal  explanations. 
In any case, we can simply note that all parties to this debate agree, 
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at the very least, that intentional properties are somehow central to 
the explanation of action, and hence to agency — whether they are 
causally involved or not.
We  therefore  arrive  at  the  first  point  of  contact  between 
agency and intentional realism: intentional explanations are central 
to the explanation of action. Recall from the discussion of Steward’s 
work in the previous chapter that giving intentional explanations of 
behaviour  is  something  that  we  do  in  certain  cases  (viz.  most 
people that  we encounter,  and perhaps some other  ‘higher’  non-
human animals), but not in others. Hence, our folk concepts make a 
distinction between certain kinds of entity: namely, those which are 
properly categorised intentionally—those  which are  the subjects  of 
intentionally-explicable behaviour—and those which are not. 
If  we  are  to  use  this  prima  facie  distinction  to  support  a 
metaphysical distinction, that is, to support a thesis about agency 
which in fact draws a distinction in reality between agents and non-
agents, then we are going to require an account of what it takes to 
have such intentional  states  — an account of  intentional  realism. 
And from Alexander’s  Dictum (and,  of  course,  the  consensus  in 
post-Davidson philosophy of action) we can see that establishing an 
account  of  intentional  realism  is  going  to  involve  defending  the 
—  !   —188
causal  status  of  intentional  properties;  in  this  case,  folk 
psychological states of belief, intention, and the rest.
In short,  my account of  agency will  involve defending the 
appropriate form of intentional realism. As already noted, it will turn 
out  that  this  account  of  intentional  realism,  which  is  central  to 
understanding  agency,  is  also  importantly  connected  to  our 
capacity for phenomenal consciousness. 
Before turning to the main work of establishing these claims, 
it is worth pausing to compare this view of agency once again with 
Steward’s own view, as considered in the previous chapter. In her 
view, the concept of agency has at least the following features:
(i) an agent can move the whole, or at least some parts,  of 
something we are inclined to think of as its body;
(ii) an agent is a centre of some form of subjectivity;
(iii) an agent is something to which at least some rudimentary 
types of intentional state (e.g. trying, wanting, perceiving) 
may be properly attributed;
(iv) an agent is a settler of matters concerning certain of the 
movements of its own body […] i.e. the actions by means 
of  which  those  movements  are  effected  cannot  be 
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regarded merely as the inevitable consequences of  what 
has gone before.5
The project I am concerned with here is establishing the minimum 
requirements for agency: that is,  the most basic features of agency, 
considered  within  the  parameters  set  by  the  two  limit  cases  of 
substance  causation  and  moral  agency.  In  other  words,  what  is 
needed  is  a  description  of  the  minimum  conditions  sufficient  to 
distinguish agency from the bare notion of substance causation. 
It was one of the faults of the moral agency view, I claimed, 
that  it  was  too  narrowly  focused  on  one  area  of  inquiry  (moral 
responsibility),  and  ended  up  simply  building  the  conditions  of 
moral  responsibility  into  the  basic  concept  of  agency.  Since  the 
notion of  moral  responsibility is  a  relatively ‘high level’  concept, 
which  comes  with  a  lot  of  theoretical  baggage  already  attached, 
using this as a touchstone for understanding the basic phenomenon 
of agency is where the difficulty lies. 
In  a  somewhat  similar  way,  a  central  feature  of  Steward’s 
view  is  incompatibilism,  itself  a  relatively  high  level  concept  that 
 Steward (2012: 71-2). The removed section of the quote is simply a reference to an 5
earlier part of the her book.
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comes as part of a whole theoretical package. As such, there is the 
possibility that the conception of agency thus characterised takes on 
too  many  of  the  theoretical  presuppositions  of  the  notion  of 
incompatibilism. Given the more general task being pursued here, 
of distinguishing agency from non-agency, it might be thought that 
introducing incompatibilism at this stage makes that view of agency 
weaker, because of the extremely demanding satisfaction conditions 
for that thesis. 
This cannot really be seen as a criticism of Steward’s view, or 
of the other views mentioned above, because it does not reflect any 
particular error or inconsistency in the work. What it does is simply 
raise the concern that, given this rarefied conception of agency, an 
opponent  might  simply argue that,  yes,  that  very metaphysically 
demanding  conception  of  agency  may  be  incompatible  with 
determinism,  but  it  is  nonetheless  true  that  mere  agency  is 
—  !   —191
something  that  is  quite  independent  of  determinism  or 
indeterminism.  6
In other words, one might object that we can simply conceive 
of  a  form  of  agency  that  doesn’t  centrally  involve  metaphysical 
indeterminism.  Precisely  because  Steward’s  view  has  set  the 
benchmark for what counts as agency so high (just like the moral 
agency view), the response is simply to section off that conception 
as a ‘special case’ of the phenomenon in question — or indeed, as a 
conception of something else altogether. 
Earlier  I  rejected  the  claim  on  the  part  of  my  imagined 
interlocutor that revising the term ‘free will’ too far from the folk 
conception would put me in danger of failing to talk about free will 
at all, thereby invalidating my argument. My response was, more or 
less,  ‘so much the worse for the folk conception’.  I  stand by that 
claim here, in the case of the agency concept. Rather than dismiss 
 I think it is clear, of course, that this is exactly Steward’s point. Given the way she 6
sets it up, it is not even that there are no deterministic possible worlds in which 
agency exists — far fewer than that, since many non-deterministic worlds will not 
contain the right ‘kind’ of indeterminism to support agency, i.e. it is not the mere 
falsity of determinism (although that is necessary) that she requires, but a positive 
conception of nondeterministic causation. The bare fact of agency, then, is a very 
rare phenomenon in logical space, so to speak.
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Steward’s  conception  of  agency  on these  grounds,  I  think  that  a 
much better response is this: Steward has articulated a  concept of 
agency  —  or  perhaps  better,  she  has  articulated  the  concept  of 
agency*. However, agency* is not in fact the concept that plays a 
role  in  our  folk  psychology in  the  way I  have  been considering. 
Thus, to the objection that we ought to accept agency* in this way, in 
spite of its theoretical commitments, because it is in fact the view 
that properly characterises our folk conception of ‘agency’, I simply 
point to the arguments of the previous chapter and deny that it does 
in fact characterise our folk conception.
Of course, one could take exactly the same line with my own 
view  of  agency  —  at  least  in  principle.  The  difference  is  that, 
according to my arguments here, my view of agency does have the 
support of the ‘folk conception’. It is, at least, a better fit  than the 
‘agency*’ concept for this particular inquiry. The benchmark in each 
case, as with the discussion of ‘free will’, is that of determining the 
practical consequences of using one or the other of these concepts. 
I  claimed  earlier  that  my  revision  of  the  term  ‘free  will’ 
makes better sense of various debates in the literature surrounding 
that  topic.  That  is  the  practical  pay-off  for  revising  in  that  way. 
Similarly, the practical pay-off in the case of Vargas’s revision of the 
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conditions for moral responsibility (in favour of compatibilism), is 
the normative adequacy of the practises that follow from accepting 
that conception of the term.
Setting aside the point about indeterminism, Steward’s claim 
that  the  agent  be  properly  attributed  at  least  some  kind  of 
intentional states, is something that I am clearly in agreement with 
— as the arguments of this chapter will show. This is perhaps the 
most obvious similarity between the views, although it is, as I have 
argued  above,  a  common  move  in  the  literature  to  view  the 
attribution  of  intentional  states  as  being  closely  connected  to 
agency.  The  important  question  as  always  is  exactly  how this  is 
spelled out: the way in which I do so here makes use of a number of 
features which are not found in Steward’s account. With that said, 
Steward’s view appears to share with the present view the thought 
that  it  is  only  when  the  entity  in  question  is  an  agent  that  the 
attributed intentional states are genuine, in a sense in which certain 
instrumental attributions of intentional states are not.
The second requirement found in Steward’s account is that 
the agent be a “centre of some form of subjectivity”. As it stands, 
the notion of ‘subjectivity’ is too vague to pick out a definite view, 
and is in any case not an idea that Steward develops in the book 
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(focusing instead on the arguments for incompatibilism). As such, I 
take no stand on whether or not the view I develop here is a view 
that Steward would endorse, or whether it is even similar to a view 
she  might  develop:  although  the  notion  of  ‘subjectivity’  could 
plausibly  be  developed  in  terms  of  specifically  phenomenal 
consciousness—as I do here—it could also charitably be interpreted 
in a range of other ways.
Finally,  there  is  a  requirement  in  Steward’s  discussion  of 
agency for self-movement. I do not include a comparable feature in 
my  discussion  of  agency.  This  is  because  the  notion  of  self-
movement  can  be  read in  at  least  two ways.  Firstly,  it  might  be 
nothing more than a quite basic requirement that the agent actually 
exhibit observable behaviour: that there be some behavioural activity 
which  we  can  interpret  as  the  manifestation  of  its  agency,  so  to 
speak. One might contrast this with the case of creatures that were 
constitutionally incapable of movement, such as Galen Strawson’s 
imagined  example  of  the  Weather  Watchers,  claiming  that  such 
creatures could not be agents because there is nothing that they do 
to identify as agentive activity.7
 Strawson (2010: 251).7
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Of course, one might suggest that the agency of the Weather 
Watchers is limited to mental actions: in the case of mental actions, 
one could argue that  there is  something that  one ‘does’  — cause 
changes in one’s mental states, and, depending on one’s views, this 
might (also) be a causing of changes in the body (viz. the brain). 
The latter appears to be Steward’s own view of the relation between 
her  self-movement  requirement  and  the  case  of  mental  actions.  8
Hence,  it  is  not  necessary  that  there  be  observable  movement  or 
change, but only that there be some movement or change in one’s 
states to identify as agentive activity.
With  that  said,  one  could  imagine  extending  Strawson’s 
example  such  that  the  Weather  Watchers  were  not  capable  of 
mental  “self  movement”  either.  Indeed,  Strawson’s  own view on 
mental action suggest that he views the phenomenon as being a lot 
less common than many philosophers have thought.  In this further 9
imagined case, we might then think that the Weather Watchers were 
 Steward (2012: 32-3). She writes: ‘When one actively thinks or undertakes mental 8
operations of any kind, one exercises a power to effect movement and changes in 
one’s  own  brain  (although  one  need  not  be  aware  that  the  action  has  such  a 
description).’
 Strawson (2008: 233).9
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not  agents,  because  they  were  not  capable  of  any  kind  of  self 
movement / change.
On  this  weak  reading  of  the  self  movement  requirement, 
according to which it is simply the requirement that there be some 
kind of behaviour that can be identified as the activity of the agent, I 
do not  include a  comparable  feature  in  my discussion of  agency 
because there is a sense in which it  is  already guaranteed by the 
attribution of genuine intentional states such as belief or desire. It is 
arguably  a  condition  of  the  genuine  attribution  of  beliefs  and 
desires  that  there  be  some  range  of  behaviour  that  can  be 
interpreted intentionally,  even if  it  is  not a sufficient  condition, as 
some stronger forms of interpretationism suggest. More generally, it 
seems almost definitional of ‘agency’ on anyone’s view that there 
be something that is done, whether that is observable behaviour or 
mental  action.  If  this is  all  that is  required by the self-movement 
requirement, according to the weak reading, then it seems to add 
very little to the discussion.
Yet on a strong reading of the self movement requirement, the 
claim is  in  danger  of  becoming  question  begging:  since,  reading 
more into this notion of ‘self movement’ leads to a view on which 
being a ‘self mover’ is tantamount to the claim that one must be an 
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agent. For example, one might suggest that a vehicle, such as a car, 
is  a  ‘self  mover’  because  it  is  capable  of  moving  around  ‘by 
itself’  (without  being  pushed  or  pulled).  But  no  doubt  the 
proponent of the self movement requirement here would reply that 
this is not a genuine case of self  movement at all, because the car 
requires a driver, and this is really just a complex case of efficient 
causation. But when it comes to spelling out what  exactly ‘genuine’ 
self movement would involve, it is hard to find a condition that is 
strong enough to say more than the simple requirement that some 
kind of movement or change occur, but that is not so strong that it 
amounts to the requirement that there be agentive activity;  that is, 
which  builds  agency  directly  into  a  sui  generis  notion  of  ‘self 
movement’. 
I suggest that the weak reading does not need to be included 
as a stand-alone requirement, because it falls out of the discussion 
of  intentional  realism,  or  it  is  too  general  to  add  anything 
substantial  to  the  idea  of  agency.  As  for  the  strong  reading,  I 
suggest that there is no non-question-begging way of characterising 
the strong sense of ‘self movement’ without presupposing agency.
In the remainder of this chapter, I will consider in detail the 
claim that agency requires intentional realism, say more about what 
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exactly  is  involved  in  such  realism,  and  discuss  the  connections 
between that view of intentional states and consciousness.  In the 
following chapter,  I  will  take up in more detail  the second set of 
issues mentioned here, and discuss the relation between perceptual 
consciousness and actions more generally. 
5.3 Challenges to Intentional Realism
I  have suggested that  our  default  view of  agency commits  us  to 
some form of  intentional  realism.  But  two objections  are  likely  to 
arise immediately. First, it will be objected that folk psychology is 
essentially  just  a  primitive  ‘proto-theory’,  akin  to  ‘folk  physics’, 
used by people to try and intuitively explain the behaviour of the 
people  around  them.  By  contrast,  we  now  have  access  to  the 
resources of science, especially cognitive science and neuroscience, 
to develop a mature theory of human behaviour without relying on 
the  outdated  notions  of  folk  psychology.  Contrary  to  some 
philosophers, it will be argued, there is little prospect of a reduction 
of  folk  psychology to  some sub-personal  level,  hence  we should 
abandon use of  the former altogether.  Call  this  the challenge from 
eliminativism.10
 The classic sources are Churchland (1981) and Stich (1983).10
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The  second  objection  can  be  called  the  challenge  from 
instrumentalism. This view turns on the suggestion that beliefs and 
desires are ‘useful fictions’ that,  although useful enough to count 
against their wholesale elimination, are not ‘strictly speaking’ real 
features of the systems to which we apply them. One might argue 
that, just as we are able to take ‘the intentional stance’ towards a 
thermostat (for example), this is really no different to what happens 
when we view other people as ‘believers’ and ‘desirers’. You and I 
no more ‘have’ beliefs and desires than does the thermostat,  it  is 
simply that such locutions add nothing of predictive or explanatory 
value in the latter case, so there is no advantage to doing so there. 
But using them in the case of other people adds a lot of convenience, 
and makes explanation a lot simpler.
Both  of  these  objections,  if  they  went  through,  would 
undermine  the  support  for  my  view  of  agency:  they  would 
undermine  the  case  for  basing  a  metaphysical  distinction  on  the 
putative  distinction  that  is  drawn  by  our  folk  psychological 
concepts.
The challenge from eliminativism would directly undermine 
this distinction, because it denies that there really are any beliefs or 
desires  that  could mark any kind of  useful  distinction.  Since  the 
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intentional  states  themselves  do  not  exist,  according  to 
eliminativism, there could of course be no distinction between those 
things that do, and those that do not, have those states (that is, are 
capable of being in those states).  11
By contrast, the instrumentalist challenge would undermine 
the distinction in  a  less  straightforward way.  The instrumentalist 
view makes use of locutions involving ‘beliefs’ and ‘desires’: it will 
be  possible  to  make  predictions  about  future  behaviour,  or  give 
explanations  for  actual  behaviour,  that  invoke  these  terms. 
Accordingly, there is a sense in which it will be possible to utilise 
those  terms  to  mark  a  distinction  between  cases.  There  may  be 
cases in which it is useful, according to some practical purposes, to 
attribute beliefs and desires to an entity. There will likely be other 
cases in which there is no advantage to doing so. We might make a 
distinction on this  basis:  things in  the  former class  ‘have’  beliefs 
and desires, and the latter do not. 
But  the  distinction  drawn  on  this  basis  would  not  be 
sufficiently  robust.  Like  any  instrumentalism,  it  depends  on  the 
‘practical  purposes’  that  set  the  criteria  for  usefulness:  this  line 
 This  could  of  course  be  put  in  terms  of  properties,  and  the  possessing  or 11
instantiating of such properties.
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could be drawn in arbitrarily many places according to the projects 
of  that  particular  enquirer.  Contrary  to  the  instrumentalist  view, 
then, it is necessary to have an objective criterion for the attribution 
of  intentional  states  in  order  to  support  a  robust  distinction 
between having or not having genuine intentional states. Hence a 
defence  of  intentional  realism  would  constitute  a  reply  to  both 
challenges.
5.3.1 Eliminativism
While it is true that a defence of realism is required, realism about 
folk psychology is too often associated with what is only one quite 
specific form of intentional realism. On this view, realism about folk 
psychology entails that it will ultimately be absorbed into a mature 
science of human behaviour. Fodor, for example, requires that the 
propositional-attitude  states  reported  by  folk  psychological 
explanations turn out to be instantiated by syntactically isomorphic 
structures in the brain (i.e. the ‘language of thought’). He requires 
that:
there  are  mental  states  whose  occurrences  and  interactions 
cause behaviour and do so, moreover, in ways that respect (at 
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least  to  an  approximation)  the  generalisations  of  common-
sense belief/desire psychology; [and that] these same causally 
efficacious mental states are semantically evaluable.12
Ultimately, Fodor believes that
We  have  no  reason  to  doubt  that  it  is  possible  to  have  a 
scientific  psychology  that  vindicates  commonsense  belief/
desire explanation.13
It is this conception of realism, or something like it, that has been 
the main target of eliminativist criticism. Note that the challenges to 
this form of realism have been empirical: the general argument is 
that  a  mature  science  of  human  behaviour  will  reveal—and  is 
already revealing—that the empirical commitments of Fodor-style 
realism  are  simply  false  posits.  According  to  Churchland,  for 
example, folk psychology is
 Fodor (1994: 5).12
 Fodor (1987: 16).13
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a radically false theory,  a  theory so fundamentally defective 
that both the principles and the ontology of that theory will 
eventually  be  displaced,  rather  than  smoothly  reduced,  by 
completed neuroscience.14
Hence the eliminativist position shares with this form of realism—
what we can call scientific realism—a conception of folk psychology 
as a ‘proto-theory’ of human behaviour, much in the same way as 
‘folk physics’ is taken to be a naïve proto-science of physical objects 
which is straightforwardly replaceable by scientific physics.
The scientific realist about folk psychology often begins with 
the quite accurate observation that folk psychology tends to get a 
lot of things right, and serves fairly well as a means of explaining 
some  large  portions  of  human  activity.  As  Fodor  puts  it, 
“Commonsense psychology works so well it disappears …”,
And [it]  works  not  just  with  people  whose psychology you 
know intimately:  your  closest  friends,  say,  or  the  spouse  of 
your  bosom.  It  works  with  absolute  strangers;  people  you 
wouldn't  know if  you bumped into them. And it  works not 
 Churchland (1981: 61).14
—  !   —204
just  in  laboratory  conditions—where  you  can  control  the 
interacting variables—but also,  indeed preeminently,  in field 
conditions where all you know about the sources of variance 
is what commonsense psychology tells you about them.15
From  this,  the  scientific  realist  moves  to  the  claim  that  the 
justification of folk psychology depends on its being absorbed, in 
some robust sense, into a mature science of human behaviour. 
The  eliminativist  critics  in  fact  agree  with  both  of  these 
claims:  Churchland,  for  example,  agrees  firstly  that  “the  average 
person is able to explain, and even predict, the behaviour of other 
persons  with  a  facility  and  success  that  is  remarkable.”  16
Eliminativists  also  agree  with  the  second  claim,  that  folk 
psychology  is  a  proto-scientific  account  of  behaviour—a  kind  of 
theory—and hence  that  it  is  in  need of  absorption  into  a  mature 
science for its continued justification. Since they believe, however, 
that this cannot be done, even to a limited extent, they suggest that 
the  theory  be  entirely  displaced,  and  the  posits  of  that  theory 
 Fodor (1987: 3-4).15
 Churchland (1981: 62).16
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(beliefs,  desire,  and  the  rest)  should  be  straightforwardly 
eliminated.
What this discussion of the classic eliminativist debate shows 
is  that  the  plausibility  of  eliminativism  about  folk  psychology 
depends  on  an  unreasonably  strong  view  about  the  criteria  that 
realism  about such intentional states would have to satisfy. In the 
discussion  above,  what  I  called  ‘scientific  realism’  about  folk 
psychology and eliminativism about folk psychology both share the 
same view about what it would take to vindicate folk psychological 
explanations of human behaviour. 
By contrast, I will argue below for a form of realism about 
intentional states that is premised on an interventionist account of 
causation.  This  sets  a  quite  different  benchmark for  realism,  one 
that is not open to the same charge of eliminativism: indeed, the 
difference-making  view  of  causation  that  is  utilised  here  is  the 
default way of understanding causality in the natural sciences. Far 
from being empirically implausible,  the interventionist  method is 
central to empirical inquiry, especially in the higher-level sciences.
Before  turning  to  develop  that  view in  more  detail,  I  will 
consider  the  second  of  the  two  challenges  noted  above:  the 
instrumentalist view. In fact, this is doubly relevant here, because 
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the instrumentalist view I will consider has been seen as a way of 
avoiding the eliminativist conclusions noted above, while retaining 
a ‘kind’ of realism about folk psychology, which is similar to my 
own approach. Ultimately, however, it does not succeed in this task, 
and does not secure any kind of realism.
5.3.2 Instrumentalism
Dennett’s ‘intentional systems’ view has been offered as a way to 
avoid the eliminativism described above,  while  at  the same time 
resisting the realism that involves accepting something like Fodor’s 
representational theory of mind. That is, Dennett’s view can be seen 
as trying to avoid the presumption shared by both the ‘scientific 
realist’ view, and the corresponding eliminativist view, considered 
above. This of course is my strategy as well, and so it is worthwhile 
exploring Dennett’s account to see how far it can take us.
It is a point of contention among many philosophers whether 
or not Dennett’s view should be considered a form of realism, as 
Dennett  sometimes  insists,  or  simply  a  straightforward 
instrumentalism. Dennett continues to maintain that it is a kind of 
realism: a ‘mild realism’, or realism ‘with a grain of salt’.  17
 See (1991) for the main defence of realism. For the ‘grain of salt’ see (1988: 73).17
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Indeed, one must be careful to distinguish instrumentalism 
from  eliminativism  about  folk  psychology:  according  to  some 
versions of  instrumentalism about intentional  states,  there are no 
beliefs  or  desires  according to the “ultimate structure of  reality”; 
instead, there is simply the “physical constitution and behaviour of 
organisms”.  What  makes  this  a  form of  instrumentalism,  and  not 
eliminativism, is the added proviso that “we are often well advised 
to  tolerate  the  idioms  of  propositional  attitude”  for  practical 
purposes in certain contexts.18
The difficulty is that there is a tension between denying that 
there  “really  are”  such  things  as  beliefs  and  desires,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  maintaining  that  the  framework  of  folk  psychology 
nonetheless has a legitimate practical use, on the other. For if there 
really are no such things, then it is hard to see how making use of 
them would confer any advantage, in practical contexts or anywhere 
else.  The  more  that  one  emphasises  the  practical  value  of  folk 
psychology, and the extent to which it works as a predictive tool, 
for instance, the more that the claim about the non-existence of such 
things as beliefs and desires is problematised. In fact, Fodor makes 
a similar point:
 These three quotations are from Quine (2013: 202).18
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After  all,  we  do  use  commonsense  psychological 
generalizations  to  predict  one  another’s  behaviour;  and  the 
predictions  do—very  often—come  out  true.  But  how  could 
that be so if the generalizations that we base the predictions 
on are empty.19
Dennett’s claims to realism notwithstanding, his view can be seen 
as an attempt to accommodate something like this basic insight, i.e. 
that  the  practical  adequacy of  folk  psychology counts  against  its 
outright elimination. 
Dennett  compares  the  question  whether  we  ought  to  be 
realists about the beliefs and desires posited by folk psychology to 
the question whether we should ‘be realists about’ the notion of a 
centre  of  gravity.  His  answer  is  that  we  should  be  realists  about 
belief in the same way that we are realists about centres of gravity. 
Beliefs  and desires,  he  claims,  are  like  that  — a  kind of  abstract 
entity. But what kind of realism is this? Dennett notes that there are 
two ways of approaching that question. 
 Fodor (1987: 4).19
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First,  the  ‘metaphysical  path’,  according  to  which  we  are 
concerned  with  “the  reality  or  existence  of  abstract  objects 
generally”.  In  that  sense,  beliefs  and  desires,  like  centres  of 20
gravity  (and  any  number  of  arbitrarily  defined  abstract  objects, 
such as the ‘centre of  population of  the United States’),  have the 
same metaphysical status as all abstract objects, such as numbers, 
the empty set, and the novels of Jane Austin.
That  is  as  much  as  Dennett  says  about  the  ‘metaphysical 
status’  of  beliefs  and  desires  in  this  context,  presumably  taking 
them to be no more or less problematic, metaphysically speaking, 
than the existence of abstract objects in general. By contrast, he is 
much  more  interested  in  the  “scientific  path”  to  answering  the 
question  of  realism.  On  this  view,  centres  of  gravity  are  “good” 
abstract objects,
They deserve to be taken seriously, learned about, used. If we 
go  so  far  as  to  distinguish  them  as  real  (contrasting  them, 
perhaps, with those abstract objects which are bogus),  that is 
 Dennett (1991: 28).20
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because we think they serve in perspicuous representations of 
real forces, "natural" properties, and the like.21
This way of characterising the ‘reality’ of abstract objects, he claims, 
gets  us  closer  to  what  he  would  like  to  say  about  the  reality  of 
beliefs and desires.  What is  ‘good’ about some abstract objects is 
their  usefulness  in  certain  applications  —  once  again,  a  broadly 
instrumentalist strategy. The notion of a ‘good’ abstract object is a 
basically  normative  one  fixed  by  the  practical  requirements  and 
projects of  a particular enquirer:  in this case,  one engaged in the 
project  of  certain empirical  calculations that  can be facilitated by 
utilising the notion of a centre of gravity.
But Dennett insists that they are useful because they (can be 
used to) track certain real features of the world: real forces, as it may 
be. This second point is meant to establish the ‘kind of’ realism that 
Dennett  insists  is  delivered  by  his  account,  and  which  makes  it 
more  than a  mere  instrumentalism.  How does  this  analogy with 
centres of gravity apply to folk psychology, that is, to the reality of 
beliefs and desires? Dennett elaborates on the above claims in his 
discussion of real patterns. In this case, too, the abstracta of beliefs 
 Dennett (1991: 29).21
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and  desires  track  some  real  feature  of  reality,  even  though  such 
‘entities’ themselves are, strictly speaking, no more to be found in 
concrete reality than are centres of gravity. 
The  features  of  the  world  that  they  track  are  intentional 
‘patterns’. Dennett suggests that the patterns which are tracked by 
the  abstracta  of  ‘belief’  and  ‘desire’  are  “discernible  in 
agents'  (observable)  behavior  when  we  subject  it  to  ‘radical 
interpretation’ […] ‘from the intentional stance’”.  Dennett’s view 22
ties  the  reality  of  beliefs  and  desires  to  the  existence  of  an 
interpreter;  that  is,  to  the  existence,  at  least  in  principle,  of  an 
observer  who  is  able  to  interpret  the  outward  behaviour  of  the 
individual according to ‘the intentional strategy’. 
Hence,  Dennett  is  committed  to  at  least  some  form  of 
interpretationism. Indeed, he defines the notion of a pattern itself in 
terms of the possibility of pattern recognition.  Thus the ambiguity 23
in  Dennett  between realism and instrumentalism is  recapitulated 
once again in the notion of a real pattern: the pattern is there to be 
 Dennett (1991: 30). The reference to ‘radical interpretation’ is a nod to Davidson, 22
who shares a somewhat similar view to that of Dennett on the question of folk 
psychology.
 He writes that "in the root case a pattern is ‘by definition’ a candidate for pattern 23
recognition” (1991: 32).
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seen; but it is only relevant, and only has a function, when it is seen. 
Dennett writes:
These patterns are objective—they are there  to be detected—
but from our point of view they are not out there independent 
of  us,  since  they  are  patterns  composed  partly  of  our 
‘subjective’ reactions to what is out there, they are the patterns 
made to order for our narcissistic concerns.24
He  compares  this  description  to  a  comment  by  Anscombe,  who 
writes of “an order which is there whenever actions are done with 
intentions”,  suggesting that she may have been making a similar 25
point. He elaborates:
If you “look at” the world in the right way, the patterns are 
obvious.  If  you look at  (or describe) the world in any other 
way, they are, in general, invisible.26
 Dennett (1987: 39).24
 Anscombe (1963: 80).25
 Dennett (1987: 39, n. 1).26
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The  essential  connection  to  the  perspective  of  an  (in  principle) 
observer  is  something  that  is  familiar  from  interpretationist 
accounts of the mind. However, Dennett maintains that the patterns 
which are picked out by observers occupying the intentional stance 
are  abstractions  from  the  activity  of  many  lower-level  ‘minutiae’ 
which produce the pattern visible in observable behaviour.  What 
the  intentional  stance  provides  is  “computational  leverage”  over 
the  lower-level  (physical)  details,  by  providing  predictions  at  a 
“scale of compression” that is vastly greater than the raw “bitmap” 
— i.e. the physical-level description of those same events.  27
This is not to suggest that Dennett believes, after all, that the 
patterns picked out from the intentional stance are to be found, like 
Fodor suggests, in the workings of the brain. But the emphasis on 
‘abstraction’  and  ‘compression’  from  the  ‘bitmap’,  and  similar 
comments, suggests that Dennett has a view of the relation between 
the  level  of  folk  psychology  and  the  level  of  sub-personal 
mechanism (for example, the workings of the brain) according to 
which  facts  at  the  former  level  can  be—in  principle—explained 
again at the lower level. 
 Dennett (1991: 42-3).27
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Or more precisely,  that  they can be explained already  at  the 
level of the most basic physical constituents—in principle, of course
—without  ever  mentioning  anything  intentional.  Such  a  project 
would no doubt be impossible for finite creatures like us, not least 
because  of  whatever  constrains  there  may  be  on  the  greatest 
physically-possible  amount  of  computational  power  available  in 
the universe: we get by with the approximations of folk psychology, 
which  compress  the  enormity  of  the  physical  data  into  useful 
abstractions.
This characterisation of the relation between the level of folk 
psychology (the “personal level”) and the “sub-personal” level is 
such that it puts into question the kind of intentional realism that 
can be extracted from Dennett’s view. It is true that the existence of 
intentional  patterns  is  not  merely  observer-relative,  because  those 
patterns  are  objectively  available  for  any  possible  observer  to 
detect. Yet those patterns which are detected by observers via the 
intentional  stance  are,  in  the  end,  simply  approximations  or,  as 
Dennett  puts  it,  computational  shortcuts,  to  the  sub-personal 
(ultimately physical-level) truth of the matter.
So far I have suggested that Dennett’s view is best seen as a 
novel  form of  instrumentalism,  which is  targeted at  resisting the 
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slide  into  eliminativism  that  I  cautioned  against  earlier. 
Instrumentalism,  as  I  have  already  suggested,  is  insufficient  for 
present purposes:  what is needed is a stronger thesis,  one that is 
straightforwardly realist about intentional states. Yet, Dennett’s view 
can help with this project: it contains the resources for constructing 
a more robust view of the mind than Dennett’s own view provides. 
Whether  or  not  it  is  true  that  the  view I  am proposing  is 
Dennett’s  own  view,  there  certainly  is  a  view  which  can  be 
developed  along  these  lines.  There  are  points  at  which  Dennett 
makes  suggestions  that  are  indicative  of  the  kind  of  difference-
making approach that I  am arguing we need in order to support 
intentional  realism,  and  parts  of  his  view  can  certainly  be  read 
profitably along those lines. Maybe, in the end, Dennett is a kind of 
intentional realist—the kind that I am about to describe—and it is 
merely his own reluctance to be pigeon-holed by the term ‘realist’ 
that prevents him from stating things in this way.
5.4. Interventionism and Mental Causation
Based  on  the  discussion  above,  one  might  object  that  Dennett’s 
view  of  the  relation  between  the  personal  and  the  sub-personal 
levels undermines the explanations of behaviour which are given 
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from the intentional  stance (the personal  level).  In fact,  there are 
points at which Dennett appears to address this challenge directly. 
In a footnote to his paper on real patterns, he considers something 
like this objection:
Several  interpreters  of  a  draft  of  this  article  have  supposed 
that the conclusion I  am urging here is  that beliefs (or their 
contents) are epiphenomena having no causal powers 
Interestingly, Dennett’s response to this objection is to note that
If one finds a predictive pattern of the sort just described one 
has ipso facto discovered a causal power — a difference in the 
world that makes a subsequent difference testable by standard 
empirical  methods  of  variable  manipulation.  Consider  the 
crowd-drawing power of a sign reading "Free Lunch" placed 
in  the window of  a  restaurant,  and compare its  power in  a 
restaurant in New York to its power in a restaurant in Tokyo.28
 Dennett (1991: 43, n. 22).28
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Dennett’s  point  appears  to  be  that  the  explanation  of  the  sign’s 
power to draw a crowd in New York is no less a causal explanation 
simply because it  is stated in intentional terms. He argues that it 
would only be because a philosopher was relying on a “pinched 
[notion]  of  causality  derived  from  exclusive  attention  to  a  few 
examples  drawn  from  physics  and  chemistry”  that  she  might 29
think the above explanation could not be a causal explanation.
Now it is quite true that the intentional explanation Dennett 
gives here ought to be considered a causal explanation: indeed, it is 
a  central  part  of  realism  about  the  mind  that  such  intentional 
explanations be considered causal explanations, as the discussion of 
Alexander’s Dictum above has made clear. 
However,  the  present  objection  was  that  Dennett’s  view 
cannot support realism about the intentional explanations that he 
claims are visible ‘from the intentional stance’,  and this objection 
really  has  two  parts.  To  the  objection  that  intentional  stance 
explanations  are  not  causal  explanations,  Dennett’s  response  is 
surely  right:  there  is  no  reason  to  think  that  such  explanations 
cannot  be  causal,  simply  because  they  are  stated  in  intentional 
terms. 
 Dennett (1991: 42, n. 22).29
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The second aspect to the objection, however, can be pressed 
further:  given  Dennett’s  views  on  the  relation  between  the 
intentional level and the lower levels (or stances one might take), 
why is the causal explanation discerned at the intentional level not 
undermined by explanations at lower levels. What gives priority to 
explanations framed in terms of intentional properties, and not, for 
example, in terms of neuroscience? Or in terms of whatever basic 
physical processes can be invoked to describe the event?
The  remarks  in  the  quotation  cited  above  suggest  a 
promising way of answering these questions: Dennett notes that if 
one finds a ‘predictive pattern’ of a certain kind, then one has ipso 
facto found a causal power: that is, “a difference in the world that 
makes  a  subsequent  difference  testable  by  standard  empirical 
methods  of  variable  manipulation”.  The  best  way to  understand 
these  remarks  is  according  to  a  a  difference-making  or 
manipulationist  view  of  causation  —  specifically,  I  suggest,  an 
interventionist view of causation. 
The question I raised above was whether there is a way, on 
Dennett’s view, to explain why we should consider the properties 
on view from the intentional stance to be causes in their own right. 
For  Dennett,  those  properties  are  defined  by  at  least  partly 
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pragmatic concerns,  as a means to dealing with physical systems 
that  are  simply  too  complex  to  interact  with  at  the  physical  or 
biological level.
Notwithstanding  Dennett’s  suggestive  comments  about 
manipulationism, the difficulty is  that  it  seems that  on Dennett’s 
view we merely have to ‘get by’ with the computational shortcuts 
afforded  by  abstractions  at  the  intentional  level,  but  that  there 
remains a sense in which we should like to ‘really’ explain things at 
the  biological,  or  even  physical,  level  —  were  that  to  become 
possible  for  us.  Hence,  the  intentional  explanations  are  not 
sufficiently ‘robust’, in a sense I will make clear in this section.
At  this  point  we  can  pick  up  on  the  nod  towards 
manipulationist views of causation, and apply them to our present 
concerns. John Campbell takes a broadly manipulationist approach 
to the problem of mental causation: in particular, he makes use of a 
theoretical device he calls a ‘control variable’ in his discussion the 
issue.  The  notion  of  a  ‘control  variable’  will  provide  a  principled 
way  of  establishing  causal  relations  that  involve  specifically 
intentional  properties in their  own right,  rather than as a merely 
pragmatic means of bypassing the unwieldy physical calculations 
that would otherwise be required. 
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The  view  that  Campbell  is  working  with  is  a  form  of 
manipulationism, but he is working within a specific form of that 
general view which is called interventionism.  Interventionist views 
are  a  special  case  of  the  general  manipulationist  approach  to 
causation. According to interventionist views, for X to be a cause of 
Y is  for intervening on X to be a way of  intervening on Y.  The 30
basic intuition behind this approach to causation is that causes are 
potential  ways  of  manipulating  their  effects.  What  specifically 31
causal  information  adds  to  information  about  correlation  is 
therefore  information  about  manipulability.  Correlations  do  not 32
have this feature: if X and Y are merely correlated, then it is not the 
case that manipulating X is a way of affecting Y.
In contrast to this way of formulating the ‘difference making’ 
part of the view, earlier examples of manipulationism leaned much 
more heavily on the notion of a ‘free action’ in formulating their 
account: these are often called ‘agency theories’ of causation for this 
reason.  The basic idea there was to give a non-circular, reductive 33
account  of  causation.  The  notion  of  a  ‘free  action’  used  in 
 Campbell (2007: 59).30
 Woodward (2007: 20).31
 Strevens (2007: 233-4).32
 See for example von Wright (1971) and more recently Menzies and Price (1993).33
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characterising the manipulation, although it appears to presuppose 
the  idea  of  causation,  was  supposed  to  depend  on  our  directly 
experiencing our own activity as agents: it was claimed that we can 
grasp a kind of ostensive definition of a basic notion of “bringing 
about”, which can then provide the ground for a reductive analysis 
of causation. 
The  purpose  of  the  present  inquiry  is  not  to  develop  an 
analysis  of  causation,  reductive  or  otherwise,  but  I  do  utilise  a 
manipulability view of causation in an important way, so it is worth 
pointing  out  some  of  the  problems  with  the  agency  view. 
Furthermore, I  am concerned with the concept of agency,  and not 
directly with the concept of causation: this is another reason why the 
aspirations of the ‘agency’ type of manipulationism do not fit well 
with my own purposes here, since they start  with the notion of a 
‘free action’ already taken for granted.
Much of the criticism of ‘agency manipulationism’ has been 
focused on (i) the notion of a ‘free action’ and its role in providing a 
reductive analysis of causation, and (ii) the threat of circularity in 
such manipulability accounts.
The interventionist view can be seen as an improvement over 
the agency theories with respect to these difficulties, and for that 
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reason I choose to work within the general interventionist approach 
in  what  follows.  The  basic  idea  that  the  agency  theory  tries  to 
capture with the notion of ‘bringing about X by a free act’, when it 
is properly refined and clarified, is more or less what the notion of 
an intervention is designed to do. Indeed, the notion of a ‘surgical’ 
intervention is  precisely  a  way of  making sufficiently  clear  what 
kind  of  manipulation  is  required  to  reliably  discover  a  causal 
relationship between two variables,  something that  was arguably 
under developed on the agency views.
Secondly,  the  interventionist  view  dispenses  with  the 
reductive aspirations of the agency theory of causation. The worry 
there was that the notion of a ‘free act’ directly involves the idea of 
causally affecting something, and, notwithstanding the comments 
about  a  direct  experience  of  the  basic  phenomenon  of  ‘bringing 
about’,  this  renders  the  account  circular.  Since  the  agency  view 
claimed  to  offer  a  reduction  of  causal  talk  to  non-causal  talk, 
presupposing  causation  in  this  way  is  viciously  circular.  By 
contrast,  the interventionist  view does not  claim to be reductive, 
but arguably it is non-circular and non-trivial in an important way.
It  is  non-circular  because,  as  interventionists  such  as 
Woodward have argued, in unpacking that claim that X is a cause 
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of Y, we might appeal to the notion of some process I as being an 
intervention  on  X.  But  for  the  purposes  of  characterising  the 
intervention I, we would not need to make use of any information 
about any causal relationship that may or may not obtain between X 
and Y. As Woodward puts it:
we may use one set of claims about causal relationships (e.g., 
that  X  has  been  changed  by  a  process  that  meets  the 
conditions  for  an  intervention)  together  with  correlational 
information  (that  X  and  Y  remain  correlated  under  this 
change) to characterize what it  is for a different relationship 
(the relationship between X and Y) to be causal.34
Hence, it is not a reductive analysis of causation, but neither is it 
viciously circular in the sense that it presupposes information about 
the very causal relation that one is trying to characterise. 
Furthermore,  it  is  non-trivial  because  the  interventionist 
view could conflict with other views about causation in its verdicts 
about  particular  cases.  For  example,  the  interventionist  approach 
 Woodward (2013: §7).  See also Woodward (2003) for the full defence of these 34
claims.
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returns  a  positive  verdict  on  the  possibility  of  causation  by 
omission (failing to water the plant caused it  to die)  — in direct 
contrast with (e.g.) causal processes views of causation, such as that 
given by Salmon or Dowe.  The possibility of inconsistent verdicts 35
on  these  cases  by  interventionist  views  and  non-interventionist 
views means that the interventionist view is not vacuous or trivial.
There  have  been  several  attempts  to  apply  the  general 
interventionist  (or  manipulationist)  approach  to  the  problem  of 
mental  causation.  I  said  above  that  one  interesting  development 
due  to  Campbell  is  the  notion  of  a  control  variable:  I  will  now 
consider Campbell’s view in some detail, before briefly comparing 
his conclusions with some similar views in the literature.
5.4.1 Causation and Control Variables
To understand how the idea of a control variable can help with the 
problem  being  considered  in  this  section,  consider  one  of 
Campbell’s  own  examples.  Imagine  that  you  have  an  ordinary 
radio and you want to know what causes the volume of the sound 
coming from the radio.  Also imagine that you have access to all 36
 Woodward (2013: §7). The process views are Salmon (1984) and Dowe (2000).35
 Campbell (2010: 22-3).36
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possible  information  about  the  radio,  including  all  the  physical 
level details.  Since you in fact have all  the information about the 
radio available to you, why not seek the explanation at the physical 
level? In the discussion of Dennett’s view above, it seemed that the 
only  reason  not  to  ‘descend’  to  lower,  non-intentional  levels  of 
explanation  was  computational  intractability.  That,  we  are  now 
imagining, is not the case with the radio.
Campbell  imagines  that  we  might  specify  a  physical  level 
variable that indexes the state of each physical particle at any one 
time, in order to represent the total  state of the radio,  at  a given 
time,  at  the  physical  level.  This  is  to  be  the  putative  ‘cause’ 37
variable.  Now,  it  will  be  true  that  (some)  interventions  on  this 
variable make a difference to the volume output of the radio. Does 
this  mean that  we have found the cause of  the  volume? Not  so, 
according to Campbell, because the supposed cause variable here is 
not sufficiently ‘good’ or ‘systematic’: for a particular variable to be 
good or systematic in this way it must meet several requirements, 
and the enormously complex physical variable just proposed fails 
 Assuming for the example a simplified view of physics. Assuming real-world 37
physics  would  only  support  Campbell’s  argument,  since  it  would  render  even 
more implausible the suggestion that such a massive physical variable could be in 
some sense the ‘cause’ of the outcome in which we were interested. 
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these criteria,  therefore failing as  a  putative cause of  the volume 
output. 
Firstly, it should be that the function from cause variable (X) 
to effect  variable (Y) is total, in that every value of X is mapped to 
some variable of Y.  This is because while some interventions on 38
the microphysical  state  of  the radio will  affect  the volume,  some 
will  make  no  difference  at  all  —  and  some  will  result  in  the 
destruction of the entire radio. Indeed, it is plausible that many of 
the individual interventions that are possible at the microphysical 
level  will  have  no  discernible  effect  on  the  output  volume,  or 
indeed on any ‘macro’ level variable.
Secondly, Campbell proposes that the relation between these 
variables should not only be total, but that it should also exhibit a 
dose-response  relationship.  He  notes  that  one  of  the  criteria  for 39
causation famously outlined by the epidemiologist Austin Bradford 
Hill was that a dose-response relationship of this kind strengthens 
the  case  for  establishing  a  causal  relation  between  the  two 
variables: if you smoke more cigarettes, for example, you are more 
likely to get cancer. 
 Campbell (2010: 23-4).38
 Campbell (2010: 25).39
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While  the  existence  of  a  dose-response  relationship of  this 
kind  is  commonly  recognised  as  being  important  in  the 
understanding  of  causation,  it  has  not  always  been  clear  exactly 
why it is so important. Campbell’s own suggestion is that the dose-
response  relationship  is  important  because  it  establishes  that  the 
variable  in  question  is  at  the  ‘right  level’  to  be  a  cause  of  the 
outcome  that  we  are  interested  in.  And  since  there  would  not 
appear to be any kind of dose-response relationship between our 
gerrymandered  physical  variable  and  the  output  volume  of  the 
radio, this suggests that what is wrong with the putative physical 
cause is that it is at the wrong level to be a cause of the outcome in 
which we are interested: the volume of the radio.
How does this example carry over to the case of intentional 
states  and behaviour?  The intended point  of  Campbell’s  analogy 
with the radio is that in many cases the proper ‘control panel’ for 
manipulating  the  outcome  that  we  are  interested  in  (actions)  is 
going to be found at the psychological or intentional level of agents’ 
mental states. He writes:
The  point  is  almost  too  obvious  to  spell  out,  but  people’s 
behaviours vary systematically with their psychological states. 
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The greater my degree of concern about my missing dog, the 
more assiduously I will look for her. The more focused I am on 
a mathematical problem, the harder I will be to distract.40
Campbell’s point is that there are going to be many cases in which 
we find intentional states that meet the requirements noted above, 
and hence should be seen as plausible candidates for the causes of 
whatever behaviour we are interested in. It is not simply that some 
changes  in  an  agent’s  mental  states  are  correlated  under 
interventions  on  those  states  with  some change  in  behaviour:  in 
many cases,  there  will  be  a  systematic  relationship between these 
variables,  involving  total  mapping  of  cause  variables  (changes  in 
mental states) with the effect variables (changes in behaviour); and 
a  dose-response  relationship,  as  Campbell  highlights  in  the  extract 
above.
This  much  serves  to  establish  the  plausibility  of  an 
interventionist  treatment  of  mental  causation,  but  such a  view is 
likely  to  encounter  several  common  objections:  (1)  it  might  be 
thought that there is a worry about ‘competition’ with non-mental 
causes  of  the  same  behaviour,  such  that  the  physical  cause 
 Campbell (2010: 26).40
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‘excludes’ the putative mental cause; or (2) one might worry that 
mental  states  are  simply  at  ‘the  wrong  level’  to  be  causes  of 
behaviour, and that there must be some physical cause to be found 
at  a  lower  level;  finally  (3),  it  might  be  objected  that  accepting 
mental states as causes in this way would be at odds with various 
naturalisation  projects,  and  a  general  scientifically-informed 
worldview.
In response to (1), one can note that the interventionist view 
of  causation is  well  placed to  handle  such ‘exclusion’  arguments 
against mental causation. In particular, work by Peter Menzies and 
Christian List  directly  addresses  such ‘exclusion arguments’,  and 
draws the interesting conclusion that, while it is true that there are 
times when mental states may be ‘excluded’ by lower-level physical 
states—as in the standard exclusion argument—there are also many 
cases in which physical states are excluded as causes by higher-level 
mental states.41
This turns out to be a basically contingent matter, depending 
on the details of the particular case. So, while they repudiate the 
 List  and  Menzies  (2009).  See  also  Menzies  (2013),  in  which  Menzies  also 41
summarises  work  from  List  and  Menzies  (2009).  In  the  text,  I  use  the  name 
“Menzies and List” when referring to either piece of work.
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claim that there cannot be any mental causes of behaviour, neither 
do they suggest the opposite general claim and suggest that there is 
always going to be a mental cause of some behaviour.
Central to their argument that mental states are not always 
excluded  by  lower  level  physical  states  is  a  difference-making 
account of causation. The basic claim is that exclusion arguments 
against mental causation mistake causal sufficiency for causation. In 
general,  such  arguments  claim that  where  a  mental  state  M  is  a 
cause of behaviour B, and where M is realised by physical state P, 
the mental state is excluded by P, because P is causally sufficient for 
B.  But  Menzies  and  List  argue  that  causal  sufficiency  is  not  the 
same  as  causation:  they  cite  Wesley  Salmon’s  observation  that, 
while a man’s taking a contraceptive pill is causally sufficient for 
his  not  getting pregnant,  this  is  not  causation because the man’s 
taking the pill makes no difference to his not getting pregnant.42
The main reason for this is that citing the man’s taking the 
contraceptive  pill  is  overly  specific  as  a  putative  cause  of  his  not 
getting  pregnant.  On  this  point,  we  can  cite  Stephen  Yablo’s 
familiar example of the pigeon that is trained to peck at all and only 
 Salmon (1971: 34). Cited at Menzies (2013: 72).42
—  !   —231
red objects.  In this example, the pigeon is shown a red object that 43
it  proceeds  to  peck  at.  In  this  particular  case,  the  red  object 
happened to be scarlet. What is the cause of the pecking? Is it the 
fact that the object was red, or the fact that it was scarlet? 
According to the kind of ‘exclusion argument’ reasoning that 
we are considering here, the object’s being red in this case is realised 
by  its  being  scarlet,  and  for  that  reason  being  scarlet  is  causally 
sufficient for the pecking — and so is the cause of the pecking. But, 
as Yablo points out, citing the fact that the object is scarlet as the 
putative cause is overly specific: the pigeon would have pecked if it 
was any shade of red, but if it had been anything other than red the 
pigeon would not have pecked. What makes the difference to the 
effect (pecking), is whether the object is red or not red, and hence 
that is the right level at which to cite the cause of the pecking.
Applying these considerations to mental causation, Menzies 
and List report that there are many cases in which citing a mental 
state as the cause will be proportional to the effect in question (some 
behaviour),  while  the putative physical  state  is  not,  and that  the 
mental state therefore excludes the physical state as the proper cause 
of the effect. 
 Yablo (1992). Cited at Menzies (2013: 72-3).43
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For  example,  consider  a  straightforward  case  in  which  a 
mental  state M  is  realised by a physical  state N,  but where M  is 
realisation-insensitive.  That  is,  according  to  the  familiar  multiple 
realisability of mental states, M could in fact be realised by a range 
of similar physical states {Ni1, Ni2 … Nin}. On this occasion, suppose 
M is realised by Ni1. The question, as above, is whether we should 
say that M is the cause of some behaviour B, or whether Ni1 is the 
cause of B. And just like the example given by Yablo, we will find 
that M is proportional to the effect in question: whether or not the 
subject is in mental state M is what makes the difference to whether 
or  not  B  occurs.  If  the  subject  was  not  in  physical  state  Ni1,  the 
closest possible world in which that is true is a world in which the 
subject in in physical state Ni2, meaning that B would still occur. Yet 
the closest world in which M does not occur is one in which some 
other  mental  state  occurs,  and  hence  makes  a  difference  to  the 
behaviour. Hence M is the cause of the behaviour B, and Ni1 is not.
In response to the second objection (2), Campbell considers 
the  suggestion  that  psychological  variables  cannot  properly  be 
causes because they are simply at ‘the wrong level’. One common 
way of developing this objection is to suggest that only variables 
that  figure  in  the  characterisation  of  mechanisms  are  causally 
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significant, and there are no definitively psychological mechanisms 
— in contrast to, for example, physical or biological mechanisms. In 
reply, Campbell points out that causation is not defined in terms of 
mechanisms, but in terms of what happens under interventions: in 
short,  causation  is  one  thing,  and  the  mechanism  by  which  it 
happens is another.  44
Indeed,  if  this  ‘wrong level’  argument were successful,  the 
claim that ‘smoking causes cancer’ would face the same objection: 
there  is  no doubt  some biological  mechanism by which smoking 
causes cancer, but the term ‘smoking’ is not a biological notion. It is 
not  “a  term  defined  at  the  level  of  mechanism”.  It  would  be 45
implausible to suggest, on this basis, that smoking does not cause 
cancer. So too for psychological variables: 
there may be a brain mechanism by which grief causes anger; 
‘grief’  and  ‘anger’  are  not  themselves  terms  defined  at  the 
level of the mechanism, but that does not show that they are 
not causally significant.46
 Campbell (2010: 18-19).44
 Campbell (2010: 20). 45
 Campbell (2010: 20).46
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Another  way  of  developing  the  objection  that  psychological 
variables are ‘at the wrong level’ to be causes is to suggest that only 
properties that are governed by exceptionless general laws. There are 
two responses to this. 
Firstly, as Campbell points out in his discussion, the whole 
methodology of the randomised controlled trial is premised on the 
idea that there are not going to be exceptionless general laws at the 
level of the variables that are being investigated, in medicine, and 
in all of the non-fundamental sciences. As he puts it 
Anyone who takes a medicine with the idea that it is going to 
do  something  to  them  is  abandoning  the  notion  that 
exceptionless  general  laws  are  required  for  causal 
connections.47
But there is a deeper point to make here. An unspoken assumption 
in these objections is that lower level physical causes are somehow 
more ‘real’, or that it is at the physical level where the real causal 
action happens, and higher level causes—if there are such things at 
all—are somehow parasitic on that. Yet it is by now a familiar point 
 Campbell (2010: 20).47
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that  the  science  which  studies  the  most  basic,  or  fundamental, 
physical  level  actually  seems  to  have  little  use  for  the  ordinary 
notion of causation. 
Indeed,  the  interventionist  view  of  causation 
straightforwardly  accommodates  this  point:  the  whole 
methodology  of  interventionism  is  such  that  we  can  identify 
causation only when we have delineated a well defined subsystem, 
and  are  able  to  identify,  in  relation  to  that  subsystem,  a  set  of 
‘exogenous’  variables  in  terms  of  which  we  can  define  an 
intervention  on  that  system.  Fundamental  physical  theories,  for 
example, are such that they apply to the whole universe — but this 
feature ensures that they are not in fact construed causally, on the 
interventionist analysis.
Campbell  points  out  that  ‘the  objective  of  finding  a 
comprehensive  scheme  of  variables  that  characterizes  everything 
that  happens  is  similarly  antithetical  to  the  idea  of  causal 
connection.’  Far  from  requiring  the  existence  of  universal 48
exceptionless laws, then, the task of discovering causal connections 
is a quite different project. Pearl sums up this thought:
 Campbell (2010: 21).48
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If  you  wish  to  include  the  whole  universe  in  the  model, 
causality  disappears  because  interventions  disappear  –  the 
manipulator and manipulated lose their distinction.49
Finally,  objection  (3),  concerning  the  more  general  worry 
about  a  naturalistic  vision  of  the  world.  Does  accepting 
psychological  states  as  causes  stand  in  conflict  with  this 
worldview? The interventionist  view of causation is  primarily an 
exercise in methodology, not metaphysics: simply put, it tells you 
how  to  find  out  whether,  and  which,  phenomena  are  causally 
connected. Woodward is clear that
one  of  the  attractions  of  the  manipulationist  account  is 
precisely its unmetaphysical character — rather than thinking 
of causal relationships as involving mysterious other worldly 
entities […] I urged instead that we think of them simply as 
relationships that are exploitable for purposes of manipulation 
and control. […] For those who care about metaphysics, this 
 Pearl (2000: 350).49
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sort of view might be supplemented by any one of a number 
of different stories about metaphysical foundations.  50
Any number of ‘metaphysical foundations’ are compatible with the 
interventionist  (manipulationist)  conclusions  about  the  causal 
reality of mental states. The minimum that is required to satisfy a 
general  naturalistic  view of  the  world  is  that  such  mental  states 
supervene  on  the  physical,  which  is  perfectly  compatible  with 
Woodward’s  comments  on  the  metaphysical  commitments  of 
interventionism,  and  with  the  conclusions  of  the  interventionist 
approach to causation.
Consider briefly a thought experiment proposed by William 
Seager. Interestingly, Seager uses this thought experiment as part of 
a discussion of Dennett’s views on the naturalisation of the mind. 
Seager asks us to imagine programming a computer simulation of 
some simple physical phenomenon, such as a pendulum swinging 
on the surface of the moon.  The simulation only represents this 51
limited region of space and time (assume that there are boundary 
 Woodward (2008: 194) — which is a response to Strevens (2007), cited above.50
 Seager (2010).  The following description of  the thought experiment is  drawn 51
from (116-7).
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conditions  to  represent  external  influence).  Importantly,  the 
programmer is not permitted to utilise any ‘gross parameters’ such 
as the mass  or the length  of the pendulum, for example, but must 
program the simulation entirely in terms of the most basic physics. 
Thus the ‘programming language’  for  this  simulation is  one that 
only makes use of the terms of the most fundamental physics. 
Seager  now  asks  us  to  imagine  a  more  complex  case:  a 
simulation of  a  child’s  birthday party.  Again,  the  programmer is 
only allowed to utilise the ‘programming language’ of physics. The 
point of the thought experiment is this: if you believe that what this 
simulation will show will ‘agree with reality’ then you believe in 
what Seager calls the Scientific Picture of the World. In other words, 
you believe that everything supervenes on the physical.
I  take  it  that  this  thought  experiment  allows  an  intuitive 
grasp of what supervenience on the physical amounts to. Dennett 
no doubt believes in this view of the world, at least in some sense. 
And Campbell too would surely agree to this rather general claim. 
The point here is that everything might supervene on the physical 
level, in the way that Seager’s thought experiment brings out, but 
in the end this says little about the causal  structure of the world, 
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leaving  it  open  for  the  interventionist  to  draw  the  conclusions 
noted above. 
Far  from  being  in  tension  with  a  naturalistic  view—or 
‘Scientific  Picture’—of  the  world,  the  interventionist’s  conclusion 
regarding  the  causal  reality  of  intentional  states  actually 
supplements that general metaphysical picture of the world, filling 
in (causal) details that are simply left open by the claim of physical 
supervenience.
5.5 Conclusion
The commonsense view of agency is committed to a realism about 
intentional  states.  The  two  principal  challenges  to  intentional 
realism  itself  come  from  eliminativism  and  instrumentalism,  and 
both  of  them  turn  of  the  notion  of  causation.  Specifically,  the 
problem is to establish how such intentional states or properties are 
causal integrated into the physical world (viz. behaviour). 
The interventionist view of causation proved to be the most 
plausible way of responding to these challenges, while maintaining 
a genuinely realist view of the intentional causation of behaviour. 
However, as we shall see in the following chapter, the defence of 
intentional realism is not yet complete: a central part of this account 
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requires not just the involvement of mental states in the way so far 
discussed,  but  the  contribution  of  conscious  mental  states. 
Specifically, it will require the input of phenomenal consciousness.  
6Consciousness in Action
6.1. Introduction
Here  is  the  state  of  the  argument  so  far.  Chapter  2  set  out  the 
general  argument  for  revising  our  approach  to  the  free  will 
problem, and suggested instead the adoption of two more specific 
philosophical  projects.  One  of  those  projects  is  taken  up  as  the 
central  part  of  this  thesis:  an  account  of  agency  that  is 
independently plausible, and that has been doing unnoticed work 
in  the  background  in  the  literature  on  ’the  free  will  problem’. 
Chapter 3 then set out the motivation for that agency project, and 
showed  how  the  notion  of  ‘agential  control’—which  is  really  a 
constitutive part of agency itself—has in fact been obscured by the 
dialectic of the ‘free will debate’.
Chapter  4  took  up  the  challenge  of  getting  a  grip  on  the 
concept  of  agency  itself,  given  the  impressive  range  of  uses  to 
which  that  term  has  come  to  be  put.  I  suggested  that  Helen 
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Steward’s account of agency has several features which make it a 
plausible starting point,  and then took up an important question 
raised by Steward’s project in that work: what can we learn about 
agency  from investigating  our  own psychology,  in  particular,  by 
looking  at  the  ‘folk  psychological’  concepts  we  apply  to  certain 
features of our experience? 
Building on that  starting point,  I  proposed a  nonreductive 
account  of  agency  that  in  fact  differs  in  substantial  ways  from 
Steward’s own view. Two of the central claims of my view are (i) 
the commitment to intentional realism, and (ii) the involvement of 
perceptual consciousness in action control.  Importantly,  I  claimed 
that these are not arbitrarily connected features, but that they come 
together as a ‘package’, and understanding this account of agency 
requires  getting  clear  on  the  interconnections  between  these 
phenomena.  Indeed,  a  central  part  of  the  argument  is  that 
defending (ii) in the way that I do here is actually a necessary part 
of (i). So these are not separate tasks, but simply different stages in 
the same argument.
The  previous  chapter  took  on  intentional  realism.  The 
conclusion there was that reference to intentional properties plays a 
central  role  in  action  explanation,  and  that  we  are  specifically 
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committed to the causal reality of such phenomena. I picked up on 
certain  suggestive  remarks  in  Dennett’s  account,  and  developed 
them along the lines of  an interventionist  account of  causation:  I 
claimed that this is the best way to defend a realist view that falls 
between  the  extremes  of  instrumentalism  about  intentional 
properties, on the one hand, and the ‘industrial strength’ realism of 
Fodor and others, on the other hand. The interventionist’s view of 
causation is,  contrary to certain arguments,  sufficient to establish 
the causal reality of mental states. But the conclusion of that chapter 
established only that this account of intentional realism is a plausible 
one, and that it makes sense of the requirements for agency that I 
set out in that chapter. The further task is to establish that it is true 
in our own case. 
Hence we arrive at the present chapter: since one of the main 
claims of the view elaborated in the previous chapter is that realism 
about intentional states requires the possibility of an intervention on 
those states, the argument of this chapter is that consciousness can
—and  actually  does—function  as  an  intervention  on  an  agent’s 
mental states. In particular, we should find that the intentional level 
is the appropriate (proportional) level at which to locate the ‘control 
panel’ for the outcomes we are interested in — intentional actions.
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Note  that  this  defence  of  intentional  realism  requires  that 
consciousness  functions  as  an  intervention  on  an  agent’s  mental 
states, and that the content of conscious perception is utilised in the 
control  of  intentional  action.  Establishing  a  robust  form  of 
intentional realism, in the way that the previous chapter suggested 
was necessary, depends on both of these tasks. Recall the discussion 
of Alexander’s Dictum: it was a criterion of the genuine reality of 
intentional states that they have causal effects — ‘to be real is  to 
have causal powers’. 
Showing  merely  that  an  agent’s  intentional  states  can  be 
affected by conscious perception is insufficient: it needs to also be 
shown that such states make a difference to behaviour, otherwise there 
is  an  important  sense  in  which  such  intentional  states  are 
epiphenomenal,  and this  counts  against  the  kind  of  realism that 
was proposed in the previous chapter. Hence it is a main concern of 
this  chapter  to  defend  the  present  view  against  the  charge  of 
epiphenomenalism,  in  order  to  complete  the  argument  for 
intentional realism that was initiated in Chapter 4.
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6.2 Intervening on Beliefs
Perhaps the most straightforward sense in which consciousness acts 
as an intervention on an agent’s mental states is in the case of belief 
—  specifically,  beliefs  about  the  agent’s  immediate  environment. 
Now  the  purpose  of  an  intervention,  according  to  this  view  of 
causation,  is  to  isolate  a  variable  of  interest  and manipulate  that 
variable in a systematic way in order to study the effects of  that 
intervention  on  a  certain  phenomenon  of  interest  (the  effect 
variable).  In  practice,  this  is  usually  characterised  by  an 
experimenter’s  intervention  on  a  variable  in  the  context  of  a 
controlled experiment, as in a randomised controlled trial. 
Put simply, the experimenter takes control of the variable X, 
and ‘tweaks’ it  in some way (causes a change in the value of the 
variable), and looks to see what happens to the effect variable Y — 
the  important  feature  here  is  that  the  intervention  be  ‘surgical’. 
What this means is that the intervention on X should be such that 
all  other  causal  influences  on  X  are  suspended;  and  that, 
importantly,  any  change  in  Y  that  occurs  as  a  result  of  the 
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intervention on X should come about only via the causal connection 
(if there is a causal connection) between X and Y.1
This  way  of  characterising  an  ‘intervention’  is  very  much 
tied to the notion of an experimenter, carrying out interventions on a 
range of phenomena in the context of a scientific experiment. But it 
might be thought that this characterisation fails to apply to the way 
that  we  form  beliefs:  there  is  no  experimenter  manipulating  the 
features of our experience, or if there is, then this cannot inform us 
about the normal processes of belief-formation. 
However, the interventionist view can happily accommodate 
the notion of an intervention in which no such ‘experimenters’ are 
involved: there just has to be the right kind of natural process, with 
the right kind of causal history.  In science, this is sometimes called 2
a ‘natural experiment’: as when, for example, it would be unethical 
or impractical to carry out a controlled trial to study the effects of 
certain phenomena. A natural experiment of this kind requires that 
there be some people who are subject to some outside influence (the 
‘intervention’), and that it is possible to compare them to a second 
population who are as similar as possible, but for the fact that the 
 Woodward  (2003:  94,  97).  See  also  the  ‘arrow  breaking’  conception  of 1
interventions, found in Pearl (2000).
 Woodward (2003: 94).2
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second population is  not subject  to the ‘intervention’.  A common 
example is that of twin studies, where children who are genetically 
identical are brought up separately in different conditions,  or are 
subject to differing external influences — allowing the study of the 
causal significance of environmental risk factors, while controlling 
for the influence of genetic factors.  3
The ‘natural experiment’ view of intervention offers a more 
promising  way  of  thinking  about  the  role  of  perceptual 
consciousness in belief formation.  In the most basic case, conscious 4
perception of some feature of your environment is an intervention 
on your beliefs about the world: specifically, of your beliefs about 
that portion of the world that you are perceiving. 
This can happen passively, but there are many cases in which 
the subject consciously attends to some feature of the world for the 
purposes of  ‘setting up’ such a natural  experiment.  For example, 
suppose that you want to know the colour of a particular object, so 
you  fix  your  attention  on  the  object  in  question,  and  attend  in 
 Campbell mentions this example at (2010: 18).3
 Although  both  characterisations  are  just  that—characterisations—and  are  not 4
separate forms of interventionism. They are simply different ways of ‘picturing’ the 
account  of  causal  inference:  by  thinking  of  a  randomised  controlled  trial,  or  a 
natural experiment.
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particular to that dimension of the object (its colour properties). You 
therefore act to make it the case that the world itself acts as a control 
variable for your beliefs about the colour of the object.5
Consider  an  example  originally  presented  by  Austin.  6
Suppose you have heard that there is a pig roaming these woods, 
although you think it is fairly unlikely. You then come across one in 
a clearing, and look at it in good light; you walk around it, prod it 
with a stick, sniff it a few times. The pig in this situation is having a 
causal impact on your beliefs. Importantly, it is not simply that the 
pig influences your beliefs, but that it has a decisive impact on your 
beliefs,  viz.  about  whether  or  not  there  is  a  pig  roaming  these 
woods. 
 Campbell (2010: 28-9).5
 Austin (1962: 114-15). Campbell develops this example, reading it as an argument 6
for perception as an intervention on belief, at Campbell and Cassam (2014: 79-80).
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On  Campbell’s  reading  of  this  example,  your  conscious 
perception of the pig functions as an intervention  on your beliefs.  7
As already discussed, one of the critical features of an intervention, 
according  to  the  recent  causal  literature,  is  that  it  be  ‘surgical’, 
which  means  suspending  all  other  influences  on  the  effect  in 
question. In this example, encountering the pig in the woods and 
perceiving it in good light (etc.) suspends any other influences there 
may be on your beliefs about pigs in the wood. You previously had 
doubts  about  there  being  a  pig  there,  but  the  experience  of 
perceiving  this  pig  suspends  that  prior  bias.  It  is  not  one 
consideration that you weigh against others:  “Once it  comes into 
play, it is the only factor specifically affecting what [you] believe on 
this point.”8
 Depending on your view of perception, you might think that what intervenes on 7
your  beliefs  here  is  not  the  pig,  but  a  conscious  representation  of  the  pig. 
Accordingly, you might think that there is a worry here that we can still doubt the 
veracity  of  the  representation,  and,  hence,  that  the  intervention  is  not  strictly 
‘surgical’,  because  it  is  being  ‘weighed’  in  the  light  of  those  other  (skeptical) 
considerations. However, I take it that this is simply an instance of a general form of 
skepticism and as such poses no special threat to this view, since in all normal non-
skeptical contexts, such conscious perception of the pig does in fact function in the 
way proposed here, having a decisive impact on your beliefs.
 Campbell and Cassam (2014: 79).8
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It is interesting to compare this example with one involving a 
case of blindsight.  Imagine how things would be different here if a 
blindsighted person was in the same situation: they had heard that 
there is  a pig in these woods,  but they think it  is  fairly unlikely. 
Now imagine that they encounter the pig in their blind field. They 
may now be inclined to guess that there is a pig there, if they were 
prompted,  but  this  guess  can—at  best—only  be  weighed against 
their prior skeptical beliefs: it is simply one factor among many, and 
may indeed be outweighed by the strength of other factors. 
Indeed, the typical blindsighted subject may not assign this 
evidence much weight at all, given that in actual cases of blindsight 
subjects always report that they have an experience of ‘guessing’ in 
such situations. That is, they experience their own judgment (when 
prompted) that there is a pig in their blind field as a judgment that 
is,  phenomenologically speaking,  no different  to guesswork.  And 
we  do  not  typically  assign  judgments  issuing  from  guesswork 
much weight in deliberation.
 
6.3 Conscious Perceptual Experience and ‘Zombie Action’
The examples  just  considered make  it  clear  that  consciousness—
that is,  conscious perceptual  experience—regularly functions as a 
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surgical intervention on belief. Hence, we have a common example 
of the kind of intervention that was posited in the previous chapter: 
conscious  perception  typically  does  make  a  difference  to  agents’ 
mental states. As I noted above, however, this is only part of the 
story  of  intentional  realism:  what  is  needed  for  the  present 
argument is to further demonstrate that the very intentional states 
in question here are appropriately linked to behaviour — that they 
make  a  difference  to  behaviour.  Without  that,  we  don’t  have 
intentional realism.
What is needed is a view on which the conscious perceptual 
experience that informs an agent’s mental states is also utilised in 
the control of action. Now, from one point of view, this claim might 
be  seen  as  rather  uncontroversial:  there  appears  to  be  a  fairly 
common pretheoretical assumption—even if the details are vague—
that  consciousness  has  some  important  role  to  play  in  what 
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happens  when  we  act.  And  the  involvement  of  perceptual 9
consciousness seems to have a good level  of  intuitive support:  it 
often appears that the way that we consciously perceive the world 
around  us  contributes  importantly  to  our  ability  to  act  on  that 
world.
From  a  different  perspective,  however,  this  commonsense 
view will be seen as seriously open to doubt. This is the perspective 
of a recent philosophical position that makes the case for so-called 
‘Zombie  Action’,  on  the  basis  of  research  in  psychology  and 
cognitive neuroscience.  The Zombie Action hypothesis has been 10
variously  formulated,  not  always  under  that  name,  and  can  be 
briefly  summarised  as  follows.  The  central  claim  is  that  our 
intentional  actions are not  controlled by conscious processes,  but 
 For example, consider the essays in the recent collection Does Consciousness Cause 9
Behaviour?  (Pockett,  Banks,  and  Gallagher  2006).  They  begin  their  introduction 
with the assertion that “All  normal humans experience a kind of basic,  on-the-
ground certainty that we, our conscious selves, cause our own voluntary acts.” (1). 
Consider  also,  for  example,  the  general  reception  of  Freud’s  theories  of  the 
unconscious sources of behaviour: the point is that they were generally regarded as 
surprising or somehow contrary to our normal self-understanding.
 The term ‘Zombie action’ apparently comes from Koch and Crick’s (2001) article 10
‘The Zombie Within’.
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are  rather  under  the control  of  ‘Zombie systems’  — that  is,  sub-
personal processes or systems that are remote from consciousness. 
But what precisely is the ‘commonsense view’ of the relation 
between our conscious experience and action that is being disputed 
by Zombie  Action? Above I  said that  the  view is  “that  what  we 
consciously experience contributes to the production of our bodily 
actions”, which remains at the intuitive level. We can sharpen the 
idea a little more by considering the following remarks from Brian 
O’Shaughnessy.  Here  O’Shaughnessy  is  considering  the  act  of 
placing one’s index finger on the centre of a printed cross. In this 
case, he writes,
one keeps looking as one guides the finger, and does so right 
up  until  the  moment  the  finger  contacts  the  cross,  and  the 
reason, surely, is that sight is continually informing one as to 
where  in  one’s  visual  field  to  move  one’s  visible  physical 
finger.11
In this context, ‘sight’ is taken to refer to specifically conscious visual 
experience. I take it that this description gets something right about 
 O’Shaughnessy (1992: 233).11
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how we commonly think about the relation between our conscious 
perception of the world, and our actions on that world. Conscious 
perception of an object informs our physical actions on that object. 
Further  elaboration of  this  commonsense view is  given by Andy 
Clark  (albeit  in  the  process  of  arguing  against  it).  According  to 
Clark,  the  commonsense  view can  be  captured  by  the  following 
definition:
Experience-Based Control (EBC). Conscious visual experience 
presents the world to the subject in a richly textured way; a 
way that presents fine detail (detail that may, perhaps, exceed 
our conceptual or propositional grasp) and that is, in virtue of 
this richness, especially apt for, and typically utilised in, the 
control and guidance of fine-tuned, real-world activity.12
On  this  view,  EBC  claims  that  conscious  visual  experience  is 
utilised  in  “the  control  and  guidance  of  fine-tuned,  real-world 
activity.” 
The  ‘Zombie  action’  arguments  deny  this  connection 
between  conscious  perception  and  action:  they  dispute  that 
 Clark (2001: 4).12
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conscious  visual  experience  is  involved  in  the  control  of  world-
engaging  activity  in  the  way  that  commonsense  (and  EBC) 
supposes. Hence if the Zombie Action argument goes through, we 
have a problematic dissociation between the agent's mental states, 
and the actual control of action.
6.3.1 Perceptual demonstratives and the ‘two-streams’ view
How, then,  is  conscious perception involved in the guidance and 
control  of  such  ‘world-engaging  activity’,  as  claimed by  EBC?  It 
might  be  that,  as  John  Campbell  has  suggested,  perceptual 
demonstratives play an important role in the control of action, and 
that such perceptual demonstratives require specifically conscious 
perception  of  the  demonstratively  identified  object.  Hence  the 
connection between consciousness and action control. But in what 
way are they involved?
The important step in Campbell’s argument is to show that 
conscious  attention  is  required  for  the  proper  understanding  of 
perceptual  demonstratives,  on the grounds that  it  is  necessary to 
‘single  the  object  out’  in  one’s  conscious  experience  in  order  to 
understand which object is intended. A blindsighted person might 
have the object in their blind field, for example, and could thereby 
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utilise  perceptual  information  regarding  that  object—perhaps  in 
order  to  respond  accurately  in  certain  ‘forced  choice’  situations 
involving the object—but this seems insufficient for the claim that 
they know which object is in question. (It is noteworthy on this point 
that  blindsighted people  do not  ever  seem to grow to ‘trust’  the 
accuracy  of  such  guessing,  and  thereby  adapt  to  rely  on  that 
perceptual information in a systematic way.)
Consider Campbell’s own example: suppose we are walking 
past  a  building  with  an  array  of  windows  and  you  say  “that 
window is the window of my office”.  I may be able to take in the 13
whole building in a glance, and therefore know that the window to 
your office must be somewhere in my field of view. But that is not 
enough  for  me  to  know  which  window  you  mean:  I  must  also 
single it out consciously, and attend to it.
Suppose you asked me to point to the window, but I have not 
yet managed to singe it out consciously. I would claim that I could 
not point to the window, and if you asked me to guess I would also 
claim to be unable to guess. Now assume that you insist that I guess 
anyway,  and  that  it  turns  out  that  I  have  the  same  capacity  for 
better-than-chance  accuracy  at  such  tasks  as  do  blindsighted 
 Campbell (2003: 151).13
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subjects. It still seems clear that I do not know which window you 
mean, and that, as in the case of blindsight, this is insufficient to 
understand the meaning of the demonstrative.
What  then  is  the  important  connection  between  such 
(conscious)  perceptual  demonstratives  and  action  control?  The 
natural suggestion here is what he calls the Grounding Thesis.
Grounding  Thesis.  The  meaning  of  a  perceptual 
demonstrative  is  grounded  in  those  aspects  of  perceptual 
experience that  set  the parameters  for  my action (how far  I 
move, in what direction, and so on).14
According to the Grounding Thesis, the meaning that a perceptual 
demonstrative has on an occasion is fixed by the way in which I 
perceive the object: “that window” doesn’t mean the same thing on 
every  occasion  of  use,  but  rather  the  meaning  is  given  by 
information  supplied  by  my  perception  of  the  object  at  that 
particular  time.  This  ‘picture’  of  the  object  provides  information 
such as the size and shape of the object, and its location, or how far 
away it is from me, etc. 
 Campbell (2003: 152).14
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Perceptual  demonstratives  are  centrally  involved  in  action 
because it is this perceptually-grounded ‘picture’ of the object that 
sets  the  parameters  for  my action  on  the  object:  the  information 
supplied in that picture is used to coordinate my action, i.e. how far 
I  reach,  and  in  what  direction,  and  so  forth.  In  this  sense,  it  is 
consciously  perceived  information  that  is  utilised  for  the  control 
and guidance of real-world activity. Hence, we have the required 
integration between intentional states and action, both informed by 
our  conscious  perception  of  the  world:  indeed,  this  would 
apparently  satisfy  Clark’s  characterisation  of  the  commonsense 
view as well (EBC).
However,  according  to  Campbell,  the  Grounding  Thesis 
comes into conflict  with certain empirical  facts.  In particular,  the 
objection to this view, and to Experience-Based Control in general, 
comes  from  consideration  of  work  done  by  David  Milner  and 
Melvyn  Goodale.  The  argument  is  essentially  another  ‘Zombie 15
Action’ problem for the Grounding Thesis: Campbell draws on the 
same set of empirical concerns as those which motivate the ‘Zombie 
 Their original monograph on the subject is Milner and Goodale (published 1995; 15
second ed.  2006).  See also the papers Milner and Goodale (1993) and the more 
recent and updated (2008).
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Action’ literature, although he does not use that term. Nonetheless, 
the worry here is the same: that there would apparently be a large 
portion of human action that is controlled by processes or systems 
that are remote from consciousness.
According  to  the  standard  view  of  the  primate  visual 
system,  there  is  an  anatomical  distinction  between  two  visual 16
streams that both stem from early cortical  visual areas:  the dorsal 
stream  and  the  ventral  stream.  The  work  of  Milner  and  Goodale 
suggests a view of the functional organisation of these two streams: 
their  ‘two  systems’  model  of  cortical  visual  processing  makes  a 
distinction  between  what  they  call  ‘vision  for  perception’  and 
‘vision for  action’.  Roughly,  the dorsal  stream is  characterised as 
being  for  direct  motor  control,  and  hence  is  referred  to  here  as 
‘vision for action’, while the ventral stream is for cognition, and is 
what is referred to as ‘vision for perception’.
In general, philosophical attention has been focused on two 
main sources of evidence for the ‘two systems’ view, and it is this 
evidence  that  informs  such  Zombie  arguments  against  the 
commonsense view of consciousness and action. 
 Mishkin and Ungerleider (1982).16
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The  first  source  of  evidence  comes  from  consideration  of 
pathological  cases,  in  which  patients  have  lesions  to  either  the 
ventral or dorsal stream. For example, Goodale and Milner report 
the case of DF, who suffered damage to the ‘perception’ pathway 
(ventral  stream)  resulting  in  visual  agnosia:  she  was  unable  to 
recognise  familiar  objects  or  faces,  or  indicate  the  size,  or 
orientation,  of  an  object.  Yet,  when  presented  with  an  irregular 
object,  she  would  grasp  the  object  with  the  appropriate  hand 
position, and when instructed to post a card through a slot, she was 
able to orient the card correctly and execute the movement without 
difficulty.
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Conversely, for example, patients with optic ataxia resulting 
from lesions to the dorsal stream can accurately report on the size 
of the object (by holding up their fingers to show how big it is), or 
identify  the  correct  orientation of  a  card.  Yet,  they are  unable  to 
properly grasp an irregular object, or to properly orient the card in 
order to post it through a slot.
The second source of evidence comes from experiments on 
normal  adult  subjects  which  reveal  apparent  perception-action 
disassociations,  brought  about  when subjects  are  asked to  act  on 
objects featuring perceptual illusions, such as the Ebbinghaus Ring 
Illusion (Fig. 6.1 a-b). 
(Fig. 6.1 a-b) Ebbinghaus Ring Illusion17
In  the  Ebbinghaus  Ring  Illusion  (also  called  the  ‘Titchener’ 
illusion), for most people, the inner circle can be made to appear 
either larger or smaller than its physical size, depending on the size 
of the surrounding annulus. 
For  example,  in  Figure  6.1a,  the  inner  circles  are  in  fact 
physically identical in size, but the circle on the left (surrounded by 
the small annulus) appears to be larger than the circle on the right. 
 Aglioti et al. (1995: 680).17
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By contrast,  in Figure 6.1b the two inner circles appear to be the 
same size,  but  in  fact  the  circle  on the  right  (surrounded by the 
large annulus) is physically larger than the circle on the left.
In  one  experiment,  Agliotti  et  al.  used  a  version  of  the 
Ebbinghaus  illusion  in  which  the  discs  could  be  grasped  (thin 
‘poker chips’ were used as the circles). Subjects were asked to pick 
up one of the two target circles (the central, inner circles on the left 
or the right) depending on the apparent size of the circles. 
Ultimately, the result was that even when both target circles 
appeared to the subject as though they were the same size, upon 
reaching  for  one  of  the  discs,  the  grip  aperture  of  thumb  and 
forefinger was found to be calibrated to the actual size of the disc, 
and not the size that it appeared to be under illusion. Importantly, 
the  size  of  the  aperture  was  shown  to  have  been  set  by  visual 
information, yet it did not reflect the size of the object given in the 
subject’s conscious visual experience.
Return  to  Campbell’s  first  proposed  explanation  of  the 
relation  between  perceptual  demonstratives  (which  require 
conscious vision) and action. According to the Grounding Thesis, 
conscious experience does two things at the same time: it grounds 
the meaning of the demonstrative, and it also sets the parameters for 
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action on the identified object (via the informational ‘picture’ given 
in  conscious  experience).  Campbell  takes  this  empirical  work  to 
show that the Grounding Thesis cannot be right: it seems as though 
what is  given in conscious experience is  mediated by the ventral 
visual  stream,  while  the  parameters  for  motor  control  that 
coordinate the action on the object are actually set by information in 
the dorsal stream. As Clark puts it:
The kind of coding and processing implicated in the real-time 
guidance of delicate,  fluent,  object-engaged action is,  it  now 
seems,  frequently  and significantly  distinct  from that  which 
supports our ongoing perceptual experience of the scene.18
Campbell’s move is to concede this point, and propose a modified 
version of the Grounding Thesis. 
According  to  this  modified  view,  instead  of  thinking  that 
perceptual experience is required to set the parameters for action on 
the object (so-called ‘action programming’), we should think of that 
task as being informed by non-conscious information in the dorsal 
stream (as  the  Zombie  argument  claimed).  However,  this  ‘action 
 Clark (2001: 17).18
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system’ does not bind the various properties together, as happens 
in  the  perceptual  system  informing  conscious  vision;  instead  it 
supplies  them  ‘one  by  one’  for  the  control  of  action.  Hence  the 
properties that the object is represented as having—supplied by the 
‘Zombie’  visual  system—individually  contribute  to  the  motor 
configuration of the hand while reaching for the object.  19
According  to  Campbell,  this  division  creates  a  ‘binding 
problem’: when you demonstratively identify an object (“that is my 
hat”) and decide to act on it, it is necessary for the action system to 
respond and configure your physical movements appropriately. It 
is  therefore  necessary  to  ensure  that  the  perception  and  action 
systems are tracking one and the same object: that the information 
that is fed into the action system for motor control is information 
about the same object  that is  picked out in perception (e.g.  “that 
hat”).
Campbell’s proposal is that the role of conscious perception 
is that of securing this initial connection. This is because conscious 
perception of the object will include information about the location 
of the object, and it is that information that is used to identify the 
object to the action system. That is,
 Campbell (2003: 157).19
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conscious attention to the object will include some awareness 
of the location of the object, and [the] target for processing by 
the visuomotor system can be identified as: ‘the object at that 
location’20
The  claim  is  that  location  itself  is  the  ‘binding  principle’  that 
ensures  the  connection  between  perception  and  action:  that  the 
object you consciously intend to act on is in fact the object which is 
used to determine the coordinates of the action. Hence Campbell 
proposes the Binding Thesis:
Binding Thesis. Conscious attention is what defines the target 
of processing for the ‘action’ system, and thereby ensures that 
the object you intend to act on is the very same as the object 
with which the ‘action’ system becomes engaged.21
The analogy Campbell  uses is that of a heat-seeking missile:  it  is 
necessary  to  point  the  missile  in  roughly  the  right  direction,  in 
 Campbell (2003: 159).20
 Ibid. (160).21
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order  for  it  to  ‘lock  on’  to  the  right  object,  but  after  that  initial 
identification lower-level systems take over to track the object, and 
co-ordinate the real-time guidance of the missile. By picking out the 
object  in consciousness—by identifying that  thing as the one you 
mean to  act  on—it  is  possible  for  the  system responsible  for  co-
ordinating  your  physical  movements  to  take  over  and  track  the 
relevant thing as ‘the object at that location’. Hence on this reading, 
perceptual  consciousness  has  a  direct  role  to  play  in  action 
planning, although the real-time guidance of the fine motor activity 
involved in carrying out the physical  movements is  regulated by 
non-conscious systems.
How does Campbell’s considered view (the Binding Thesis) 
compare to the commonsense view noted above? First, consider the 
claim that is being made by the Zombie Action arguments. The best 
way to understand this is the way that Milner and Goodale put the 
point themselves:
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Two  Systems.  The  visual  system  that  gives  us  our  visual 
experience of the world is not the same system that guides our 
movements in the world.22
This is one way of understanding what ‘Zombie Action’ theorists 
see as philosophically important in Milner and Goodale’s research. 
They make this claim on the basis of a specific reading of the two 
lines  of  evidence reported above:  the  pathological  cases,  and the 
perceptual illusions. And if Two Systems is true, then it seems like 
we have empirical evidence against the commonsense view.
Earlier,  I  claimed  that  the  commonsense  view  might  be 
sharpened  by  appealing  to  Clark’s  thesis  of  ‘Experience-Based 
Control’:
Experience-based Control. Conscious visual experience …[is] 
especially  apt  for,  and  typically  utilised  in,  the  control  and 
guidance of fine-tuned, real-world activity.23
 Goodale and Milner (2004: 3). The label ‘two systems’ is mine: the subsequent 22
definition is a quotation.
 Clark (2001: 4).23
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Now according to this reading of Milner and Goodale’s empirical 
work,  conscious  visual  experience  typically  is  not  utilised  in  the 
control  and guidance  of  fine-tuned,  real-world  activity.  Hence,  it 
appears that according to this empirical work, we have shown the 
commonsense  view—characterised here  as  EBC—to be  false,  and 
precluded  the  needed  integration  between  conscious  perceptual 
experience and action.
Campbell’s  suggestion  is  that  conscious  visual  experience 
does have a role to play in action, but it is not the role that EBC says 
it  is.  Instead he claims,  according to the Binding Thesis,  that  we 
should accept the general lesson of Milner and Goodale’s research 
and concede  that  something  like  Two Systems  is  right.  His  novel 
suggestion here is that, although conscious visual experience might 
not play the role claimed for it by EBC, there is a further  role not 
captured  by  that  definition:  that  is,  conscious  visual  experience 
allows us to demonstratively identify the object that we intend to 
act on, and enable the non-conscious ‘Zombie’ systems to lock on 
and modulate our fine-grained physical movements in the way that 
the  research  above  suggests.  So,  this  argument  goes,  conscious 
perceptual experience is required for action on an object after all, 
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since  it  is  required  to  connect  our  intentions  and  our  physical 
movements. 
Does  the  Binding  Thesis  provide  the  required  integration 
needed  for  intentional  realism,  and  hence  agency,  as  discussed 
above? I claim that it does not. In the previous chapter, intentional 
realism turned out to be a prerequisite for agency: it was suggested 
that such a realist view required the possibility of intervention on 
an  agent’s  mental  states.  And  in  section  5.2  above,  such 
interventions were shown to occur at the level of (e.g.) belief, as a 
result of our ability to consciously experience objects in the world. 
The variables that it is possible to intervene on here are those at the 
mental or intentional level. 
But as I pointed out above, in order to complete this picture, 
we must show that the effects of the intervention do not stop there, 
as  it  were,  and  that  the  intentional  states  in  question  are 
appropriately connected to action. If we accept Campbell’s Binding 
Thesis, we have not done enough to establish that connection.
According to the Binding Thesis, consciousness only gives us 
knowledge  of  reference—the  object  we  intend  to  act  upon  is 
identified  at  that  one—before  turning  over  control  to  the  non-
conscious ‘Zombie’ systems that have been discussed above. Now it 
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is  those  systems  which  are  responsible  for  providing  the 
information that is used to guide action. Hence, it is those systems 
which  control  the  action.  So  while  consciousness  gives  us 
knowledge  of  reference,  it  is  Zombie  systems  which  give  us 
knowledge of the object, and which thus control and co-ordinate the 
physical actions. 
But  the  commonsense  view  has  it  that  agents  consciously 
control  their  actions  —  a  view  which  was  later  unpacked  more 
precisely as the claim that consciousness must be involved in the 
control  and  guidance  of  real-world  activity  (EBC).  The  Binding 
Thesis does not provide this control. 
What  is  in  fact  needed  is  something  closer  to  Campbell’s 
original Grounding Thesis. According to this view, which Campbell 
had  dismissed  in  response  to  the  empirical  concerns  discussed 
above,  it  is  conscious  perceptual  information  that  gives  us 
knowledge of reference as well as providing the information about 
the object that is utilised in action control. 
I take no stand on whether or not the Binding Thesis is true. 
In any case, it is not necessary to claim that the Binding Thesis is 
false,  since Experience-Based Control (and the commonsense view 
in  general)  is  compatible  with  the  essential  claim of  the  Binding 
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Thesis.  Consciousness  can  still  be  involved  in  the  selection-for-
action  that  the  Binding  Thesis  claims  for  it,  but  it  must  also  be 
shown  that,  contrary  to  Zombie  Action  views,  consciousness  is 
directly  involved  in  the  real-time  control  and  guidance  of  our 
actions.
6.3.2 Embodied demonstratives
Campbell dismissed the proposed Grounding Thesis because of the 
empirical evidence discussed above. But Christopher Mole disputes 
the philosophical  interpretation of this evidence (the pathological 
cases, and the illusion studies).  He denies that the results of Miler 24
and Goodale’s work support the philosophical claims made on that 
basis, viz. the Zombie Action argument. The basis of Mole’s claim is 
“that movement control and conscious experience are the work of 
one and the same system”, which is a way of denying the Two Systems 
thesis,  and hence undermining the philosophical interpretation of 
Milner and Goodale’s research.  25
Now,  as  Wayne Wu has  pointed out,  there  is  a  reading of 
Mole’s  claim  here  that  makes  it  trivial:  namely,  that  the  visual 
 Mole (2009; 2013).24
 Mole (2009: 1002). Emphasis in original.25
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system  as  a  whole  yields  both  visual  experience  and  visual 
guidance.  Making this claim non-trivial would require a criterion 26
for system individuation, if the Zombie Action worry is not to turn 
into  a  simply  verbal  dispute.  But  the  sameness  or  difference  of 
systems is not really the salient point, as Mole acknowledges. The 
real  issue—especially  for  present  purposes—concerns  the 
involvement of consciousness in action control. 
In particular, Wu suggests that we should think of the issue 
as  a  matter  of  the  consciousness  or  unconsciousness  of  the 
representations that control behaviour.  Now I take no stand here 27
on whether we should adopt the representationalist  approach,  or 
whether  Campbell’s  own  relational  view  is  to  be  preferred.  The 
pertinent  question  here  is  whether,  and  to  what  extent, 
consciousness is directly involved in action control, as opposed to 
the view on which non-conscious systems or processes are primarily 
responsible for the control of action. 
 Wu (2013: 219).26
 Although as Mole points out, citing Bennett and Hacker, talk of representations 27
being conscious or unconscious is better thought of in terms of a subject’s being 
conscious of the content of a representation: “A representation of x is a conscious 
representation if and only if there is a subject who is conscious of x on account of x 
being the content of that representation.” (Mole 2013: 232).
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Mole answers this question affirmatively.  He proposes that 
there  is  a  class  of  embodied  demonstratives  that  can  contribute 
conscious  information  to  the  systems  that  control  action.  Hence, 
Mole’s view is much closer to the Grounding Thesis that Campbell 
had  originally  proposed:  the  meaning  of  the  embodied 
demonstrative  is  grounded  in  the  information  supplied  by  our 
conscious  perception  of  the  object,  and  which  is  thus  used  for 
action control. 
To illustrate the point, return to the case of the visual form 
agnosic DF, who is unable to recognise the shape or orientation of a 
letterbox-like slot, although she is able to correctly co-ordinate her 
hand movements in order to post a card through that slot in the 
right way. According to some philosophers, this is evidence for the 
Zombie Action hypothesis: it suggests that the system responsible 
for her conscious visual experience of the slot—which is the system 
that  is  damaged—operates  separately  from  the  system  that  is 
controlling her action on the slot when she posts the card correctly. 
The more general ‘Zombie’ hypothesis is of course that, even when 
both  systems  are  functioning  normally,  they  are  nonetheless 
operating in casually distinct ways. Mole sums up the worry about 
this ‘mild form of epiphenomenalism’:
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it  suggests that the causal chains leading to our experiences 
occur on branch lines from the causal chains that bring about 
our actions on the things that are experienced.28
However,  Mole  suggests  an alternate  reading of  the  evidence  on 
which  Milner  and  Goodale’s  work  does  not  license  the  Zombie 
Action conclusion. According to this view, the standard reading of 
Milner and Goodale’s work explains the case of DF by claiming that 
her actions on the slot are guided by representations that make no 
contribution  to  her  consciousness.  (And  that  this  is  true  in  the 
normal, non-pathological cases as well.) 
By contrast, Mole suggests an alternate interpretation of the 
evidence: according to this view, DF’s action on the slot is guided 
by  a  representation  that  contributes  to  consciousness,  “but  that 
these representations have a format that is immediately useful only 
for informing D.F. of how the slot should be acted upon.” What this 
means  is  that  DF  experiences  the  orientation  of  the  slot  “as  the 
referent of a demonstrative concept that latches onto its content by 
 Mole (2013: 233).28
—  !   —275
means of an embodied gesture.”  According to Mole’s view, when 29
DF acts on the slot, by posting the card correctly, visual experience 
presents the slot to her, not as “vertical” or “at ninety degrees to the 
floor”, but as “being oriented so as to be acted on thus” — where 
‘thus’  is  characterised  by  a  bodily  gesture,  the  embodied 
demonstrative.
Because of  this,  Mole  claims,  DF’s  action is  not  a  ‘Zombie 
action’: it is “under the control of a conscious experience that has 
this embodied demonstrative character.”  It is on the basis of the 30
conscious representation that she is able to act on the object in the 
way  that  she  does,  contrary  to  the  Zombie  Action  hypothesis, 
because it is the conscious perception of the object that is providing 
the information necessary for  action control,  albeit  not  in a  form 
that is available for verbal report, or other ways of reporting on the 
dimensions  of  the  object.  The  information  is  available  for  action 
control,  however,  and  is  represented  by  the  embodied 
demonstrative gesture.
Interestingly, one of the arguments Wu raises against Mole’s 
position  takes  the  form  of  a  reductio,  based  on  the  Ebbinghaus 
 Mole (2013: 235).29
 Mole (2013: 235).30
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reaching illusion. According to this argument, stated informally, if 
we deny that  Milner  and Goodale’s  Two Systems hypothesis  (or 
some similar view) is the right way of explaining the results of the 
reaching experiment, we seem to end up in a difficult position.
First, note that there is a visual representation controlling the 
action (the reaching behaviour) that represents the disc as size x. 
Second, there is a (conscious) visual representation informing the 
verbal report that represents the disc as size y, and where y ≠ x. If 
we assume, for reductio, that the representation x is conscious (the 
representation informing the reaching behaviour), then we seem to 
be  in  a  situation  where  the  subject  has  a  conscious  visual 
representation of the disc as size x and size y — that is, we end up 
saying that the disc looks to the subject to be both size x and y. But, 
the  argument  goes,  the  disc  cannot  look  that  way,  hence  the 
representation x is not conscious.
The nature of the reaching illusion is such that according to 
the subject’s verbal report, which everyone agrees is informed by 
the subject’s conscious visual experience, the disc looks a certain size 
(y). But because of the effects of the illusion, this is not the actual, 
physical size of the disc. Yet when the subject reaches for the disc, 
the grip aperture is  set to the actual size of the disc (x),  meaning 
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that  the  reaching  must  be  guided  by  some  other  representation. 
Now,  Wu  believes  that  if  the  subject  were  conscious  of  this 
representation of the disc’s size (x), this would mean that the disc 
looked that way to the subject too. Hence, the claimed absurdity: the 
disc looks to the subject to be size x and size y.
Mole’s  account  of  embodied  demonstratives  offers  a 
response to this argument. According to Mole’s view, the reductio 
does  not  follow from those  premises:  the  claim that  leads to  the 
absurdity (“but the disc cannot look that way . . .”) is an assumption 
introduced by  Wu.  In  fact,  Mole  denies  this  claim.  Since,  on  his 
view,  x  and  y  are  represented  under  different  modes  of 
presentation, it may not be manifest to the subject that the sizes are 
not the same — i.e. the size represented for verbal report (y), and 
the size represented for action guidance (x).  Hence it is open to 31
Mole to accept the apparently contradictory claim that the subject 
‘represents’ the disc as being both ‘size x’ and ‘size y’.
6.4 Disputing the Evidence for Zombie Action
Mole has much more to say in defence of the general plausibility of 
the ‘embodied demonstrative’,  but it  would take us too far away 
 Mole (2013: 237).31
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from the central point to discuss the idea in more detail.  What is 
interesting to note here is that it represents an advancement over 
Campbell’s use of the perceptual demonstrative in his own Binding 
Thesis,  since according to Mole the embodied demonstrative is  a 
means for conscious information to be utilised in the guidance and 
control  of  action  —  as  opposed  to  the  more  limited  role  of 
consciousness allowed by Campbell’s own view.
In  any  case,  what  I  would  like  to  focus  on  here  is  the 
exchange  between  Mole  and  Wu  that  was  just  considered,  in 
particular regarding the putative ‘absurdity’ involved in apparently 
consciously perceiving contradictory content (and which serves as a 
core premise in the Zombie Action argument). Mole’s response was 
built into his notion of the embodied demonstrative. On that view, 
the differing size-contents of  the two representations of  the discs 
are actually represented under different modes of presentation, and 
hence the contradiction disappears. 
In this section, I will complete the argument against Zombie 
Action  by  generalising  this  strategy,  and  criticising  the  Zombie 
arguments  in  a  way  that  does  not  depend  on  any  particular 
philosophical theory (such as Mole’s embodied demonstratives).
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Firstly, it  is worth pausing to consider in more detail  what 
does and does not need to be established by the defender of EBC. 
Importantly,  it  does  not  need  to  be  shown that  no  sub-personal, 
non-conscious systems or processes are involved in the production 
of  action.  Human  beings  are  physical,  embodied  agents,  and  it 
would be highly implausible to suppose that the aetiology of action 
involved  no  causal  processes  that  were  non-conscious,  including 
non-conscious  mental  processes.  It  is  no  barrier  to  accepting  the 
causal  relevance  of  conscious  perceptual  information  on  action 
control that it is not the sole causal factor controlling action.
With that in mind, it will have to be quite specific empirical 
evidence that can support the Zombie Action hypothesis. For it to 
be philosophically interesting, and actually come in to conflict with 
EBC,  it  would  have  to  be  shown  that  conscious  perceptual 
information clearly is not playing such a casual role — for example, 
by showing that non-conscious processes alone are causally sufficient 
for the control of action. Simply demonstrating that certain features 
of our physical actions are modulated by processes of which we are 
not  (and  perhaps  could  not  be)  conscious  is  not  sufficient  to 
repudiate EBC in favour of Zombie Action.
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The  strategy  in  Mole’s  paper  was  to  dispute  the 
interpretation of Milner and Goodale’s work on visual perception 
that  leads  to  the  Zombie  Action  conclusion.  In  particular,  he 
disputes the interpretation of the experiment involving DF’s action 
on  the  letterbox-like  slot.  Proponents  of  the  Zombie  Action 
hypothesis take this experiment to reveal a disassociation between 
conscious  perception  and  action  control:  since  DF  is  unable  to 
report on the orientation of the slot, but is able to reliably post a 
card  through  the  slot,  this  is  taken  to  show  that  the  action  is 
controlled  by  non-conscious  processes.  But  Mole’s  suggestion  is 
that we could also take this to show that DF only has access to the 
information  about  orientation  that  is  revealed  in  conscious 
perception when it is positioned as a target for action, and is not 
available  for  report  other  than  in  the  form  of  the  embodied 
demonstrative gesture.
At best, the evidence can be seen as equivocal between these 
competing interpretations of the data: support for Zombie control, 
on the one hand, and support for embodied demonstratives, on the 
other.  If  one  is  not  independently  convinced  about  the  general 
theory of embodied demonstratives, Mole’s response might not be 
seen as decisive. However, the general strategy of Mole’s response 
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here  is  instructive:  it  is  worth  looking  more  carefully  at  what 
pathological  cases  such  as  DF,  and  the  research  on  perceptual 
illusions, really licenses us to say.
First,  return  to  the  Ebbinghaus  ring  illusion.  In  this  case, 
discussed above, it was claimed that there is a dissociation between 
the conscious perception of  the disc,  and action on the disc.  The 
‘Zombie’ interpretation is that, since subjects’ reports on the size of 
the disc reveal the effects of the illusion, and since their physical 
actions seem to be informed by the real size of the disc, the latter 
cannot be controlled by conscious perception — that is, it cannot be 
informed by information that  comes from the subject’s  conscious 
perceptual experience. 
But  why  should  we  suppose  this?  Morgan  Wallhagen  has 
argued, in response to a different experiment involving the illusory 
movement of a target,  that such cases depend on the assumption 
that  visual  experience  cannot  represent  veridical  and  illusory 
contents. This is a general version of Mole’s response, but without 
the more specific claim that the illusory and veridical contents must 
be represented under different  modes of  presentation,  and is  not 
dependent  on  the  theory  of  embodied  demonstratives  given  by 
Mole.  Nonetheless,  it  adopts  the  same  strategy:  effectively 
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challenging  the  premise  in  the  Zombie  Action  argument  which 
assumes  that  veridical  contents  cannot  accompany  the  illusory 
contents  in conscious perception.  According to Wallhagen’s  view, 
there  are  actually  many  cases  in  which  both  are  presented  in 
conscious visual experience.
For example, consider the Müller-Lyer illusion. In this case, 
subjects will report having an experience as of the two lines being 
an unequal length, whereas the physical dimensions of the lines are 
equal.  Wallhagen  suggests  a  simple  way  to  demonstrate  that 
veridical contents are also presented in conscious perception: draw 
the lines on graph paper. One can then simply observe that the ends 
of the Müller-Lyer lines are touching parallel vertical graph lines.
If it were the case that the content of perceptual experience 
was exhausted by the illusory contents, it would not be possible to 
observe that the lines are of equal length in this way. The content of 
visual  experience  here  contains  veridical  and  illusory  “length 
contents”.  In normal cases, the subject simply doesn’t notice that 32
their  visual  states  have  this  content.  Similar  examples  given  by 
Wallhagen include Escher drawings: in these cases, there is what he 
calls the “objective content”, which is the impossible properties that 
 Wallhagen (2007: 554).32
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no objective object could have; yet there is also the “line content”, 
which is perfectly coherent — “there are just lines of certain lengths 
on paper”.  33
That there are such further examples of illusory and veridical 
contents being presented in conscious visual experience, and since 
there  is  nothing  in  the  description  of  the  Ebbinghaus  illusion 
experiment conducted by Milner and Goodale that rules out such 
an interpretation, I suggest that this is a plausible response to such 
results  — that  the  reaching  behaviour  is  dependent  on  veridical 
information that is presented in conscious visual experience. 
Further,  if  one is  convinced by Wallhagen’s  examples  here 
(e.g. the Müller-Lyer lines and the Escher drawings), then it might 
not  even  be  necessary  to  claim  that  the  illusory  and  veridical 
contents  must  be  represented  under  different  modes  of 
presentation. However, since that claim is itself contentious, I will 
not directly argue for it here: the conclusion established by Mole’s 
argument  considered  earlier  is  also  sufficient  to  make  the  point. 
Whether they are presented under different modes of presentation 
or not,  the claim here is that veridical and non-veridical contents 
can be presented in conscious visual experience. 
 Wallhagen (2007: 554, n. 11).33
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In illusion experiments of this kind, the subjects are typically 
assumed to have normal perceptual capacities.  But in the case of 
DF,  frequently  discussed  by  proponents  of  the  Zombie  Action 
argument, we are dealing with a pathological case in which part of 
the  normal  perceptual  system  is  not  functioning.  It  might  be 
thought that the Zombie Action argument is stronger here because 
the  subject  is  (so  it  is  claimed)  physiologically  incapable  of 
consciously  perceiving  shape  and  orientation.  Hence,  there  is 
(apparently)  no  way  that  conscious  perception  of  the  physical 
dimensions of the letterbox could be informing DF’s actions on the 
object, because there is no such perception of those features of the 
object.
However,  we  should  be  very  careful  when  characterising 
what it  is  that DF is supposedly unable to do, before concluding 
that  the Zombie Action view offers  the best  interpretation of  the 
results  of  her  trials  in  the  experimental  situations.  DF  has  the 
condition  known  as  visual  form  agnosia,  which  means  that  she 
performs very poorly at tasks designed to test her sensitivity to the 
physical form of objects (e.g.  shape, orientation, etc.).  In much of 
the  literature,  however,  there  is  very  little  information about  the 
phenomenology  of  her  perceptual  experience.  Indeed,  it  is 
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strikingly hard to imagine what her experience of objects must be 
like,  given  that  she  apparently  retains  the  capacity  to  perceive 
properties  such  as  texture  and  colour,  while  being  apparently 
unable to discern shape or the physical dimensions of the object. 
On the contrary, it would seem that there ought to be some 
basic  sense  in  which  she  is  able  to  perceive  form,  viz.  as  the 
boundary or limit of the coloured, textured areas that we are told 
she is able to perceive. Similarly, we are told that perimetry tests 
indicate  that  her  visual  field is  not,  for  example,  limited to  very 
small regions of space (i.e. such that she is not able to take in the 
boundaries of such objects at all). Certainly, we are not given any 
better explanations of her phenomenology: in the absence of that, 
we should assume that there is some sense in which she is able to 
consciously perceive form. So what is going on in the experimental 
situations?
What we do know about DF’s situation is that she is unable 
to report on the form of the object: she cannot answer questions about 
the form of the object, or indicate the orientation of the object using 
her hands, etc. Note that the claim that she is ‘unable to consciously 
perceive form’ is a much stronger claim than any of these, and is 
not licensed or entailed by any of them.
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The fact that, despite her visual agnosia, she is able to act on 
the object in a way that would require information about physical 
form is taken by proponents of the Zombie argument to be evidence 
that non-conscious ‘Zombie systems’ are controlling the action: but 
this is only a legitimate move if one assumes  the stronger view of 
her condition just noted. Without this assumption, which is  simply 
quite  implausible,  her  ability  to  act  on  the  object  is  perfectly 
consistent  with  the  commonsense  view  according  to  which  her 
conscious perception includes some kind of information about form
—but  which  is,  for  whatever  pathological  reason,  unavailable  for 
report—and which is being used to control the action. Indeed, in the 
absence  of  more  positive  evidence  that  she  clearly  cannot  have 
conscious  experience  of  form  in  any  sense,  this  reading  of  DF’s 
situation is the more plausible one.
Interestingly, in his own positive account of DF’s condition, 
Wallhagen suggests a view according to which her problem is one 
of  knowledge,  not  consciousness.  He  suggests  that  what  is 
problematic about her situation is that she is  unable to bring the 
objects of  her experience ‘under concepts’,  and it  is  this fact  that 
explains her inability to report on the form of objects. In addition, 
he suggests that we appeal to nonconceptual content to explain how 
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DF nonetheless experiences  the form of  objects,  while  at  the same 
time lacking the  conceptual  abilities  just  noted (as  a  result  of  her 
visual agnosia).
While  I  think  it  is  important  to  look  carefully  at  DF’s 
condition before taking it  as supporting evidence for the Zombie 
Action view, the details of Wallhagen’s alternative proposal are less 
convincing.  The  move  seems  to  be  too  quick:  i.e.  that  the 
philosophical claim that DF’s condition should be interpreted as an 
inability to bring objects of experience under concepts is the best 
way  of  characterising  the  effects  of  that  specific  damage  to  the 
ventral  stream.  We  would  need  to  know  much  more  about  the 
relation  between  physical  information  about  the  brain  and  the 
psychological phenomena that we are interested in here before such 
a  conclusion  could  be  plausibly  entertained.  Wallhagen’s 
suggestion raises more philosophically contentious questions than 
it  answers.  In any case,  the salient  point  here is  not  the positive 
proposal about what is going on in DF’s situation, but rather what 
is  not  happening  —  that  is,  the  extent  to  which  experimental 
research  on  her  condition  fails  to  support  the  Zombie  Action 
argument. 
—  !   —288
The problem of this chapter was to show that consciousness 
makes  a  difference  to  behaviour.  I  conclude  that  we  have  good 
reason to believe that  it  does.  The main challenge to this  largely 
commonsense view was the Zombie Action argument,  or various 
forms of it. By contrast, the arguments of this chapter have shown 
that we need not accept the conclusions that the Zombie arguments 
seem to force upon us.  
7Conclusion
7.1 The Problem Reconsidered
I  said  in  the  Introduction  that  this  project  has  two  central 
arguments, one ‘first-order’ and one ‘second-order’. I addressed the 
second-order argument first, concerning the shape of the free will 
problem. I  call  it  a second-order argument because it  is  really an 
argument  about  certain  existing arguments,  i.e.  those  making up 
the ‘free will problem’.
The main thrust of my argument in this regard has been that 
we should stop hanging on to the terminology of ‘free will’,  and 
associated  terms,  and  stop  allowing  it  to  shape  our  ongoing 
perspective of the philosophical problems. My main suggestion was 
to just look at what philosophers substantially disagree over when 
they  disagree  about  free  will:  most  of  the  time  it  is  really  moral 
responsibility  that  is  the  problem.  My  practical  suggestion  was 
simply  to  define  the  term  operationally  as  whatever  those 
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conditions  are  that  an  agent  must  meet  in  order  to  be  morally 
responsible. Then we have a well defined use for the term, and can 
continue to use it. Of course, we don’t need to retain the term at all, 
given my view of things. Whether we should in fact retain the term 
at all is not of direct philosophical concern to me here, but those are 
the options as I see them.
The  interesting  part  comes  when  we  realise  what  this 
conceptual housekeeping has allowed us to see more clearly: that 
there are certain things in the existing literature that aren’t about 
moral  responsibility  at  all,  but  are  about  agency.  So  here  is  an 
important  distinction  that  was obscured,  and that  my perspective 
helps bring into view.
Hence the first-order part of the project is about this concept 
of agency, and how it turns out to play a role in what has come to 
be called ‘the free will problem’. Of course, agency is not a concept 
that is unique to this problem. It has its own burgeoning literature, 
where it is addressed on its own terms. For this very reason, what I 
have said about agency here clearly does not amount to a full-scale, 
novel account of human agency. That would take at least a book on 
its own: the fact is that I have to strike a dialectical balance between 
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actually investigating agency itself, and situating this investigation 
in the context of a larger conceptual claim.
So  although  I  do  make  direct  metaphysical  claims  about 
agency in a non-trivial way, the added disclaimer is that this is of 
necessity only a sketch of a theory of agency. The point has been to 
show  how  there  is  in  fact  a  plausible  account  of  agency  that  is 
consistent  with  the  role  I  identified  for  it  within  the  free  will 
dialectic. 
Looking at  it  from another perspective,  I  am claiming that 
the  structure  of  agency itself  turns  out  to  be  directly  relevant  to 
arguments about free will. It is not therefore possible to investigate 
such ‘free will’ independently of the direct study of agency.
7.2 Causal Integration as Central to Agency
I  have shown how agency is  relevant to the ‘free will  and moral 
responsibility’ debate. I gave two primary examples of cases where 
the  theory  of  agency  is  doing  the  ‘heavy  lifting’  in  certain 
arguments that are putatively about ‘free will’. 
A central notion that came out of these examples was that of 
‘causal  integration’.  I  claimed that  causal  integration  is  a  central 
feature of agency, and showed how it played a role in responding to 
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Pereboom’s  Four  Case  argument,  for  example.  So  the  notion  of 
agency  as  causal  integration  was  central  to  an  argument  against 
Pereboom’s hard incompatibilism.
The  further  challenge  (now  the  first-order  part  of  my 
argument) was to show that this kind of causal integration actually 
is part of a plausible theory of agency. To that end, I sketched the 
outlines of such a theory of agency. The notion of causal integration 
was unpacked further, and I suggested that—at least in the human 
case—agency is a matter of the causal integration of phenomenal 
consciousness,  the  agent’s  intentional  states  (such  as  belief  and 
desire),  and  behaviour.  So,  for  example,  what  goes  wrong  in 
Pereboom’s 4CA is that the agent’s intentional states are rendered 
epiphenomenal, thus breaking the causal integration between them 
and the agent’s behaviour. Hence we do not have an agent at all in 
this  case,  contrary  to  Pereboom’s  own premise.  So  the  argument 
fails to go through, but not because of anything about ‘free will’: it 
fails because it makes assumptions about agency that do not stand 
up to scrutiny.
The  notion  of  causal  integration,  then,  is  my  central 
substantive  claim  about  agency.  In  the  first  instance,  when 
discussing the 4CA, I agreed with Demetriou’s argument when she 
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pointed out that there is something defective about Plum’s agency 
in that case. She had claimed that he was not a ‘causally integrated 
entity’,  and illustrated this  with  the  schematic  diagram that  was 
reproduced above. The point was that Plum’s mental states were 
divorced from the  causation of  his  behaviour  in  a  way that  was 
deeply at  odds with both our commonsense view of agency,  and 
most  philosophical  accounts.  Plum’s  mental  states  were 
epiphenomenal.
What was not said in Demetriou’s argument was what the 
needed causal integration should look like. This is not a criticism of 
the  argument,  given the  context  of  her  discussion of  Pereboom’s 
work. What it does mean is that the rather abstract claim that Plum 
fails  to  be  a  ‘causally  integrated entity’  remains  compatible  with 
many  positive  views  of  what  a  causally  integrated  entity  should 
look like. All that is really suggested is what’s implied by negation: 
we are to assume that an agent’s mental states should  be causally 
connected to his physical behaviour, in a way that Plum’s are not.
I  have  claimed  that  an  agent’s  mental  states  should  be 
causally  connected  to  her  behaviour  in  this  way,  and  that  these 
mental states should be intentional, and roughly as characterised by 
our folk psychology — in short, that intentional realism is true. For 
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that  reason,  I  made  the  case  for  accepting  a  form  of  intentional 
realism,  against  the  challenges  from  eliminativism  and 
instrumentalism.
Strictly speaking, the truth of intentional realism is by itself 
sufficient to satisfy the ‘causal integration’ criterion that I have just 
discussed. For two reasons, however, I did not leave the discussion 
there. Firstly, as part of the discussion in Chapter 4, I claimed that a 
plausible  account  of  agency  also  contains  a  notion  of  subjectivity 
that  is  not  already captured by the  basic  structure  of  intentional 
realism. This was inspired by Helen Steward’s suggestive remark in 
her discussion of the topic, that it is part of our commonsense or 
intuitive  conception  that  an  agent  is  the  ‘centre  of  some form of 
subjectivity’.
Secondly, and more importantly, I claimed that—as a matter 
of fact—we need to bring in the idea of consciousness in order to 
properly  make  the  case  for  intentional  realism.  So  although,  in 
principle, the claim of intentional realism is by itself sufficient for 
causal  integration,  in order to actually get  intentional  realism we 
need to appreciate the role of phenomenal consciousness. And, of 
course,  we  have  independent  reason  to  make  consciousness  a 
necessary part of agency because of the subjectivity claim. 
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The picture of agency that I have sketched here is one that is 
built  around  the  notion  of  causal  integration.  The  two  central 
examples I cited above (the 4CA, and ‘agent causation’) show how 
this notion makes a difference to arguments putatively about ‘free 
will’. I have elaborated on the notion of causal integration to show 
that there is a possible account of agency that takes that notion as its 
central feature. But I have also gone some way to showing that this 
account of agency is a plausible and maybe true account of human 
agency. Even if it is, I have not claimed that it’s a complete account 
of human agency (not to mention non-human agency). In the end, 
the main thrust of my argument here has been that we cannot begin 
to  address  the  ‘free  will  problem’,  such  as  it  is,  without  first 
considering our understanding of agency: at the very least, the two 
are not nearly as independent as has been previously thought.  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